

Criminal (Cartel & Gang) Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas: What you need to know, not what you want to hear

“Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere at the Hearing ‘Has Merida Evolved? Part One: The Evolution of Drug Cartels and the Threat to Mexico’s Governance.’”

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We need this basic premise to be clear—that Mexico is facing something way beyond an organized crime threat. With this as the premise from which it starts, this congressional testimony will posit that the Mérida Initiative as it stands is too myopic in nature given the on-the-ground realities currently present in Mexico. These two contentions will herein be discussed in more detail and their merits supported by evidence from my own work and that of other area and subject specialists. Of necessity, therefore, the testimony will focus upon the broader security environment and the policy and strategic levels of analysis. It integrates writings that I have done previously, both on my own and in collaboration with my colleague John Sullivan and others on this topic. The analysis is divided into two sections addressing, first, the narco (criminal) threat and, then, governmental policies. Each section, in turn, is divided into two main themes. The themes covered in this testimony are as follows:

Narco (Criminal) Threat

- *Increasing cartel and gang evolution towards ‘new warmaking’ entities*
- *The rise of criminal (& spiritual) insurgencies—societal warfare— in Mexico*

Governmental Policies

- *An ongoing cycle of countermoves and unintended consequences (second order effects) stemming from our own and allied governmental policies*
- *The myopic nature of the Mérida Initiative vs the need for a Western Hemispheric Strategy against cartels and gangs*

The testifier's intent by selecting these themes is to better inform the members and staff of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere concerning the Mérida Initiative within the context of the present security environment in Mexico and to some extent in other Central American states of concern. For some Subcommittee members and staff, this testimony might end up being 'what you need to know, not what you want to hear.'

The Narco (Criminal) Threat

Increasing cartel and gang evolution towards 'new warmaking' entities

In many ways, aspects of this testimony are extremely unpleasant since the security environment in Mexico has become so barbarized. We are now witnessing horrendous crimes against humanity undertaken by the cartels and gangs not only against each other but against Mexican government agencies throughout that nation from the local through Federal level and against the public, including innocent children. Over 40,000 individuals have now been killed in this conflict in Mexico alone over the last four-and-a-half years with tens-of-thousands more killed throughout Central America, primarily from the gang warfare and street crime endemic to some locales. In reaction to a series of seemingly endless twitter and social-media feeds graphically describing unfolding events in Mexico which we witnessed on a particular occasion, my colleague John P. Sullivan and I recently described the imagery as follows:

If Dante had been our contemporary, we fear he could just have easily have taken a stroll through some of the cities and towns of Mexico and, using those news feeds, could have substituted the imagery for the circles of hell he described in his early 14th century work the *Divine Comedy*.¹

The primary intent of this testimony is not to forensically dissect the Hobbesian reality on the ground in many regions of Mexico but it must be acknowledged up front in this testimony that torture and beheadings are an everyday occurrence in this conflict, going well beyond the endemic quick and dirty assassinations or engagements between rival cartel/gang forces or between cartel commandos and Mexican police or military forces. For over a decade, ongoing research has been taking place contending that some

street gangs and drug cartels are evolving and, essentially, becoming more sophisticated and deadly organizations as they do so. This research has been published in both academic journals and professional (law enforcement and military focused) publications and is a component of broader future war and conflict research. The main forms of this research are focused on 3rd Generation Gangs (3GEN Gangs), initially conceived by John Sullivan in 1997, and Third Phase Cartels, initially conceived by Robert Bunker and John Sullivan in 1998, in the journal *Transnational Organized Crime*. Other scholars, including Max Manwaring— US Army War College, have extended this research as it pertains to gang generations. Basic overviews of the earlier research model typologies quoted from a forthcoming essay are:

The 3rd generation model— using politicization, internationalization, and sophistication criteria— views the evolution of these gangs as follows:

- **Turf:** *First Generation Gangs* are traditional street gangs with a turf orientation. Operating at the lower end of extreme societal violence, they have loose leadership and focus their attention on turf protection and gang loyalty within their immediate environs (often a few blocks or a neighborhood). When they engage in criminal enterprise, it is largely opportunistic and local in scope. These turf gangs are limited in political scope and sophistication.

- **Market:** *Second Generation Gangs* are engaged in business. They are entrepreneurial and drug-centered. They protect their markets and use violence to control their competition. They have a broader, market-focused, sometimes overtly political agenda and operate in a broader spatial or geographic area. Their operations sometimes involve multi-state and even international arenas. Their tendency for centralized leadership and sophisticated operations for market protection places them in the center of the range of politicization, internationalization, and sophistication.

- **Mercenary/Political:** *Third Generation Gangs* have evolved political aims. They operate—or seek to operate—at the global end of the spectrum, using their sophistication to garner power, aid financial acquisition, and engage in mercenary-type activities. To date, most third generation (3 GEN) gangs have been primarily mercenary in orientation; yet, in some cases they have sought to further their own political and social objectives. A shift from simple market protection to power acquisition is characteristic of third generation activity. A key indicator of gang evolution is internationalization. Transnational gangs in Los Angeles and on the border have been notable in this regard...Third generation

gangs can be considered netwarriors and networked organizational forms contribute to the rise of non-state or criminal-soldiers.^[18 org]

The third phase cartel model—using a number of metrics including organizational form, type of violence/corruption utilized, level of public profiting, product range, technology use, and mercenary use— describes the evolution of these cartels as follows:

• ***1st Phase Cartel (Aggressive Competitor)***: The first phase cartel form originated in Colombia during the 1980s and arose as an outcome of increasing US cocaine demand. This type of cartel, characterized by the Medellín model, realized economies of scale not known to the individual cocaine entrepreneurs of the mid-1970s. This early cartel was an aggressive competitor to the Westphalian state because of its propensity for extreme violence and willingness to directly challenge the authority of the state. The Medellín model, pioneered by Pablo Escobar, was hierarchical and revolved around Escobar as the kingpin...In retrospect, the Medellín model represented a very successful, albeit short lived, form of criminal entity...Their attempt at directly taking on a Westphalian state, politically and militarily, was both organizationally and individually suicidal as witnessed by the successful decapitation of the top Medellín leadership ranks by governmental forces in the early 1990s. Against the resources and legitimacy of the Colombian state, this emerging netwarrior ultimately was crushed.

• ***2nd Phase Cartel (Subtle Co-Opter)***: The second phase cartel form also originally developed in Colombia, but in this instance is centered in the city of Cali. Unlike their Medellín counterparts, the Cali cartel was a shadowy organization and the actual kingpins remained as anonymous as possible. Its organization was more distributed and network based, relying on terrorist-like cell structures, rather than being hierarchical. Many of its characteristics and activities were dispersed and stealth-masked, which yielded many operational capabilities not possessed by the first phase cartel form. Specifically, it possessed leadership clusters that are more difficult to identify and target with a decapitation attack...This cartel form has also spread to Mexico with the rise of the Mexican Federation, an alliance of the “big four” mafias based in Tijuana, Sonora, Juárez, and the Gulf.

• ***3rd Phase Cartel (Criminal State Successor)***: Third phase cartels, if and when they emerge, have the potential to pose a significant challenge to the modern nation-state and its institutions. A Third Phase Cartel is a consequence of unremitting corruption and co-optation of state institutions. While this “criminal state successor” has yet to emerge, warning signs of its eventual arrival are present in many states worldwide. Of current importance to the United States are the conditions favoring narco- or

criminal-state evolution in Mexico. Indeed, the criminal insurgency in Mexico could prove to be the genesis of a true third phase cartel, as Mexican cartels battle among themselves and the state for dominance. Essentially, third phase cartels rule parallel polities or criminal enclaves, acting much like warlords.^[19 org]

Non-state threat groups, such as Los Zetas and La Familia Michoacana, have made for an interesting hybrid case as they have attributes representative of both 3rd generation gangs and 2nd phase cartels, with evolving 3rd phase cartel attributes, that include emergence of forms of spirituality and governance that compete with traditional Mexican state values and political structures.²

It should also be noted at this point that, in the case of the Mexican cartels, these organizations are no longer just narcotics or drug revenue focused. They have evolved to the point that any form of criminality goes as long an illicit market exists for it. If the cartels or gangs can profit from the body part trade or human trafficking (for labor or sexual exploitation), they are increasingly likely to do so. This is especially true for a group such as Los Zetas. Forcing slave laborers to dig drug tunnels and then killing them afterward is not unheard of. As a result, very few people discuss the threat posed by ‘Mexican drug cartels.’ [Note: Even though the bulk of cartel revenue still comes from the sales of illicit narcotics, the term ‘Mexican cartels’ is used due to the polygot nature of these criminal organizations.]

At some point in the recent past, the Mexican cartels (and some gangs) crossed a ‘firebreak’ between our perceptions of what is ‘organized crime’ or even ‘transnational organized crime’ — a criminal threat and law enforcement concern — and what is ‘insurgency’ — a military threat and national security/military concern (though law enforcement plays a partnership role with the military in responding to such a threat). Essentially, we are seeing criminal organizations in Mexico morph into new warmaking organizations. The problem we find ourselves with is that, since the academic disciplines studying these subjects are relatively mature, their prevailing wisdom holds that existing constructs can explain every phenomenon with many disciplines unable or unwilling to recognize that certain phenomena are evolving past what a single discipline can explain or understand. Take, for example, the existing gang and organized crime literature on the security environment in Mexico. Its prevailing perceptual lens dictates

that street gangs engage in petty street crime and that organized criminals engage in organized crime and, therefore, it may fail to recognize important linkages between the two. With due respect to the many esteemed scholars in that area, it is but one of many such disciplines that are stovepiped in structure and thus alone cannot comprehend the true nature of the problem faced by Mexico today.

Rather we must take a multidisciplinary approach and look at other disciplines and analytical tools that we can draw upon to better understand what is taking place in Mexico. In this instance, I have found it fruitful to draw upon the warmaking and statemaking literature that exists. In regard to cartel and gang evolution, the following short excerpt from the essay quoted previously highlights Vanda Felbab-Brown's current thinking concerning competition in state-making and then ties it back to Charles Tilly's earlier groundbreaking work:

It is thus important to stop thinking about crime solely as aberrant social activity to be suppressed, but instead think of crime as a competition in state-making. In strong states that effectively address the needs of their societies, the non-state entities cannot outcompete the state. But in areas of socio-political marginalization and poverty— in many Latin American countries, conditions of easily upward of a third of the population— nonstate entities do often outcompete the state and secure the allegiance of large segments of society.^[21 org]

Implicit in this line of reasoning, though unstated, are parallels to the work of Charles Tilly concerning 'Warmaking and Statemaking as Organized Crime' published in 1985. The agents of states that engage in organized violence focus primarily on four activities:

1. War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories in which they have clear and continuous priority as wielders of force.
2. State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside those territories.
3. Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing the enemies of their clients.
4. Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three activities— war making, state making, and protection.^[22 org]

Historical parallels and lessons learned suggest that early European dynastic states were ruled by leaders, such as Brandenburg under the Hohenzollern warlords of the 15th century, whose initial activities to secure wealth and power, and their later gaining of political legitimacy due to the passing of time in which they possessed lands and resources, were little

different in character than contemporaries personages such as the late Pablo Escobar (Medellin Cartel) and Joaquin ‘El Chapo’ Guzman (Sinaloa Cartel). The Americas are now witnessing the painful birth of new proto-states, branded anathema by the established order, much in the same manner as Europe did as it transitioned from the Medieval to the early Modern era.³

Something very old historically, and at the same time very new, is thus taking place in Mexico. To use a biological metaphor, we are witnessing ‘cancerous organizational tumors’ forming in Mexico both on its encompassing government and its society at large. These tumors have their roots intertwined throughout that nation and, while initially they were symbiotic in nature (like traditional organized crime organizations), they have mutated to the point that they are slowly killing the host and replacing it with something far different. These criminalized tumors draw their nourishment from an increasingly diverse illicit economy that is growing out of proportion to the limited legitimate revenues sustaining the Mexican state. These tumors do not bode well for the health of Mexico or any of its neighboring states.

The rise of criminal (& spiritual) insurgencies—societal warfare— in Mexico

The preceding theme discussed gang and cartel evolution and the eventual rise of new warmaking entities. Al Qaeda is a perfect example of another such entity. Americans have yet to realize that, while Al Qaeda was the first to rise, others are now following. In fact, the 9/11 attack is viewed as both a criminal act and an act of war—utterly confounding for modern states to easily pigeonhole within the context of international law. The US and its allies went to war against Al Qaeda and its allies and are still locked in that global struggle ten years later. Ultimately, the emergence of Al Qaeda, along with many other triggers, has helped to turn our understanding of the nature of war on its head and is forcing security scholars to ask many difficult questions. As these questions get asked (e.g. Can only states engage in war?) , anomalies arise in the security environment triggering more questions (e.g. Why have mercenary armies come back to the battlefield?).

It has been proposed for over two decades now by an increasing body of security scholars (including Martin van Creveld and the 4th Generation and Fourth Epoch

theorists) that the traditional understanding and parameters which define what we call “war” are rapidly becoming obsolete. While they may more or less accurately describe the war presently waged between modern states, they cannot account for the rise of war directed by non-state entities against modern states. Our understanding of this new and developing form of warfare is still somewhat limited.

It has, however, resulted in questions pertaining to the very nature of insurgency being raised. In a forthcoming edited work, my colleague John Sullivan and I contribute an essay discussing the changing nature of insurgency and how scholarly perceptions have been maturing. That essay will be only paraphrased briefly here but its introduction sets the stage for the context within which new forms of insurgency emerge:

The shift of government authority from the state to “para-states” (aka, non-state actors/non-state armed groups or criminal netwarriors) is a consequence of globalization, networked organization, and the exploitation of regional economic circuits to create a new base of power. These new power configurations may result in the decline of the state and new forms of sovereignty/new state forms. As such, criminal gangs and cartels would be acting as new state-making entities.^[6 org] These networked cartels and gangs are challenging the existing power structure(s). Their challenge involves the impact of high levels of violence, barbarism, attacks on journalists,^[7 org] police, and mayors, the use of information operations^[8 org] and, increasingly, the use of what we call social/environmental modification. Social/environmental modification includes the instrumental use of *narcocultura*, including religious cults or spiritual symbolism, to secure legitimacy, justify atrocity, and form social cohesion (in effect, combat power) among criminal soldiers. No longer is insurgency viewed from a purely political or ideological lens; it now has post-modern implications.^[9 org]⁴

Mexico can be considered an initial archetype for two forms of insurgency that were once—as far back as the early 1990s— something just theorized. The first is known as ‘criminal insurgency’ (then known as ‘commercial insurgency’) and the second is known as ‘spiritual insurgency’. Steven Metz, US Army War College, in *The Future of Insurgency* in December 1993 provided much of the conceptual basis of these forms of insurgency. Stephen Sloan, W.G. Thom, and Ralph Peters all contributed early on to the thinking concerning criminal insurgency with John P. Sullivan becoming in 2008 the first scholar to fully articulate the criminal insurgency construct and broadly promote its usage:

Criminal insurgencies are the result of criminal enterprises competing with the state. Their competition is not for traditional political participation within state structures, but rather to free themselves from state control so they can maximize profits from illicit economic circuits. As defined by Sullivan, criminal insurgencies can exist at several levels:^[28 org]

- *Local Insurgencies:* First, criminal insurgencies may exist as ‘local insurgencies’ in a single neighborhood or ‘failed community’ where gangs dominate local turf and political, economic and social life. These areas may be ‘no-go zones’ avoided by the police. The criminal enterprise collects taxes and exercises a near-monopoly on violence. A large segment of the extreme violence in Mexico is the result of ‘local insurgencies.’ Municipalities like Ciudad Juárez or portions of some states, like Michoacán, are under siege. The cartels and other gangs dominate these areas by a careful combination of symbolic violence, attacks on the police, corruption, and fostering a perception that they are community protectors (*i.e.*, ‘social bandits’). Here the criminal gang is seeking to develop a criminal enclave or criminal free-state. Since the nominal state is never fully supplanted, development of a parallel state is the goal. In a federal state, the erosion of control at sub-state levels (municipalities, states or provinces) can marginalize the capacity of the federal entity and create zones of impunity which enhance criminal capacity in other polities.
- *Battle for the Parallel State:* Second, criminal insurgencies may be battles for control of the ‘parallel state.’ These occur within the parallel state’s governance space, but also spill over to affect the public at large and the police and military forces that seek to contain the violence and curb the erosion of governmental legitimacy and solvency that results. In this case, the gangs or cartels battle each other for domination or control of the criminal enclave or criminal enterprise. The battle between cartels and their enforcer gangs to dominate the ‘plazas’ is an insurgency where one cartel seeks to replace the other in the parallel state.
- *Combating the State:* Third, criminal insurgencies may result when the criminal enterprise directly engages the state itself to secure or sustain its independent range of action. This occurs when the state cracks down and takes action to dismantle or contain the criminal gang or cartel. In this case, the cartel attacks back. This is the situation seen in Michoacán where La Familia retaliated against the Mexican military and intelligence services in their July 2009 counterattacks, and the July 2011 battles between Los Caballeros Templar against state forces. Here the cartels are active belligerents against the state.
- *The State Implodes:* Fourth, criminal insurgency may result when high intensity criminal violence spirals out of control. Essentially this would be

the cumulative effect of sustained, unchecked criminal violence and criminal subversion of state legitimacy through endemic corruption and co-option. Here the state simply loses the capacity to respond. This variant has not occurred in Mexico or Central America yet, but is arguably the situation in Guinea-Bissau where criminal entities have transitioned the state into a virtual narco-state. This could occur in other fragile zones if cartel and gang violence is left to fester and grow.⁵

Sullivan has since been actively developing this line of research with some co-writers, the earliest being Adam Elkus, and later this author. Additionally, Bob Killebrew, Jennifer Bernal, Tom Ricks, Juan Castillo, and Hal Brands have also all touched upon this concept in one manner or another. Steven Metz has also revisited the original commercial insurgency construct but his new work articulated in a 2010 conference paper has not been released.

Spiritual insurgency, also originally theorized by Steven Metz, has witnessed less development over the years than his economic based one, but this has significantly changed in the last few years given the darkening situation in Mexico. While Pauletta Otis also wrote on religion and violence for years, it was not until 2009 that Matthew Lauder resurrected the actual construct. Pamela Bunker, Lisa Campbell, and Robert Bunker then wrote on this topic in various combinations in 2010. Their works:

...raised concerns over a real cultural shift in Mexico to a ‘narcocultura’ stemming from societal corruption via the drug cartels and drug culture. Such a cultural shift, it was feared, would result in a spirituality that included a belief in ‘supernatural forms of protection’ and ‘their own higher morality’ by those engaging in narcotics trafficking and concomitant and heinous acts such as torture and beheading.⁶

and that

this insurgency [in Mexico] has at its basis a spiritual, if not religious, component that threatens the underlying foundations of our modern Western value system.⁷

Sullivan was later brought into these writings in 2011 and both forms of insurgency—criminal and spiritual— started to become integrated. Metz did not foresee this possibility in his earlier work but times have since radically changed. These two forms of insurgency when blended together, as we are seeing happen in Mexico, also make a strong case for the perception that societal warfare is now taking

place within that nation. The more advanced cartels and gangs, representative of new warmaking entities, are utilizing environmental modification to change the institutions and structures of Mexican government and society and, in the process, create their own vision of what the human condition and relationships should be. This is much like a street gang—if viewed as a cancerous form of deviant and criminal values—changing a street over time to mirror its own system of twisted norms and codes of behavior wherein graffiti marks the turf, the strong prey on the weak, public spaces such as street corners are taken over, and young girls are viewed as gang property. This process in Mexico is taking place writ large with the rise of a narcocultura. We are seeing the glorification of narco-violence, narco-corruption, narco-songs, narco-mansions, and narco-saints. Where this process is most pronounced is in the territories held by the La Familia cartel, though the Mexican government has been severely targeting its leadership due to the recognition of the extreme threat it represents. Various forms of narcocultura permeate all cartel held territories, even the more secular Sinaloa cartel with its more benign Jesus Malverde spirituality.

Thus, what can be considered more restrained Mexican society is now in a battle for the hearts, minds, and souls of its citizens against a new and deviant form of Mexican society that is on the rise. Ultimately, the bonds and relationships that hold the Mexican government, its people, and the military/police of the state together are under siege by the criminal and spiritual insurgencies taking place. If that were not enough, those cartel and gang insurgent groups have built up parallel narco bonds and relationships to solidify the rise of shadow states within Mexico. They have the money and the coercive power to sustain such a strategy. This results in dual sovereignty arising along with varying mixtures of legitimate and illegitimate structures in the hundreds of ‘zones of impunity’ found across Mexico. No one in these locales know who to trust. Many persons assume dual roles, seeming to representing the Federal government on the one hand and the cartel presently holding local power on the other. Narco (criminal) cities are emerging in Mexico with Nuevo Laredo the largest and most pronounced. In cities not as far gone such as Ciudad Juárez, anarchy reigns with tens of thousands of homes now left vacant and as many as 200,000 people having fled that city.

Warlordism, advanced forms of social banditry, cult-like behaviors, the pervasive use of the bribe (silver) and the threat (lead), and the use of child soldiers have also arisen and blended in such locales. The end result at minimum is a laundry list of horrors related to targeted killings, torture sessions, and beheadings carried out in a secular ‘it’s only business’ manner taking place. Somewhere in the middle, we are seeing the use of fragmentation grenades and car bombs (so far limited), arson to burn out neighborhoods, improvised armored fighting vehicles, and heavier infantry combat weaponry (rocket propelled grenades, anti-tank rockets and .50 cal sniper rifles). At the extreme end of this process, we can now add in sadistic (pleasure killing) and human sacrifice (ritualized killing) taking place. Should these be thought to be an exaggeration, some of the numerous examples of these activities now taking place include:

- The stacking of headless bodies and the staged placement of body parts.
- The staging of a skinned skull resting on severed arms with the victim’s male genitalia held in the palm of one of their hands.
- Decapitated heads left at the tombs of deceased drug lords—implicated as Santa Muerte worshippers— as sacrificial offerings.
- Decapitated heads offered directly to Santa Muerte by her worshippers.
- Victims killed at Santa Muerte altars/shrines.
- The ritual burning of decapitated heads as offerings.
- The removal of the hearts of victims.
- The skinning of victims while alive.
- The castration and then decapitation of victims while alive.
- The desecration of at least one shrine belonging to a more benign Saint with the body parts of the victims strew over it and their heads line up on the roof.
- The use of black candle magic to request that the deity kill one’s enemies.
- The threatening of a kidnap victim at a Santa Muerte altar with divine wrath if they failed to cooperate with their captors.
- The alleged smoking of a victim’s ashes mixed with cocaine in a ‘smoking death’ ritual.
- The likely rise of cannibalistic rituals during cartel-led ‘spiritual’ retreats. ^[8org] 8

While they are unfortunately necessarily graphic, these examples clearly show that something dark and sinister is taking place within the broader security environment.

Mexico even has *Los Caballeros Templarios* (“The Knights Templar”) and *Manos con ojos* (“Hands with Eyes”) now deploying fighters on the battlefield. These groups, breakaways from the La Familia and Beltrán Leyva cartels, are extremely violent and, in the case of the Templarios, have the very real potential of carrying out future

suicide (martyrdom) attacks for god and cartel. I never thought we would contemplate the day when ‘true believers’ from a Mexican cartel would start looking a lot like jihadists fighting for Al Qaeda—instead representing a perverted form of Christianity—but such a day appears very close at hand.

For whatever reason, however, unwillingness still exists by many to call what is taking place in Mexico what it is. Because the insurgencies taking place do not look like traditional Maoist insurgencies, many scholars have summarily discounted them as insurgencies at all. Further, a fight against “organized crime,” as many attempt to label the conflict waging in Mexico, is a politically expedient strategy that benefits the Calderon administration and a term that is less unnerving to an increasingly threatened and demoralized citizenry. It is understandable that the Calderon administration has simply called the cartels and gangs ‘organized criminals’ since it denies them any form of legitimacy. After the recent casino torching and mass murder in Monterrey, his shift to characterizing the perpetrators as ‘terrorists’, though the rhetoric was quickly downplayed, is also understandable due to the horrific nature of the act. Despite the “criminal” label, which would imply a law enforcement response, President Calderon nonetheless introduced ground troops into this conflict with the cartels in December 2006 shortly after his inauguration because Mexico was beginning to lose control over parts of its sovereign territories. Organized criminals represent a law enforcement issue and do not seize control of states, however, insurgents and criminal-soldiers do and this is the reality of what we are witnessing in Mexico. Such seizure of the reigns of power— albeit in the shadows—can take place both purposefully and accidentally but results in the same end state of de facto political control. With the achievement of economic (loads of narcotics money) and military (standing armies of gunmen) power comes the eventual attainment of political power, plain and simple.

It is thus imperative that US Congressional members and their staffs accurately understand the threat Mexico, and some of the Central American states, face. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in September 2010 alluded to an insurgency in Mexico taking place (it kind of looks like Colombia...) as did Undersecretary of the Army Joseph Westphal in February 2011 who actually said it was the case. Both utterances of the “I” word were quickly retracted and apologies made. While the Calderon administration

would prefer that we did not start using the “I” word openly I think we owe it both to the American and Mexican peoples to call it what it is. Failure to properly define what is taking place means that both this threat and its severity will be misdiagnosed and, as a result, the policies enacted to respond to it will be inappropriate and ineffective and Mexico and its allies will spend countless amounts of precious funding on useless mitigating measures.

Still, once we do accept that criminal and spiritual insurgencies are now taking place in Mexico— and even the beginnings of societal warfare between traditional values and narcocultra (an ideological component of the new warkmaking entities)— great problems still exist in regard to past governmental policies enacted. Not only do we have to get the threat right but we also have to get the policies right too. As is covered in the next section, so far this has proved to be a major impediment stretching back decades within the broader cartel and gang threat and illicit narcotics market that exists.

Governmental Policies

An ongoing cycle of countermoves and unintended consequences (second order effects) stemming from our own and allied governmental policies

In creating policies to mitigate and suppress the cartel, gang, and narcotics threat, an ongoing ‘policy spoiler’ effect has taken place representative of an inhibiting action-reaction dynamic. For every move the US and other governments (e.g. Mexico), have made either intentional countermoves and/or unintended consequences (second order effects) have come about. Seven examples of this policy spoiler effect occurring over the course of several decades have been highlighted and are illustrative of what has been taking place:

- 1970-1990: The US victory in the maritime drug war centered in the Gulf/Caribbean resulted in overland (and air and border tunnel) routes through Mexico into the United States becoming dominant. The unintended second order effect was to strengthen the position of the illicit narcotics smugglers (pre-cartel formation) in Mexico.
- 1985-1989: The DEA response (Operation Leyenda) to the death of Enrique ‘Kiki’ Camarena at the hands of Mexican traffickers resulted in ‘El Padrino’ Felix Gallardo in 1987 establishing the *plaza* system as an intentional defensive countermove. This countermove established the cartel system in Mexico, divided

into the Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez, Sonora, Matamoros, and Sinaloa cartels and operated by prominent trafficking families. Prior to that time, the “godfather” was running an illicit business from which the PRI/other Mexican elites were quietly profiting.⁹

- 1981-1996: Colombia was victorious (with US DEA/CIA/military aid) over the Medellin and Cali Cartels. Over the course of this conflict, the power relationship between the Colombian cartels and the new Mexican cartels shifted as the Colombian cartels were eventually dismantled. The unintended second order effect was solidifying the power of the new Mexican cartels.

- 1988: The US Congress enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and thereby made illicit narcotics users accountable for their actions. Prior to this time, sellers were the primary target of US enforcement operations. While some positive benefits have resulted from this policy in that user % rates are down, the unexpected second order effects are the filling of our nation’s federal and state prisons with narcotics offenders (at great economic cost) and the US having gained the dubious distinction of incarcerating more people than any other nation in the world.

- Early through late 1990s: Central American and Mexican gang members living illegally in Los Angeles belonging to Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street were deported back to their home countries, typically as teenagers. Getting rid of these hardcore gang members helped to reduce crime in Los Angeles but resulted in an unexpected second order effect. The maras established themselves in El Salvador, Guatemala, other Central American countries, as well as in Mexico and their members now number in the tens-of-thousands. These gang members and the new members that they recruited then immigrated to the US East Coast and other parts of the United States further spreading the maras in the Western Hemisphere.

- Late 1990s: The use of Mexican special forces to locate and apprehend cartel members resulted in a countermove by the Gulf Cartel. Thirty-one of these elite soldiers were fully corrupted and became the nucleus of the Zetas—initially the enforcer arm of the Gulf Cartel and now an independent cartel in their own right. This countermove resulted in the militarization of all the cartels in response to the Zetas initial ‘battlefield’ dominance. The ensuing arms race is still taking place with cartel use of heavier military weapons and, more recently, improvised armored fighting vehicles (IAFVs). A side effect of this process has been to make local and state Mexican police forces—those not already corrupted by the cartels—totally outclassed in engagements with cartel enforcer and commando units.

- December 2006-Present: Calderon has turned the Mexican military loose on the cartels and, in essence, ‘declares war’. Numerous countermoves and second order effects have taken place—understandable given that the cartels represent

extremely violent, sentient, and formidable opposition forces. One notable countermove by the cartels (primarily from the Zetas and Sinaloa) is their seeking safe haven in Central America. This phenomena, coupled with the growth of the maras in various Central American states, has resulted in a bottom up gang and top down cartel assault on nations such as Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.

The existence of this continuing policy spoiler issue makes perfect sense in hindsight given the intractability of the illicit narcotics market. When governmental policies have been enacted, they are typically directed at only a component (in time, geography and/or market sector) of the broader illicit narcotics market and non-state entities associated with it. It is reminiscent of the ‘squishy balloon’ analogy wherein a balloon when pushed will typically bulge in another area not undergoing immediate pressure. Further, these governmental policies are generally not analytically ‘red-teamed’ or even gamed or analyzed to determine which countermoves and/or unintended consequences (second order effects) could be projected as a likely outcome. The creation of governmental policy thus exists in a ‘strategic vacuum’ and does not benefit from the larger historical context of what has been taking place in the Western Hemisphere. Even when a well thought out strategy is actually utilized, as in the case of maritime battle against illicit narcotics coming through the Gulf/Caribbean region, it only pushes the problem into unexpected areas or creates fundamentally new problems in its wake. The rise of the Maras in Central America and Los Zetas in Mexico are but two examples of the latter.

Decades of policy formulation and implementation in this arena, however well-intentioned, suggest that the complex and adaptive illicit markets and evolving threats that we have been facing, on the whole, have not been severely challenged by our efforts. While we can agree that Colombia is now better off than it was in the 1980s when besieged by the Medellin and Cali cartels, that Miami is much quieter with Colombian operatives no longer fighting for market share, and that African American gangs (such as the Crips and Bloods) are no longer openly fighting in some of our inner cities over crack distribution, instead we find that Mexico, a number of states in Central America (including Honduras, Guatemala, and increasingly Belize), and the US Southern Border are now imperiled. Certain areas, including entire cities, are no longer under the

The myopic nature of the Mérida Initiative vs the need for a Western Hemispheric Strategy against cartels and gangs

Because of the inhibiting action-reaction ‘policy spoiler’ dynamic, derived from either intentional countermoves and/or unintended consequences (second order effects) identified previously, the Mérida Initiative which this hearing is focusing upon should be considered—devoid of any link to a more encompassing strategy— too myopic in scope to be of any lasting benefit in our response to the cartel/gang threats and illicit narcotics market that we have been facing. A far more encompassing approach must be undertaken. In an earlier *Narcos Over the Border* (Routledge 2011) work, this author identified six trans-operational environments within which the US is now engaging the cartels and gangs. An initial description of these environments from that work is as follows:

US Engagement in Trans-Operational Environments

A component of the strategic threat that the Mexican cartels and their associated mercenary and gang affiliates pose to the US is the numerous operational environments in the Western Hemisphere in which they are now being engaged. These six trans-operational environments can be viewed in Table 4. These operational environments can be characterized by the environment itself, the location of the physical threat, the narco-opposing force (NARCO-OPFOR), a typology of the criminal-combatants engaged, and the US responding forces. The most basic environment is that of crime taking place within the US. Local and state law enforcement respond to the threats that exist in this environment— threats which are basically low level street and prison gangs and individual members of the Mexican cartels. The next environment type is that of high intensity crime taking place in the US. This threat is derived from more organized entities such as the Mexican cartels themselves and actual drug trafficking gangs who have access to better weapons and employ more sophisticated tactics. The responding forces are specialized law enforcement units and task forces and federal law enforcement agencies such as the DEA, FBI, and ATF.

The third operational environment is characterized by threats to US homeland security. This is a new environment that has been created in response to the 9-11 attacks and is focused on protecting the US from threats of terrorism and insurgency taking place within its borders. The primary responding forces are drawn from federal law enforcement agencies and components of the still relatively new Department of Homeland Security. Some specialized units created by the larger cities,

especially New York and Los Angeles, will also be operating in this environment though, from a support and consequence management perspective, all levels of law enforcement and other responder groups will also be involved. The next operational environment is homeland defense support against terrorism and insurgency taking place on US soil. The military corollary to homeland security with the operating environment and response requirements also articulated since the 9-11 attacks. The creation of US Northern Command and US Army North are integral components of the federal military response with these entities presently providing a stability and support and consequence management support role due to *Posse Comitatus*.

The fifth operational environment is found in Mexico and Latin America and pertains to foreign military support. Specifically the US military is providing allied military forces, predominately the Colombian and Mexican militaries, with the training, resources, and hardware necessary to respond to the drug cartels who are waging campaigns of narco-terrorism and narco-insurgency throughout large swaths of Latin America. This response from the US side falls predominantly upon US Northern Command and US Army North in regards to Mexico and US Southern Command and US Special Forces in regards to Latin America. The final operational environment is also primarily found in Mexico and Latin America. It pertains to foreign law enforcement support to allied nations facing what is generally considered to be an operational environment challenged by cartel, mercenary, and gang generated high intensity crime. Federal law enforcement agencies and specialized law enforcement units, such as Los Angeles based gang task forces, are principally involved in providing this foreign support.

Of concern with regard to the trans-operational environments the US is engaging in is the lack of any form of comprehensive hemispheric strategy coordinating these multiple efforts. Because the threats are principally non-state, criminal, and more networked than hierarchical in nature, they continue to defy US national security perceptions. This should be somewhat of an amazing occurrence given the recent passing of the 8th anniversary of 9-11 but ultimately it is not. The US response to the threats posed by the Mexican (and Colombian) cartels and their mercenary and gang associates is being responded to in a federally mandated ‘stove pipe’ manner. This is the process the US followed for decades during the Cold War—though an overarching strategy existed— and ultimately yielded victory over the Soviet Union. This same process is now being taken into the 21st Century and applied to very different types of threats. In this new conflict in the Americas, we are still very much in the opening rounds so caution concerning the future is warranted. At the very minimum, the US critically needs an organizing hemispheric strategy to be developed which coordinates the current ‘stove pipe’ response.^[39 org] More than likely, however, given the fundamentally different nature of the new non-state threats and opposing networks (the NARCO-OPFOR) developing in the

Americas, a hemispheric strategy combined with a new process, drawing upon network response capabilities, will be required to meet this new challenge— a war this author views will be fought over humanity’s new forms of social and political organization.¹⁰

Table 4. Six Trans-operational Environments

Table 4. Trans-operational environments involving US engagement with Mexican cartels, mercenaries and Sureños gangs

Operational environment	Crime	High intensity crime	Homeland security (terrorism and insurgency)	Homeland defense (terrorism and insurgency)	Foreign military support (terrorism and insurgency)	Foreign law enforcement support (high intensity crime)
Physical threat location	United States	United States	United States	United States	Mexico Latin America	Mexico Latin America
NARCO-OPFOR	Street and prison gangs, individual cartel members	Mexican cartels, street and prison gangs	Mexican cartels, Mexican/US street and prison gangs	Mexican cartels, Mexican/US street and prison gangs	Mexican and Colombian cartels, Latin American street and prison gangs	Mexican and Colombian cartels, street and prison gangs
Criminal-combatant Typology	1 st GEN. gangs, individual members of more advanced gangs or cartels and mercenary groups	1 st -2 nd phase cartels, 2 nd GEN. gangs	2 nd -3 rd phase (emergent) cartels, 3 rd GEN. gangs, narco-terrorists, narco-insurgents, narco-mercenaries, criminal-soldiers	2 nd -3 rd phase (emergent) cartels, 3 rd GEN. gangs, narco-terrorists, narco-insurgents, narco-mercenaries, criminal-soldiers	1 st -3 rd phase (emergent) cartels, 3 rd GEN. gangs, narco-terrorists, narco-insurgents, narco-mercenaries, criminal-soldiers	1 st -3 rd phase (emergent) cartels, 2 nd GEN. gangs
US responding Forces	Local and state law enforcement	Special LE units and task forces and federal law enforcement (DEA, FBI, ATF)	Federal law enforcement (DEA, FBI, ATF), Department Of Homeland Security (DHS)	US Northern Command, US Army North	US Northern Command, US Army North, US Southern Command, US Special Forces	Special LE units and task forces and federal law enforcement (DEA, FBI, ATF)

Source: ©Counter-OPFOR Corporation, September 2009.

Another way of characterizing the more encompassing threat is derived from viewing the Mexican cartel debate through five fields of security studies. The author wrote an essay in February 2011 in *Small Wars Journal* addressing this issue:

Divergent Fields of Security Studies

Five primary fields of security studies are presently engaged, to one extent or another, in research and publication on the Mexican cartel phenomena and on the threat that this phenomena poses to that country, to the United States, and to other Western Hemispheric nations. Each field of security study will be summarized and its major assumptions, concerns, and authors highlighted:^[1 org]

- *Gang Studies*: These studies fall primarily under the disciplines of sociology and criminal justice. Law enforcement practitioners in gang units, such as Wes McBride (Sgt. LASD, Ret), and university academics have long dominated this field. This field focuses on generic street and drug gangs, prison gangs, geographically focused (e.g. New York, Chicago, Los Angeles) gangs, specialized ethnic (e.g. Hispanic, African American) gangs and gender (female) gangs. Gangs with more organized structures— such as Asian and Outlaw Motorcycle— also fall into this field with some overlap into organized crime studies. The basic

assumption is that street, drug, and prison gangs engage in low intensity crime activities and therefore they are a local law enforcement problem—though regional and national gang investigators associations have emerged for information sharing and coordination purposes due to the spread of these groups throughout the United States...

- *Organized Crime Studies*: This field, which covers both domestic and transnational (or global) organized crime, draws normally upon the disciplines of political science, history, and criminal justice. Organized criminal organizations and illicit economies are the center focus of these studies. It should be pointed out that the Mexican cartels are still drawing the bulk of their resources presently from illicit narcotics sales, but have also branched out into numerous other illicit endeavors including human trafficking, kidnapping, and street taxation. The basic assumption of this field is that organized crime entities seek to establish a parasitic (and symbiotic) relationship with their host state(s) and simply obtain freedom of actions for their illicit activities. Such criminal entities are viewed as solely money making endeavors, are not politicized, and have no intention of creating their own shadow political structures or taking over the reigns of governance. These studies view organized crime as the purview of law enforcement with specialized units (i.e. FBI and DEA task forces) required to dismantle the more sophisticated and dangerous criminal organizations. The conflict environment is said to be that of crime or organized crime with the extreme operational environment now found in Mexico being labeled as that of ‘high intensity crime’...

- *Terrorism Studies*: This field of studies emerged out of the late 1960s— as urban guerillas became politically motivated terrorists— with initial terrorism courses taught in the mid-to-late 1970s in political science and international relations departments. This field has had its assumptions shift from limited levels of violence utilized and the use of kidnappings as theater plays; hence “terrorists want lots of people watching not dead”^[3 org] to religiously motivated terrorists who seek to engage in killing on a mass scale. The basic assumption is that terrorists, both politically and religiously motivated, engage in destructive attacks that generate -terror (a form of disruptive societal targeting) in order to change governmental policies. Further, terrorism is considered a technique that, when utilized in a revolutionary or insurgent setting, can help to create a shadow government and/or overthrow a government in power. Narco-terrorism would be considered a subfield of terrorism studies— though utilizing terror to promote criminal objectives. To date, many of the best and brightest terrorism scholars— except for Brian Jenkins who possesses insurgency expertise from the Vietnam era— have not made an attempt to engage in this area of research as it pertains to the cartels in Mexico. Depending on its severity and where it takes place, terrorism can be

considered a law enforcement problem, a homeland security problem, and/or a military problem...

- *Insurgency Studies*: These studies are politico-military based and undertaken at think tanks, in some university departments, and at U.S. military and governmental institutions...and get us into topical areas including revolutionary warfare, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, low intensity conflict, operations other than war, shadow governmental structures, and a host of other terms for this level of conflict and/or techniques. Since terrorism is also common as an insurgency technique, some bleed over from this field to terrorism studies exists as do some forays into organized crime studies, due to the benefits illicit economies provide to insurgents (for example, we might ask where the Taliban would be without its illicit narcotics income). This field predates Mao Zedong's works of the late 1930s and has been developing for over a half-century with key interest during the Vietnam era. The field is especially vibrant now with American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan-Pakistan. Assumptions and concerns focus on political change and revolution, that is, how groups out of power in a country seize control of a government by indirect and irregular means not conventional military conquest. The latter may, however, be considered the final phase of revolutionary warfare so clearly the techniques used vary widely. Insurgency itself, if allowed to gain strength, is viewed as a national security threat to a state. This field of study is undergoing its own internal debate concerning the primacy of political based insurgency vs. broadening the definition of insurgency to include other forms derived from religion and/or criminality. The threat posed by the Mexican cartels encompasses this internal debate and raises the question as to whether Mexico is or is not facing "criminal insurgencies"...

- *Future Warfare Studies*: The areas of military and strategic studies, political science, international relations, and military history (via trend analysis) have all contributed to the study of future warfare. This form of study assumes that -modes of warfare or -coherent warfare practices exist and that warfare is continually evolving. Typically, this is attributed to the introduction of new forms of technology (such as the stirrup or gunpowder), an expansion of the battlespace into new temporal and spatial dimensions (such as the domain of cyberspace), or the rise of new military organizational forms (such as the legion or modern divisional structure). Multivariate explanations for the evolution of warfare also readily exist in this field of study. The threat represented by the Mexican cartels would therein be considered part of a modal warfare shift. This shift would, at a minimum, elevate the threat the Mexican cartels represent to that of a national security threat as the cartels would be engaging in a new form of warfare against the Mexican state—though a

number of scholars would argue such a threat transcends national security and represents a threat to the nation-state form itself...¹¹

The Mérida Initiative from a Western Hemispheric Strategy perspective currently only exists in two trans-operational environments (primarily in Mexico via US military and law enforcement foreign support—the 5th and 6th operational environments) and mainly within only some of the security fields—probably only gangs and organized crime and possibly terrorism to some extent. Mexican political authorities have fully rejected the notion that a criminal insurgency is actually taking place in their country and the conflict as an element of emergent forms of future warfare based on new warmaking entities challenging the nation-state form is a totally alien concept to their present thinking.

The Mérida Initiative as presently articulated is simply too myopic to do much good by itself—it misses much of the bigger threat picture that exists. On its own, it will only help to promote the ‘squishy balloon’ phenomena or result in additional cartel countermoves and/or unintended consequences taking place. The Mérida Initiative thus needs to evolve—or more accurately the Mérida Initiative, Plan Colombia, and increasing levels of US aid to Central America (about \$300 million in 2011) need to be merged together into nucleus of a more encompassing Western Hemispheric Strategy. That strategy, as this testifier argued in 2010, needs to be part of a new strategic imperative for the United States which requires the realignment of our national threat perceptions:

The drug cartels and narco-gangs of the Americas, with those in Mexico of highest priority, must now be elevated to the #1 strategic threat to the United States. While the threat posed by Al Qaeda, and radical Islam is still significant, it must be downgraded presently to that of secondary strategic importance. Europe, due to the threat derived from changing demographics, larger numbers of citizens radicalized, and proximity to Islamic states, many of which contain Islamist insurgent forces, will continue to identify the threat of radical Islam as their #1 strategic imperative and should be allowed to take the opportunity to share, if not take the strategic lead, in this important area of concern. The recently heightened tensions in Europe with the threat of Mumbai style attacks directed at a number of its capital cities are indicative of the mandate which should now be provided to allied states such as Great Britain, France, and Germany and that of the more encompassing

European Union. The US must help defend the line in Europe against terrorist attack, the imposition of Sharia law, and other threats to the social organization of our allies such as the disenfranchisement of women, while acknowledging for the immediate future, we have ignored for too long a new type of threat which has arisen far closer to home.¹²

In sum, due to the evolution of cartels and gangs into new warmaking entities, the rise of new forms of criminal and spiritual insurgencies promoting societal warfare, and the ongoing cycle of countermoves and unintended consequences confounding our own and allied governmental policies, the Mérida Initiative, and others like it directed at Colombia and Central America, need to evolve to a more encompassing scope and scale and with a greater sense of strategic urgency than most Congressional policy makers might *a priori* think is necessary.

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Notes

1. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, "Extreme Barbarism, a Death Cult, and Holy Warriors in Mexico: Societal Warfare South of the Border?" *Small Wars Journal*. 22 May 2011, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/societal-warfare-south-of-the-border>.
2. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, "Integrating feral cities and 3rd phase cartels/3rd generation gangs research: the rise of criminal (narco) city networks and BlackFor." Robert J. Bunker, ed., "Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War" special issue of *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. Vol. 22, No. 5, 2011 (*Forthcoming*).
3. *Ibid.*
4. John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker. "Rethinking insurgency: criminality, spirituality and societal warfare in the Americas." Robert J. Bunker, ed., "Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War" special issue of *Small Wars & Insurgencies*. Vol. 22, No. 5, 2011 (*Forthcoming*).
5. *Ibid.*
6. Pamela L. Bunker, Lisa J. Campbell, and Robert J. Bunker, "Torture, beheadings, and narcocultos." Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Narcos Over the Border*. London: Routledge, 2011: 172.
7. Pamela L. Bunker and Robert J. Bunker, "The Spiritual Significance of ¿Plata O Plomo?" *Small Wars Journal*. 27 May 2010, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-spiritual-significance-of-%C3%A2%C2%BFplata-o-plomo>.
8. See Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan, "Extreme Barbarism, a Death Cult, and

- Holy Warriors in Mexico: Societal Warfare South of the Border?” This listing has been updated via incidents posted at *Borderland Beat* and *Blog del Narco*. The initial concerns over cannibalism arise from George Grayson, *La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security*. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 13 December 2010, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/people.cfm?authorID=797>. Recently rumors of the now deceased cartel leader Arturo Beltran Leyva dabbling in cannibalism have also been made. See Vanessa Grigoriadis and Mary Cuddehe, “An American Drug Lord in Acapulco.” *Rolling Stone Magazine*, 25 August 2011, <http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/an-american-drug-lord-in-acapulco-20110825>.
9. For the origins of the plaza system in Mexico see Malcolm Beith, *The Last Narco*. New York: The Grove Press, 2010: 40-55.
 10. Robert J. Bunker, “Strategic threat narcos and narcotics overview.” Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Narcos Over the Border*. London: Routledge, 2011: 21-24.
 11. Robert J. Bunker, “The Mexican Cartel Debate: As Viewed Through Five Divergent Fields of Security Studies.” *Small Wars Journal*. 11 February 2011, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-mexican-cartel-debate>.
 12. Robert J. Bunker, “The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift From Iraq/Afghanistan to Mexico/The Americas and the Stabilization of Europe.” *Small Wars Journal*. 6 October 2010, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-us-strategic-imperative-must-shift>.

**United States House of Representatives
Committee on Foreign Affairs**

“TRUTH IN TESTIMONY” DISCLOSURE FORM

Clause 2(g) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives and the Rules of the Committee require the disclosure of the following information. A copy of this form should be attached to your written testimony.

1. Name: Dr. Robert J. Bunker	2. Organization or organizations you are representing: Small Wars Journal El Centro
3. Date of Committee hearing: 13 September 2011	
4. Have you received any Federal grants or contracts (including any subgrants and subcontracts) since October 1, 2008 related to the subject on which you have been invited to testify? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No	5. Have any of the organizations you are representing received any Federal grants or contracts (including any subgrants and subcontracts) since October 1, 2008 related to the subject on which you have been invited to testify? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
6. If you answered yes to either item 4 or 5, please list the source and amount of each grant or contract, and indicate whether the recipient of such grant was you or the organization(s) you are representing. You may list additional grants or contracts on additional sheets. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, Tampa, FL, for 25–27 August 2009. Amount: Travel costs only; I was the recipient. United States Army North (Fifth Army), San Antonio, TX, for 21 July 2009. Amount: Travel costs + \$1000.00 honorarium; I was the recipient.	
7. Signature: 	

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