U.S. POLICY TOWARD NIGERIA: WEST AFRICA'S TROUBLED TITAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

JULY 10, 2012

Serial No. 112–184

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

74–961PDF WASHINGTON : 2012

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, *Chairman*

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
RON PAUL, Texas
MIKE PENCE, Indiana
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
CONNIE MACK, Florida
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas
TED POE, Texas
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio
DAVID RIVERA, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
DENNIS CARDOZA, California
BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
KAREN BASS, California
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, *Staff Director*
RICHARD J. KESSLER, *Democratic Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, *Chairman*

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
ROBERT TURNER, New York

KAREN BASS, California
RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida

CONTENTS

Page

WITNESSES

The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State 6
The Honorable Earl Gast, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development 19
Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, president, Christian Association of Nigeria 43
Darren Kew, Ph.D, associate professor, McCormack Graduate School, University of Massachusetts Boston 49
Mr. Anslem John-Miller, U.S. Representative, Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) 57

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement 10
The Honorable Earl Gast: Prepared statement 21
Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor: Prepared statement 46
Darren Kew, Ph.D: Prepared statement 52
Mr. Anslem John-Miller: Prepared statement 59

APPENDIX

Hearing notice 66
Hearing minutes 67
The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Missouri: Prepared statement 68
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, to the Honorable Johnnie Carson 69
Written responses from the Honorable Johnnie Carson 70
Written responses from the Honorable Earl Gast to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith 77
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith to Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor 82
Written responses from Darren Kew, Ph.D., to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith 83
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith to Mr. Anslem John-Miller 87

U.S. POLICY TOWARD NIGERIA: WEST AFRICA'S TROUBLED TITAN

TUESDAY, JULY 10, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m., in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SMITH. Good afternoon and welcome. Today's hearing will examine U.S. policy and policy options for managing relations with Nigeria in light of concerns on terrorism and social and political unrest. The stability of the Nigerian Government is critical to regional, continental and global interests. Nigeria is hugely important on many fronts. Nigeria, Africa's largest producer of oil and its largest democracy is one the United States Government's key strategic partners on the continent. It is Africa's most populous country with more than 155 million people, roughly half Muslim and half Christian, and its second largest economy. Nigeria supplies over three times the volume of imports to the United States as Angola, the second leading U.S. import supplier. The United States receives nearly 20 percent of our petroleum exports from Nigeria. Consequently, Nigeria's stability is of critical interest for the U.S. economy and American policy interests.

Attacks by the Nigerian Islamic group Boko Haram on Christians, including attacks launched this past weekend, are absolutely unprovoked and they are unconscionable. People of all faiths and all people of goodwill must demand immediate action against the terrorist organization.

According to the Catholic News Agency, EWTN News, and I quote,

> "Archbishop Ignatius A. Kaigama is concerned over the seemingly endless violence against Christians that claimed at least 58 lives this past weekend and hundreds of others in recent weeks. It is 'our prayer that something definitive will be done to stop the situation that is inhuman,' the Archbishop of Jos, Nigeria and Nigerian Bishops' Conference president said. In a July 9 interview with Vatican Radio, Archibishop Kaigama said that the violence against Christian villages 'doesn't seem to stop.' Although he was recently awarded the Institute for International Research's annual peace building award, the

> archbishop said he and his priests are discouraged by the silence of foreign governments surrounding the violence in Nigeria. A peaceful resolution 'cannot be left to just one country,' the archbishop said, urging a 'collective effort.'"

Boko Haram, as we all know, reportedly is in league with al-Qaeda in the Mahgreb, and is involved at some level with Tuareg rebels in northern Mali, Islamists in Somalia, and possibly even the Taliban in Afghanistan.

In addition to its well publicized attack on Christians in Nigeria, Boko Haram has been involved in murdering those they consider moderate Muslims or Muslims collaborating with the Central Government or the West, including several Muslim clerics, the leader of the All Nigeria People's Party and the brother of Shehu of Borno, a northern Muslim religious leader. There are reports that some northern Nigerian leaders may be supporting Boko Haram in some way as a leverage against a government that they oppose.

U.S. policy toward Nigeria must also take into account ethnic, religious and political changes the Nigerian Government faces outside of the Boko Haram dynamic. Furthermore, development deficits in Nigeria have had unequal impacts on various minority groups such as Nigeria's Delta region. This lack of attention to equitable development in Nigeria has led to violent uprisings that do not appear to be resolved in any part of the country, certainly not in the Niger Delta.

In Nigeria, President Goodluck Jonathan is considered to be the personification of his name, a fortunate politician who has been in the right place at the right time to enable him to enjoy a meteoric rise in politics with no perceived political base or political distinction in his relatively brief career. He was an obscure government employee before he entered politics in 1998, and a year later was elected Deputy Governor of the Bayelsa State. Except for his success in negotiations with his fellow Ijaws in the troubled Delta region, he served until he became the Governor of Bayelsa State, after his predecessor was impeached on corruption charges in 2005.

Outgoing President Obasanjo selected the then-Governor Jonathan to be the People's Democratic Party's Vice Presidential candidate with Umaru Yar'Adua, a Presidential candidate from the North, in the 2007 elections. Yar'Adua was ill for much of his time in office, and Jonathan was called on to exercise presidential authority from November 2009 when Yar'Adua was unable to do so. The Nigerian power brokers accepted Jonathan as official Acting President in February 2010. Jonathan did surprise people, they didn't think he would do this, when he announced in September 2010 that he had consulted widely throughout Nigeria and would actually run for President. President Jonathan won the election convincingly but his People's Democratic Party lost seats in the Senate and the House of Representatives, and PDP now holds four fewer governorships, down to 23 of 36.

In October 2010, the Jonathan administration called for the fuel subsidy to be removed. The government's decision was met with demonstrations and strikes by national unions. But while the unions agreed to end strikes and protests, the Joint Action Forum, a civil society affiliate of the unions, continued protest for a time throughout the country. The government responded with what

human rights groups charge was excessive force. In northern Kano State, a student was shot to death in the course of breaking up a rally.

In addition to the resentment caused by government brutality in dealing with the large youth-led fuel subsidy protests, high unemployment, resentment over perceived government corruption, and mismanagement and experience in organizing social protests may yet have a lasting impact on Nigerian politics and society.

The issues of excessive government force in the Niger Delta, northern Nigeria and other areas of the country over several past governments in Nigeria have fed resentment. Combined with the northern political opposition, the increasing resistance by minorities and the civil society political revolt, the Jonathan administration faces significant forces arrayed against it. The questions our Government must answer, will this government withstand its opposition and what can we do to help Nigeria remain Africa's essential nation?

I would like to yield to my friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, for any opening comments she might have.

Ms. BASS. Well, once again Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your continued leadership and attention toward the African continent and on holding today's hearing on Nigeria, one of our country's most important strategic partnerships in the region.

We all know that Africa's most populous nation with a wealth of natural resources, Nigeria has much to offer the continent, our country and the world. Over the last 6 years, Nigeria has experienced an average growth rate in GDP of nearly 7 percent, due in most part to the fact that Nigeria is Africa's largest oil producer and one of the top U.S. suppliers of oil. It said that oil and gas production account for 95 percent of export earnings. The Congressional Research Service reports that U.S. imports account for over 40 percent of Nigeria's total crude oil export, making the United States Nigeria's largest trading partner.

It is clear that the United States and Nigeria have a unique partnership that links our two nations in important and meaningful ways. However, despite all that Nigeria has to offer, Nigeria continues to be challenged by a host of social, political, economic and security issues that stymy its full emergence as one of the continent's brightest stars.

Just over a year since Presidential elections, President Jonathan continues to press for much-needed reforms, and it is my hope that he will move expeditiously on a path of reform that addresses endemic corruption in and outside of government, and that these reforms focus on transparency and accountability at all levels. President Jonathan must also address some of the most enduring tensions that divide ethnic groups in the north and south and that also cut across religious lines.

Too many Nigerians have lost their lives and sadly more hang in the balance if President Jonathan and his administration do not address social-economic development and land rights issues as part of the root causes of these tensions. This includes continued efforts to strengthen the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the lead body established to address fraud and corruption. I would ap-

preciate the witnesses providing an update on the Jonathan administration's efforts to address corruption.

We are also aware that Boko Haram continues down a path of violence and disruption, and poses serious threats to peace and stability in Nigeria and can be a destabilizing element throughout the region, especially if its ties to AQIM are continued. Just 2 weeks ago, AFRICOM's General Ham commented that Boko Haram and AQIM are likely sharing guns, training and explosive materials. I would appreciate the witnesses providing their perspectives on the present-day makeup of Boko Haram.

Does the core group number just in the hundreds? Is the group susceptible to fracturing of its leadership away from building ties with al-Qaeda? I will be particularly interested to hear your remarks, Assistant Secretary Carson, on what diplomatic efforts show signs of positive progress with the Nigerian Government to effectively address Boko Haram's strength and position. And I would appreciate greater clarity about designating Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization.

Is there the potential for Boko Haram to be further emboldened and given greater legitimacy with an official designation? And most important, how do we address the root causes of Boko Haram's grievances without ostracizing other groups and communities in regions where the social and economic and political realities are equally challenging?

On another note, and changing subjects a bit, I do want to acknowledge that Nigeria is a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance with aid topping $625 million in Fiscal Year 2012. Nigeria is also a participant in the State Department's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, a successful program that has increased border protection and regional counterterrorism capabilities and coordination.

Additionally, while 90 percent of exports from Nigeria are AGOA-eligible, I hope that as we look to the future of AGOA, with which many of my colleagues in both the House and Senate have been involved, we will see a broader diversification of other goods and services that can also take advantage of AGOA opportunities.

Lastly, as we continue to deal with the vast array of complex social, political, economic and security challenges, we must remember the serious environmental issues faced by those in the Niger Delta. Environmental degradation and health hazards have depressed a once vibrant area. I specifically want to point out the problem with Nigeria's oil fields lacking the infrastructure to capture and transport natural gas, and the government unsuccessfully stopping the flaring gas at oil wells.

My question to you is, what happens at wells operated by U.S. companies? Have they addressed this problem? If not, why not, and if so, are they able to assist the Nigerian Government in addressing this issue? I raise this as a question for this hearing because we are all aware that the social and economic conditions are the root causes of the topic that we are discussing today.

Thank you, and I look forward to today's witnesses testimonies.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Ms. Bass.

Mr. Turner?

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I would just have one series of questions for the witness, Mr. Carson. The nondesignation of Boko Haram as an FTO, it has been pressed, this designation has been pressed by the FBI, the Department of Justice, Homeland Security. There is a bill in the Senate with Senator Brown. There is a bill in the House. This group has attacked the U.N. There have been over 1,000 deaths attributed to it. Their attacks have been very pointed on religious grounds, on Christmas, on Easter, attacking Christian churches.

And as I have researched this, the only recommendations seem to be that this would make life a lot easier here if it was designated, Boko Haram, as a foreign terrorist organization. And in view of the proactive interdepartmental efforts against terrorism since 9/11, it would seem this would be the logical thing to do, yet it is not. So I would like to get a better understanding of the rationale. It has been blocked by the State Department and the State Department only. So that would be my single question. Thank you.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Turner.

The chair recognizes the vice chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Fortenberry.

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening this hearing today to focus on the U.S. policy toward Nigeria, which as our distinguished witness, Assistant Secretary Carson, has described as probably the most important country in sub-Saharan Africa. As Africa's second largest economy and one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid on the African continent, Nigeria has made a notable transition to democracy after decades of military rule since the nation's independence in 1960. In its recent 2011 Presidential elections, however imperfect, they were widely viewed as credible and seen as foundational for further development of Nigeria's nascent civil society institutions.

However, serious problems demand our attention. A collection of photographs recently published in the Washington Post under the headline, Forgotten Conflicts, highlighted Nigeria's Niger Delta region which has yet to emerge from a vicious cycle of environmental degradation and militancy and remains largely unaccessible to outside observers. Also, a long-standing rivalry between the North and South punctuated by ethnic and sectarian tensions has resulted in the loss of more than 13,000 lives since 1999. Brutal attacks on minority Christian communities in Nigeria illustrate why the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom recommended that Nigeria be classified as "a country of particular concern" and then considered the potential for regional destabilization as radical elements within Nigeria potentially linked with global terrorist organizations.

Even as reform efforts have developed under President Jonathan, which offer encouragement, Nigeria's future trajectory will depend upon how effectively the root sources of instability within that society are managed.

Unfortunately we are being called away from a vote, so Secretary Carson, I am going to state one question now and if I am not in attendance, if you could potentially try to address it when we return. How do you see the future of reconciliation and evaluate the national government's efforts to address the grievances of commu-

nities in the Nigerian Delta, such as the Ogoni community? Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Fortenberry.

Ambassador Johnnie Carson has been a frequent witness for this subcommittee. He currently serves as Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs, a position he has held since May of '09. Ambassador Carson has a long and distinguished career in public service including 37 years in the Foreign Service including time as our Ambassador to Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

Ambassador Carson has also served as the staff director of this subcommittee and as a Peace Corps volunteer in Tanzania. Ambassador Carson is also the recipient of numerous awards for his service in the State Department.

Earl Gast—welcome back—is making his second appearance before our subcommittee, and it is nice to see him again. He is USAID's Assistant Administrator for Africa and has a 21-year career working at USAID in leading development programming, especially in post-conflict and transitioning societies.

Prior to this position, Mr. Gast served in Afghanistan, Colombia, Eastern Europe and Rome. Mr. Gast was also one of the first USAID employees stationed in Iraq. He played an equally important role in developing the post crisis strategy for Kosovo, overseeing all mission operations. Most prominently, he received the agency's award for heroism and the Distinguished Unit Award.

Ambassador Carson?

Under advice from my good friends and colleagues, we will take a very brief recess. We have three votes, a 15, which is now, we have about 8 minutes left, and then two fives. And we will be back. Sorry for the delay.

[Recess.]

Mr. SMITH. We will resume this hearing. And I apologize again for the interruption. But Ambassador Carson, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you very much.

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to speak with you this afternoon about Nigeria. Since my service in Nigeria as a young Foreign Service Officer at the beginning of my career, I have followed closely the country's political and economic developments. Nigeria is a country of significance and is one of our most important strategic partners in sub-Sarahan Africa. Let me mention just a few facts that illustrate this point.

At 160 million people, Nigeria is Africa's most populous nation. It is home to one of every five sub-Sarahan Africans. It has the sixth largest Muslim population in the world, and over the next decade will surpass Egypt as Africa's largest Muslim state. On the global stage, Nigeria is the largest African contributor to international peacekeeping operations and the fifth largest in the world. Nigeria is also serving a 2-year term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

Nigeria is also a dominant economic force in Africa and our largest trading partner on the continent. It is the second largest recipient of American direct private sector investment. It is the fifth largest supplier of crude oil to the United States and our largest export market for American wheat. Underscoring its economic influence, Nigeria has the largest economy in West Africa, contributing over 50 percent of West Africa's GDP. A stable, prosperous Nigeria is in the interest of the United States, in the interest of West Africa and Africa, and in the interest of the global community. A stable and prosperous Nigeria can also be a powerful force for promoting peace, prosperity and stability across Africa.

Nigeria, however, is not without its challenges. Decades of poor governance has seriously degraded the country's health, education and transportation infrastructure. Despite hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenue, Nigeria has virtually no functioning rail system and only half of the population has any access to electricity. Nearly 100 million Nigerians live on less than $1 a day and nearly 1 million children in that country die each year before their fifth birthday. Public opinion polls and news reports suggests that there is a strong sentiment throughout Nigeria that Nigeria's poverty is a result of government neglect, government corruption and government abuse.

This brings us to the subject of today's hearing about "West Africa's Troubled Titan." The inability of the government to address the needs of the people, to grow the economy and to generate jobs has generated a sense of hopelessness among many. It also helps feed a popular narrative among some that the government simply does not care.

Boko Haram capitalizes on popular frustrations with the nation's leaders, its poor government, its ineffective service delivery and the dismal living conditions of many northerners. Over the past year, Boko Haram has created widespread insecurity across northern Nigeria, inflamed tensions between various communities, disrupted development activities and frightened off investors. Boko Haram is responsible for most of the instability and violence that is occurring across northern Nigeria.

Although our understanding of Boko Haram is limited, we believe it is composed of at least two organizations. A larger organization focused primarily on discrediting the Nigerian Government, and a smaller, more dangerous group that is increasingly sophisticated and lethal in its objectives and tactics. The smaller group has developed links with AQIM and has a broader anti-Western agenda. This group has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of Westerners and for the attacks on the United Nations building in Abuja. They also bomb churches to aggravate ethnic and religious tensions in an attempt to sow chaos and increase their public profile.

To help expose and isolate the most dangerous elements, the most dangerous leaders of Boko Haram, the United States Government recently designated three individuals as specially designated global terrorists. Those individuals are Abubakar Shekau, Khalid al-Barnawi, and Abubakar Adam Kambar. Shekau is the most visible leader of Boko Haram, while Barnawi and Kambar have ties to Boko Haram and also have close ties and links with AQIM, al-

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. These designations demonstrate our resolve to diminish the capacity of Boko Haram to execute violent attacks. Boko Haram has grown stronger and increasingly more sophisticated over the past 3 years, and defeating Boko Haram will require a sophisticated and comprehensive domestic response that has both a security strategy and a social-economic strategy and component for addressing the social-economic conditions of northern Nigeria.

Security efforts aimed at containing Boko Haram's violence must avoid excessive violence and human rights abuses and make better use of police and intelligence services to identify, to arrest and to prosecute those responsible for Boko Haram's violent acts. Boko Haram thrives because of social and economic problems in the north that the government must find a way of addressing. A coordinated government effort to provide responsible, accountable governance to all Nigerians while creating opportunities for economic growth will diminish the political space in which Boko Haram operates. We must also remember ongoing dangers in other parts of the country as well, particularly the Niger Delta which is witnessing alarming rates of oil bunkering, costing the government almost 20 percent in potential government revenue, and also an area of the country where environmental damage because of oil spills and oil leakages have caused enormous economic hardship.

U.S. engagement with the Nigerian Government is based on mutual respect, mutual responsibility and partnership, and it is consistent with the new U.S. strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa. The forum for our engagement with Nigeria is the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission. The various working groups of the BNC, which have met over ten times since its launch in April 2010, have provided us with a very valuable mechanism to conduct frank exchanges with senior Nigerian officials on issues of governance, energy, agriculture, regional security cooperation and the Niger Delta. On June 4 and 5 of last month, Deputy Secretary Bill Burns led the United States' delegation at the highest level meeting of the BNC since the Commission's inauguration in 2010. The Nigerian delegation was led by Foreign Minister Ashiru and included representatives at all levels of the Nigerian Government including governors, legislators, military officers, security officials and Federal Government authorities. We believe the Binational Commission is an effective way of strengthening our partnership with Nigeria, including our efforts to assist Nigeria in the security arena.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Nigeria faces significant challenges, but it is not going to collapse, implode or go away. I believe that the forces holding Nigeria together are much stronger than those that might seek to pull it apart. Nigeria and Nigerians are up to the task, and the opportunities for economic growth in that country are boundless.

We should remember that Nigeria has a large and very talented professional class, an abundance of natural resources and a strategic location along the West African coast. Nigeria is committed to democratic rule and there are committed reformers in the economic sector and solid leaders in the judiciary, in the EFCC and in the Electoral Commission of the country. They are committed to

leading their country forward and to fighting corruption and extending opportunity for all.

Nigeria's future is in the hands of its leaders, but we here in Washington are committed to working with them in partnership to advance their goals of democracy, development, respect for human rights, stability, peace and greater opportunity for all of that country's citizens.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, again, for this opportunity to speak with you this afternoon. I welcome any questions that you have. I have provided a longer statement for the record. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Carson follows:]

Testimony by Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson,
Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State
House Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on African Affairs
July 10, 2012
"U.S. Policy Toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan"

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you about Nigeria. Since I served in Nigeria as a Foreign Service Officer at the beginning of my career, I have closely tracked the country's political and economic development. And for good reason: what happens in Nigeria affects us all, and that is why it is one of our most important strategic partners in sub-Saharan Africa. Let me mention a few facts that illustrate this point. At 160 million people, Nigeria is home to one out of every five sub-Saharan Africans. Its diverse and dynamic people are the greatest source of its strength, with the sixth largest Muslim population in the world, and Nigeria is the world's largest country to have approximately equal number of Christians and Muslims. It is the largest African contributor to international peacekeeping operations, and the fifth largest in the world. Over one million Nigerian and Nigerian-

Americans live in the United States, constituting the largest sub-Saharan diaspora group in the United States.

Nigeria is a dominant economic and financial force across West Africa. It is the second largest recipient of American direct private sector investment in Africa, and the fifth largest supplier of crude oil to the United States. Nigeria is our largest trading partner in Africa, and our largest export market for wheat. Nigeria has the largest economy in West Africa, contributing over fifty percent of West Africa's GDP, and is the largest producer in West Africa of nearly all major agricultural products. It is also Africa's largest oil producer and with abundant reserves of natural gas. These facts are unmistakable: a stable, prosperous Nigeria can be a powerful force to promote stability and prosperity all over Africa.

Reading recent headlines, there is also no doubt that Nigeria's prospects are tempered by the many challenges it faces. Decades of poor governance have seriously degraded the country's health, education and transportation infrastructure. Despite hundreds of billions of dollars in oil revenue, Nigeria has virtually no functioning rail system and only

half of its population has access to electricity. Nearly 100 million Nigerians live on less than one dollar a day, and nearly one million children die each year before their fifth birthday. Public opinion polls and news reports suggest that there is a strong sentiment throughout Nigeria, especially in the North, that Nigeria's poverty is a result of government neglect, corruption, and abuse.

This brings us to the subject of today's hearing about "West Africa's Troubled Titan." The inability of the government to address the needs of the people, to grow the economy and to generate jobs generates a sense of hopelessness among many. It also helps feed a popular narrative among some that the government does not care. Boko Haram capitalizes on popular frustrations with the nation's leaders, poor government, ineffective service delivery, and dismal living conditions for many northerners. Over the past year, Boko Haram has created widespread insecurity across northern Nigeria, inflamed tensions between various communities, disrupted development activities, and frightened off investors. The near daily spate of bombings and attacks

that have claimed the lives of thousands of Nigerians is unacceptable, and the United States strongly condemns this violence.

Before we prescribe actions, it is important that we understand what Boko Haram is and what it is not. The truth is that our understanding is limited at best. Boko Haram is composed of at least two organizations, a larger organization focused primarily on discrediting the Nigerian government, and a smaller more dangerous group that is increasingly sophisticated and increasingly lethal. This smaller group has developed links with AQIM and has a broader, anti-Western agenda. This group has claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of westerners and for the attacks on the UN building in Abuja. They also bomb churches to aggravate ethnic and religious tensions in an attempt to sow chaos and increase their public profile. Complicating the picture further is the tendency of some officials to blame Boko Haram for all of the bank robberies and local vendettas occurring in the North when these should be attributed to common criminals and political thugs.

To help expose and isolate the most dangerous leaders of Boko Haram, the U.S. Government recently designated three individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists – Abubakar Shekau [SHAY-cow], Khalid al-Barnawi [ahl-bar-NOW-ee], and Abubakar Adam Kambar [KAHM-bar]. Shekau is the most visible leader of Boko Haram, while al-Barnawi and Kambar have ties to Boko Haram and have close links with AQIM. These designations demonstrate our resolve to diminish the capacity of Boko Haram to execute violent attacks.

Boko Haram has grown stronger and increasingly more sophisticated over the past three years, and defeating Boko Haram will require a sophisticated and comprehensive domestic response. Security efforts aimed at containing Boko Haram's violence must be targeted, tempered, and humane. The Nigerian government must avoid excessive violence and human rights abuses, and make better use of police and intelligence services to identify, arrest, and prosecute those responsible for Boko Haram's violent acts. Boko Haram thrives because of social and economic problems in the north that the government must also address. A coordinated government effort to provide responsible,

accountable governance to all Nigerians, while creating opportunities for economic growth, will diminish the political space in which Boko Haram operates. We must also remember ongoing dangers in other parts of the country, particularly the Niger Delta. We have been heartened by the success of Nigeria's 2009 amnesty program to reduce militancy in the Delta, but there are still serious concerns about accountable governance and economic development in the region. The Niger Delta is witnessing alarming rates of oil bunkering, costing the government, according to the Minister of Finance, almost 20 percent in potential government revenue. The U.N. Environmental Program released a report last year (2011) detailing the billions of dollars worth of environmental damage the Niger Delta has suffered over the years, and we encourage the Nigerian government to act upon the report's recommendations for remediation. In addition, we are committed to partnering with the Nigerian government to enhance regional maritime security and to reducing the inflow of small arms and light weapons into the region.

U.S. engagement with the Nigerian government is done in the context of partnership, and reflects the comprehensive, whole-of-government approach that is consistent with the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. The forum for this engagement is the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission. The various working groups of the BNC, which have met over 10 times since its launch in April 2010, have provided us regular forums to conduct frank exchanges with senior Nigerian officials on issues of governance, energy and investment, agriculture, regional security cooperation and the Niger Delta. On June 4 and 5, Deputy Secretary Burns led the U.S. delegation at the highest-level meeting of the BNC since the Commission's inauguration. The Nigerian delegation, led by Foreign Minister Ashiru, included representatives at all levels of the Nigerian government – including governors, legislators, military officers, and federal government officials.

To reinforce the linkages among the working groups, particularly as they relate to addressing insecurity in northern Nigeria, the June meeting of the BNC conducted concurrent meetings of four working

groups: Governance, Transparency and Integrity; Energy and Investment; Agriculture and Food Security; and Regional Security Cooperation. One impressive outcome of the working groups is that it sparked serious conversations among various members, branches, and levels of the Nigerian public and private sector. The June meeting presented new opportunities for collaboration. Working with Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and its Independent National Electoral Commission, we agreed to help build transparency and accountability from the local to national levels. We agreed to encourage Nigeria's laudable reform efforts that attract private investment in the power and agriculture sectors. And we agreed to work together to increase public confidence in the ability of the Nigerian military and police units to respond effectively, appropriately, and professionally to the violent extremism threat.

I believe now more than ever that the forces holding Nigeria together are stronger than those trying to tear it apart. Nigeria is up to the task, and the opportunities for growth are endless. We should remember that it has a large and very talented professional class, an

abundance of natural resources, and a strategic location along the West African coast. Nigeria held its most credible national election last year since it returned to democratic rule. There are committed reformers in the economic sector, and leadership in the Ministry of Justice, the judiciary, and the EFCC who are committed to taking on corruption. They are the future of Nigeria. And in partnership together, we must not let the forces succeed who seek to bring Nigeria down.

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. I welcome any questions you may have.

Mr. SMITH. And without objection, Ambassador Carson, your full statement will be made a part of the record.

And Mr. Gast, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EARL GAST, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. GAST. Good afternoon, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass and Congressman Turner. Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. It is an honor for me to appear before you again to discuss an important topic.

Since 2003, Nigeria has been carrying out an ambitious agenda of reforms in public finance, agriculture, banking, oil and gas, and other sectors. Promising developments such as the 2011 Freedom of Information bill, and the public distribution of government budgets are increasing transparency and providing better opportunities for a citizen engagement.

However, Nigeria's uneven development has created conditions that threaten internal and regional security. Over the next 25 years, the country's population will bloom from 160 million to more than an estimated 300 million persons further straining the country's ability to meet future needs. Conflict, whether it is triggered by political rivalries, competition for resources or communal ethnic or religious tension poses a challenge to consolidating gains and strengthening democratic institutions. Unless Nigerians use their resources to address these challenges, the destabilizing influence of violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram as well as conflicts in the Middle Belt and Niger Delta will continue to undermine Nigeria's aspirations toward development and its desire to play a greater role on the world stage.

Consistent with the U.S. Presidential strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa, USAID's development activities in Nigeria target the root causes of frustration that stoke instability including the lack of economic opportunity and lack of basic services as well as lack of participation. With 64 percent of the population living below the poverty line and more than 20 percent of the population unemployed, economic growth is a major area of concern. Government of Nigeria reform efforts supported with revenue from high oil production and high oil prices, have contributed significantly to reduce inflation and strong GDP growth which remained steady in 2011 at 7.2 percent. While significant, this growth needs to be both increased and more widely distributed before it can raise Nigerians out of poverty.

Oil accounts for 95 percent of Nigeria's export earnings and 85 percent of government revenue, yet it directly benefits only a small segment of the population. Agriculture, on the other hand, employs seven out of ten Nigerians and holds great potential for broad-based economic growth. We are intensifying our efforts in the agriculture sector by strengthening value chains for select commodities, those that have a ready market and can generate employment. Such value chains include rice, sorghum, and cassava. We have introduced better technologies for production and post harvest management. We have also linked farmers to markets and unlocked access to credit as well as improved access to fertilizer through a

voucher initiative. To date, our flagship agricultural program has worked with 1.2 million clients, created 160,000 jobs, leveraged $57 million in financing, and helped Nigerian farmers generate $260 million in revenue.

Agricultural production is necessary but not sufficient for accelerated economic growth. Adequate infrastructure, regional trade and the development of other sectors are also needed. We are leveraging funds from the Government of Nigeria, the World Bank and other donors to improve roads, ports and energy sources. We also work closely with the government to promote trade by modernizing and reforming the customs system.

In addition to addressing economic opportunities, USAID focuses on basic needs that affect average Nigerians. Things such as obtaining life saving care for infants, accessing treatment for malaria, confronting the challenges of living with HIV/AIDS, and obtaining quality education for the next generation. In particular, I would like to point out our active engagement with the Government of Nigeria in saving childrens' lives. Nigeria has made a commitment to its people, a commitment to its children to reduce substantially the under-five mortality rate. While this rate has decreased steadily over the past decade, Nigeria will need to rapidly accelerate reductions in child mortality from the current modest 4.8 percent per year to 13 percent in order to meet its own targets in 2015.

At the recent global Child Survival Call to Action we joined host country governments, other donors and development partners to realign strategies and activities toward shared goals. This partnership among donors and governments is already saving tens of thousands of lives in Nigeria. Our work in primary health care has deeply engaged state and local governments in Bauchi and Sokoto where the program covers all local government areas, though we also have programs that cover all 36 states throughout the country.

However, peace and stability is needed for such long-term development efforts to last. Since 2000, USAID has worked with the government to reduce violence through efforts that prevent and mitigate conflict arising from sectarian and ethnic tensions. We are also making a new effort to strengthen the ability of Nigerian stakeholders, including government, to better understand and address causes and consequences of violence and conflict. To this end, we also promote interfaith dialogue and stronger collaboration between government and civil society to reduce sources of tension.

Our efforts to encourage broad based economic growth open an accountable governance and effective delivery of quality services are critical to Nigeria's stability. In light of the tremendous and complex needs of the country, we are increasing our presence in Nigeria. We are hopeful that the new generation of Nigerians will engage with their leadership so that the country will not stagnate or backslide, but rather work to shape a promising future.

Thank you again for inviting me to speak before you today, and I welcome any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gast follows:]

Testimony of U.S. Agency for International Development
Assistant Administrator for Africa, Earl Gast

House Foreign Assistance Committee
Subcommittee on African Affairs
July 10, 2012

"U.S. Policy Toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan"

Good afternoon Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me to speak today. It is an honor for me to appear before this Subcommittee to discuss such a critical issue.

Nigeria is among the United States' most strategic African partners. Home to the seventh largest population in the world, Nigeria is the world's largest contributor to peacekeeping missions in Africa, the fifth largest supplier of U.S. crude oil imports, Africa's second largest economy, and home to the continent's largest Muslim population. Nigeria plays a significant role in African regional affairs through the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, and counterterrorism and transnational crime efforts.

Since 2003, Nigeria has been carrying out an ambitious agenda of reforms in public finance, agriculture, banking, the electoral process, oil and gas, power, telecommunications, ports, steel, and mining. On May 29, 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan and 26 state governors were sworn in for four year terms after elections that were freer and less violent than any since Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999. . The government's strong economic management team is playing a crucial role in carrying out sound macroeconomic policies and strengthening trade and investment to sustain the growth that will be needed to create jobs.

In May 2011, President Jonathan signed the Freedom of Information bill into law, enabling citizens to access information that will enhance transparency and accountability at all levels of government and spur advocacy for needed reforms and service delivery. Information about the law was quickly and widely accessible to 93 million cellular users thanks to a free, easily navigable USAID-supported application that allows users to download the entire law to a cell phone. In September 2011, the law received a further boost when Nigeria's Minister of Finance resumed publication of federal, state, and local budget allocations, which were last made public during the Obasanjo Administration in 2003. Most recently, President Jonathan has replaced some of his security advisers in an effort to more effectively tackle the Boko Haram insurgency and other challenges facing the nation.

However, Nigeria's inadequate infrastructure, a dearth of incentives and policies that promote private sector development, and poor access to quality basic education and health services threaten this progress. Oil and gas revenues dominate the government's income, but contributions from agriculture, Nigeria's largest employer, make up only a quarter of the GDP.

Although it is considered an "anchor state" for West Africa, bringing a sense of stability amongst its neighbors, Nigeria's uneven development has potentially created conditions for extremism that could pose its own formidable threat to security in the region. A high poverty rate, coupled with a large population of unemployed and underemployed youth—41.6 percent of those between the ages of 15-24—heightens the risk. Over the next 25 years the country's population will balloon from 160 million to more than 300 million people, further straining the country's ability to meet future needs for jobs and adequate social services such as health and education.

Conflict—whether triggered by political rivalries, competition for resources, or communal, ethnic, or religious tension—poses a challenge to consolidating gains and strengthening democratic institutions. Civil society lacks both the capacity and the resources to effectively engage with government and advocate for change. Government institutions in general have not established meaningful partnerships with citizens or the private sector, which lack the capacity to carry out their own mandates.

Poor governance remains a consistent impediment to development and a major trigger for political violence and public discontent. Unless Nigerians begin using their substantial human and natural resources to address these challenges, the destabilizing influence of violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram, as well as inter-communal conflicts in the Middle Belt and Niger Delta, will continue to undermine Nigeria's aspirations toward development and its desire to play a greater role on the world stage. Additionally, without addressing the increase in security force abuses and impunity within both the military and police, violence will continue to spiral.

Consistent with the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, USAID's development activities target the root causes of the popular frustration with the Government of Nigeria that stokes instability in the North, Middle Belt and Niger Delta regions: poor governance, insufficient respect for human and civil rights, inadequate delivery of basic services, and a lack of economic opportunity, particularly for young Nigerians. Creating a culture of peace that acknowledges and transcends Nigeria's ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity is critical for stability, democracy, and economic development.

Since 2000, USAID has worked with the Government to reduce violence through efforts that prevent and mitigate conflict arising from sectarian and ethnic tensions. A new project set to begin in 2012 will focus on strengthening the ability of Nigerian stakeholders, including government, to better understand and address causes and consequences of violence and conflict in priority states and communities. To this end, we also promote interfaith dialogue and stronger collaboration between government and civil society to reduce sources of tension and build robust conflict early-warning systems.

In response to violent extremism, USAID's contributions include working with traditional leaders to build on existing cultural and social resilience to violence, such as our programming in the Middle Belt that supports groups working across religious and cultural communities to mitigate conflicts when possible and provide early warning when serious troubles arise. Across the North, the concept of providing economic and leadership opportunities to empower vulnerable youth and help them serve as positive role models in their community is intertwined throughout USAID programs. In the states of Bauchi and Sokoto, USAID and its partners have built the capacity of elected local authorities and supported small-scale community improvement projects, which tie in with our ongoing health and basic education programs. USAID is also examining ways to incorporate governance and conflict mitigation throughout all programming in its next five-year strategy beginning in 2014.

These programs were designed and commenced implementation before the Boko Haram phenomenon spread beyond a few communities in northeastern Nigeria. However, they reflect the underlying economic challenges stemming from neglect of the agricultural sector and

infrastructure across Northern Nigeria, as a result of poor governance, corruption, and an over-reliance on oil revenues that skewed the terms of trade away from other productive sectors. Diversified trade and sustainable economic growth will also play a critical role in building the kind of long-term development that contributes to national and regional stability. However, Nigeria's policy and regulatory frameworks do not sufficiently encourage investments in basic infrastructure. Private enterprises lack capacity and access to credit, as well as strong regulatory frameworks and enforcement of existing laws. Despite the Government's economic reform efforts over the last 12 years, its capacity to overcome these persistent obstacles to growth has a long way to go.

These reform efforts, supported with revenue from high oil production and high oil prices, have indeed contributed significantly to macroeconomic improvement, including reduced inflation and strong GDP growth, which remained steady in 2011 at 7.2 percent. While significant, this growth rate needs to be both increased and more widely distributed before it can raise the majority of Nigerians out of poverty. The economy is structurally imbalanced, with the most highly concentrated export structure in the world. Oil accounts for 95 percent of Nigeria's export earnings and 85 percent of government revenue and benefits only a small segment of the population. Agriculture, on the other hand, employs seven out of ten Nigerians and accounts for only 2.6 percent. The performance of the agricultural sector in Nigeria has been improving in recent years, and the new Minister of Agriculture, who was previously an official with the Rockefeller Foundation and the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, is introducing significant and positive changes, many based on experience from USAID agriculture programs.

U.S. assistance is focused on expanding trade and investment opportunities to promote regional trade and agriculture. USAID is strengthening the enabling environment at both the federal and state levels for improved infrastructure. We are leveraging funds from the Government of Nigeria, the World Bank, and other donors to improve roads, ports, and energy sources. USAID also works closely with the Government to promote trade by modernizing and reforming the customs system, revising legislation to be in line with global best practices, and supporting the customs risk management unit. With USAID support the Lagos-Kano-Jibiya Transport Corridor Management Group is positioned to be a stronger advocate for improved governance and trade flow for this transportation corridor that is vital for national and regional food security. At the same time, assistance to private enterprises will stimulate commerce by providing export-ready private enterprises with training in finance and export competitiveness and linking them to international markets and partners. USAID's West Africa Trade Hub supports Nigeria's implementation of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme, business-to-business linkages, increased trade under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, and exports of economically important cash crops, including cashews and shea, that engage thousands of farmers. USAID's African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion initiative is working to increase exports of non-petroleum products, especially unique high value-added agricultural products within the larger context of helping to increase food security and create jobs.

Through the Feed the Future Initiative, our agriculture programs concentrate on building private-sector, demand-driven value chains for selected commodities—those that have a ready market with value-added possibilities and that can generate employment. The program seeks to develop partnerships with private sector firms involved in processing, agricultural input supply and that

are interested in expanding exports to the West Africa region, the United States, and other international markets. To help Nigeria make further progress toward meeting the Millennium Development Goals, USAID is supporting the Government's work on agricultural policy, irrigation, farmer training, and technology development. With its Development Credit Authority, USAID also helps to expand small businesses' access to credit through partnerships with commercial banks and the Central Bank of Nigeria.

In the energy/electricity sector, Nigeria struggles to successfully integrate sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Nigeria recognizes the urgent need to continue and accelerate the reforms it has initiated in its electricity and gas sectors. Annually, Nigeria loses $2 billion of potential revenue through natural gas flaring -a process that not only negatively impacts Nigeria's economy, but also creates significant greenhouse gas emissions. Nigeria's government has recognized its need to capture and utilize these flared gases, support the creation of markets and industries utilizing the captured gases, and attract private sector investment to build power plants and other facilities to capture and transport these gases to the Nigerian markets. USAID is supporting the Nigerian government in all three of these areas. USAID support to develop privately constructed natural gas plants and support for the country's small hydropower sector will help to significantly reduce the volume of greenhouse gas emissions from diesel generators, and the increased supply of hydropower will improve infrastructure stability. It is also supporting efforts by the Nigerian government to increase lending to companies for clean energy projects through partial risk guarantees with local commercial banks. These activities have generated optimism that private sector participation in power generation and supply will soon result in the availability of additional megawatts of clean energy.

USAID has a burgeoning portfolio of public-private cooperation in Nigeria, with over 20 operational partnerships that engage the private sector in development investments. In one such partnership, Chevron is matching USAID's $25-million investment to improve the agriculture value chain for selected crops in the Niger Delta.

Each of these efforts contributes to Nigeria's development and mitigate the root causes of instability. Yet Nigeria's political leadership faces many critical choices. It can choose to expend enormous resources to contain the consequences of ungoverned spaces and disparity in incomes, or it can address the root causes: continue to pursue reforms that will create a large, educated middle-income country, while holding itself accountable to engage and serve politically, socially, and economically marginalized populations. We are hopeful that the new generation of Nigerians will engage with their leadership so that the country will not stagnate or backslide, but rather work to shape that promising future.

Thank you again for inviting me to speak to you today and I look forward to any questions you might have.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much for your testimony and your service.

I would like to begin with Ambassador Carson if I could. You mentioned that the administration has designated three members of Boko Haram as terrorists, and I am wondering if you could speak to why the organization has not itself been classified as a foreign terrorist organization.

Are those three acting in way that is contrary or out of bounds with the organization itself? What would a declaration of that organization as a foreign terrorist organization provide the U.S. Government in terms of tools, and why would we not designate an organization that seemingly is responsible and claiming responsibility for horrific acts of violence? It appears to have at its core a radical Islamic position; I mean I would beg to differ with you, that somehow this is, I believe, at its core an attempt to impose Sharia law and to promote a radicalized version of Islam.

I have spoken to many people from Nigeria and other countries where there has been a significant upsurge of radical Islamic belief. And the moderate Muslims as well as the Christians are equally contemptuous and fearful of our seeming misperception of what the real game plan is here. I think we have done it in places like Egypt. When people were waxing eloquent about the Arab Spring, I held a series of hearings on the impact on Coptic Christians and what that portends if the Muslim Brotherhood or other Islamist groups were to rise in power, and now the situation has gone from bad to worse for those believers who happen to be Christian or moderate Muslims.

So why isn't the group designated, and those other questions as well.

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for that question. Is it an important question. It is a question that we think about all the time. We have indeed designated three individuals who we think are in top leadership positions inside of Boko Haram to that list. But we have not designated the entire organization because we do not believe that Boko Haram is a homogeneous, homogenous organization. We believe that it is an organization of several parts. We believe that the individuals that we have designated represent a core group who lead a part of Boko Haram which is desirous of attacking not only Nigerian targets and interests but also Western and international targets and interests. We believe that the larger element of Boko Haram is not interested in doing anything but attempting to discredit, disgrace the Nigerian Government. Discredit, disgrace, and embarrass by carrying out attacks against Nigerian Government security and government civil institutions, attacking politicians, attacking government officials and judges. But the bulk of the organization we believe to be mainly aimed at going after Nigerians.

Equally, and as you will see in my longer testimony, almost everything of a criminal nature that happens in northern Nigeria today is attributed to Boko Haram. And again, a lot of things that go on there such as bank robberies and assaults on homes and individuals are frequently labeled as attacks by Boko Haram and they are, in fact, only criminal activities that are labeled as such. We believe that designation of these individuals will be useful.

When these individuals are designated it means that they are not allowed to travel into the United States. They would not be allowed to be given visas. All of their assets, if they have any in the United States, would be frozen and confiscated, and it prohibits any American national from engaging in any kind of commercial activity or economic or financial activity with these individuals. It also opens up other opportunities for discovery under Federal statutes which govern the work of the FBI. I might point out that none of the individuals here are believed to be in possession of U.S. visas or are likely to travel here or have any assets in the United States, but by designating these individuals as such, it certainly signals that we think they are in leadership positions, that they have linkages and relationships with AQIM, and that they are individuals of considerable police investigation interest to the United States, and it signals to others in the region and in the international community that this is so.

Mr. SMITH. How large is Boko Haram? Where do they get their money? Where do they get their weapons? When people assert that it was Boko Haram that did it, whether it did it, whatever "did it" might be, blowing up a house, blowing up a church, is it that the group claimed credit for it or it becomes just a statement that is made by someone who has been victimized?

And finally, how often do we actually designate individual members of a group especially when they are in a leadership capacity, and by implication are we now saying they are acting out of sorts from the rest of the organization by designating only those three and not everyone else? I mean the organization is really what its leadership is. Is the top leadership, other members not terrorists? And how often do we do that for other foreign terrorist organizations, just name individuals but not the group itself?

Ambassador CARSON. Again I would have to take the last question and get back to you. I am not a specialist on the designation of international terrorist organizations. I keep a fairly, regrettably, narrow focus on the 49 countries in Africa that I am focused on and not on the broader. But we will come back to you on that issue.

I think that when an activity is carried out in northern Nigeria, any number of individuals have been known to say that this is an activity of Boko Haram. They do have someone who is known to be a spokesperson for the organization, but there are frequently claims that are made in the name of Boko Haram from individuals that we don't know anything about.

Mr. SMITH. Could you provide information on that for the record? That would be very helpful.

Ambassador CARSON. Sure, absolutely. Absolutely.

Mr. SMITH. How often it is asserted and what degree of confidence do we have that it is not Boko Haram that is actually doing it or is it just out there? I mean I remember with other groups like the IRA, they would claim credit and we took them at their word, if they blew up some soldiers or members of the Catholic community.

Ambassador CARSON. Sure, we can look into this.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. It was stated by Ann Buwalda from the Jubilee Campaign, and I quote her, "The issue is impunity as there seems to be no consequences to the violence." She is the exec-

utive director of the Jubilee Campaign, and she said, "After thousands have been killed, the Federal Government in Nigeria is not doing enough to bring the perpetrators to justice."

And Archbishop Kaigama as I said in my opening comments who has really preached aggressively for reaching across the divide to build bridges with the Muslim community, he pointed out that other countries are not doing enough to stop the violence and that a peaceful resolution cannot be left to just one country, urging a collective effort.

Could you speak to that issue? Are we doing enough? Are the others in the world, U.N., everyone else doing enough?

Ambassador CARSON. We have through our Binational Commission, through our bilateral discussions and engagements with Nigerian officials in Abuja, and also here in Washington on any number of occasions, offered both advice and assistance to the Nigerian Government on trying to tackle the problem that Boko Haram presents.

Mr. SMITH. What kind of assistance did you offer?

Ambassador CARSON. We have provided investigative courses, post blast courses, IED prevention courses and other related police courses that would help the Nigerian authorities, and we have provided forensics training and forensics experts to look at post blast situations and we have given them advice on how to prevent IEDs and other things from being used against facilities. We have also encouraged the government to establish an intelligence fusion cell which would help them to better integrate the intelligence that they receive from their various police and military and security services, and to be able to effectively operationalize the kinds of information that they acquire.

We have to also encourage the Nigerians to do several other things that are critically important, and that is not to allow their security services and their military to carry out human rights abuses as they go after individuals in the community. And there have been many complaints that when the military has come into the community looking for one or two suspects in an individual dwelling, they leave many of the citizens and homes in that community in disarray. So it is important that human rights abuses not occur during investigations of activities.

But let me also bring you back, Mr. Chairman, to concerns that I raised about Nigeria needing a comprehensive policy to address the problems of Boko Haram. There is a need for a good security policy, but there is also an equally strong demonstrable need for social economic recovery policy for the North. I know that the level of income in Nigeria is relatively low given its vast oil reserves, but any figures, and we certainly can provide you with many of them, demonstrate that the economic conditions in northern Nigeria are some of the very worst, not just in Nigeria but across Africa.

The infant mortality rates are among the lowest in the world. Mothers who die during childbirth among the highest in the world. Access to clean water among the lowest in the world. Illiteracy, especially among women, some of the highest in the world. Infrastructure among the weakest, and unemployment and underemployment well over 50 percent across the North and particularly in the North and the northeast in the area of Borno. I know that

people will make comparisons to other parts of Nigeria which are also deserving of attention, but the problems in the North are some of the most egregious.

I would remind people that the phenomena of Boko Haram is one of discrediting the Central Government in power for its failure to deliver services to people. The current President, a Southerner, a Christian, has been in office for less than 1½ years and before that was effectively only Acting President for approximately 6 months. His predecessor was indeed a Northerner, the late Yar'Adua. Boko Haram's emergence as a terrorist organization in Nigeria predates the current government, and irrespective of whether there is a Christian leader or a Muslim leader in the country, as long as the social economic problems exist in the North to the extent that they do, there will be a reaction which may, in fact, as this one does, take on political consequences.

Mr. SMITH. If I could, if you could answer, how big is Boko Haram? Where are they getting their weapons? Are the IEDs coming from Iran, for example? You just called it a terrorist organization. Why isn't it designated a terrorist organization with the implications that would follow from that?

And I think it is all too convenient to suggest that somehow just because there are deprivations, somehow people then automatically know Osama bin Laden was rich. Idealogy that is highly, highly radicalized may exploit poverty at times, but poor people don't necessarily become terrorists and killers. That is an insult, frankly, to poor people. I think we made the same mistake, with all due respect, with South Sudan.

I remember raising that myself throughout that entire conflict that the imposition of Sharia law on Catholics and Animists was largely underplayed. The U.N. did very similar things vis-à-vis the former Yugoslavia when it attributed guilt almost on an equal basis with what Slobodan Milosevic was doing. And I say for the record, no one did more to try to help the Muslims in the former Yugoslavia than I did. Working around the clock particularly in places like Srebrenica when 8,000 Muslim men were mustered, I sat at a hearing with a translator that was with the Dutch peacekeepers when Milosevic and the Dutch peacekeeper separated the men from the women and took them to a slaughter that lasted for approximately 7 or 8 days. I was there for one of the internments, worked very closely with the Grand Mufti from Sarajevo, Reis Ceric. But even the modern Muslims will recognize and say you folks, us, Americans, the West, so underappreciate radical Islamic fervor to kill and maim and terrorize. And I get the same, and we all have gotten the same reports from Christians who have now exited enmasse or be killed, from Iraq, suggesting that it was much better Saddam Hussein than it is under the current-day situation.

So how big is Boko Haram; where is it getting its money? And if there are things that need to be conveyed to the subcommittee secretly we would welcome that to get a better handle as to why it has not been designated a terrorist organization. What is the reason? Please.

Ambassador CARSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your comments. I can't tell you exactly how many members there are in Boko Haram. We know that the——

Mr. SMITH. Do you have an estimate though?

Ambassador CARSON. I will ask our colleagues in the intelligence community to see what they have in terms of an estimate. Certainly the core group probably numbers in the hundreds so there is probably an estimate. But the precise number I can't tell you.

Where do they get their money and their arms? They probably get a lot of their money from engaging in criminal activities, robbery and extortion. And so you can look at that as a source. Arms are fairly easy to acquire when you have money, and that money can buy lots of arms across Africa. They are probably buying the kinds of things that they need to make IEDs locally for the most part. What they do get from the linkages that they have with AQIM is the sophisticated training that gives them a knowledge of how to put together these kinds of devices.

Mr. SMITH. Do we have any evidence that it is coming from Iran? I mean those IEDs, I remember on trips to Iraq myself, as it became increasingly known that those very sophisticated IEDs were killing Americans, wounding Americans and our allied coalition.

Ambassador CARSON. I am not aware of any weapons coming into northern Nigeria from Iran.

Mr. SMITH. Any money from Saudi Arabia that we——

Ambassador CARSON. But again I am not aware of it. As I say the elements that comprise most of the vehicle-borne explosives and bombs as well as IEDs are things that can be acquired locally. It is the sophistication and the ability to put these things together that is acquired as the result of the linkages that are had with other organizations that have carried these things out in other parts of Africa.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Mr. Gast, if I could ask you a few questions and then I will yield to my friend and colleague, Ms. Bass.

Earlier today I spoke at the Interagency Autism Coordinating Committee or IACC. It is an organization I wrote the legislation for back in 2000, and I am also the prime author of the Combating Autism Reauthorization Act of 2011, putting money into our all-out effort to combat autism domestically. And I pointed out to the members, including the NIMH director, Dr. Insel, that we had a hearing last year focusing exclusively on the global phenomenon, a very dangerous one, of autism. The estimates are, and it is a guesstimate, that there are as many as 67 million autistic children throughout the world. In Africa, WHO suggests the number is in the "tens of millions." They don't have a better more finely honed number than that but it is huge.

We had a woman from Cote d'Ivoire testify, who actually became an American, who talked about the absolute dearth of services for autistic children.

And on one particular trip that I made on behalf of the human trafficking issue, because I wrote that law too, when I was in Lagos, I spoke to a large group of people on the sanctity of life in the unborn, newly born, all vulnerable people, on human trafficking, I had a man come up who said, what are you doing for autism in Nigeria? I have been working with him and others throughout Africa ever since and they are still—I even have a pending bill we are trying to get to enhance, something you could do adminis-

tratively, to help combat autism worldwide. We are planning another hearing shortly that will focus on where we go from here.

And I asked the IACC if they would do more in sharing not with you and others but also with our African friends who are so desperate for technical and financial assistance to mitigate the impacts of autism which is devastating the continent and it is a silent killer. It is just like AIDS in terms of prevalence, not quite as much, but right in the ballpark. And I saw it in Lagos, I saw it elsewhere when I visited NGOs. So if you could maybe speak to that as number one.

Secondly, on trafficking, and again I wrote that law, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, and we were very, very encouraged when Nigeria achieved Tier I status. But this year it slipped back to Tier II largely because of a lack of law enforcement, according to the just recently released TIP Report, which is regression when it comes to modern-day slavery. Red flags should be going up everywhere, and I am wondering what you all are doing to try to help turn that around particularly with the President and others.

Third, if I could, yesterday I chaired a heartbreaking hearing on Chinese barbaric anti-woman, anti-child course of population control program. For over 30 years the UNFPA, the U.N. Population Fund has significantly enabled and supported China's one-child-per-couple policy which has slaughtered countless babies, made brothers and sisters illegal, and has devastated the lives of women. Approximately 500 women per day, not per week or per month, but per day commit suicide in China. And I have met, and we had one woman testify yesterday who is broken, years later, after having her baby ripped out of her womb and killed by the state. Throughout the entirety of the 33-year program, UNFPA has emphatically said that the program is voluntary and must be replicated in other nations. One leader of UNFPA after another including the current, a Nigerian, executive director of the UNFPA has said, "Export it."

A couple of years ago several health ministers from Africa were all invited to Beijing where the so-called State Family Planning Council of China and the U.N. Population Fund feted this Potemkin village effort to say if you want economic growth you need child limitation policies.

And let me just say parenthetically, Mr. Gast, I have read Margaret Sanger's books. She even had one called, "Child Limitation." She wrote a book called, "The Pivot of Civilization." She was a known eugenicist and a known racist. She is the founder of Planned Parenthood. And I have read her books, not every one of them but I have read several of them, and she wrote a chapter, chapter five, of "The Pivot of Civilization" that was entitled, "The Cruelty of Charity." And she said, we do not want dysfunctional people, useless eaters and certainly African Americans, Africans in general, Latinos, Irish, Catholics. There was a whole group of people that she construed to be subhuman that were not eligible for being part of—she founded Planned Parenthood. Well, that agenda in my opinion is now in full stride but heavily stealthed and heavily concealed for what it is all about.

I was very concerned last year when AFP reported that U.S. population control enthusiast, Jeffrey Sachs, urged Nigeria to adopt a three-child-per-couple limitation on children, and all the same ar-

guments were made for China back in the 1970s that led to the '79 one-child policy into effect. And now I know Mr. Jonathan has talked openly about embracing the three-child policy just like Paul Kagame in Rwanda.

So I just have a very specific question which you could answer now or take back, but in the interest of our oversight capacity I would love to know very precisely the answers to these questions. Has the administration suggested or pushed in any way child limitation policies anywhere in Africa including in Nigeria? Exactly what role, if any, from both a funding point of view and policy initiatives has the United States played either directly or indirectly through NGOs, organizations like the U.N. or UNFPA or any other group like that or groups, lending organizations like IMF or World Bank or like-minded organizations, to support child limitations policies in Africa as well as in Nigeria? And are any U.S. foreign aid dollars in any way conditioned on whether or not child limitation policies are being promoted domestically?

I have lost track, and I say this with deep respect, of how many diplomats have told me at the United Nations, have told me when I have been in-country how they have been bullied. They have been told that if you want foreign aid you need to get with the program of child limitation policies. Very often they are loathe to say publicly out of fear of retaliation. I was at the Cairo Population Conference and I had several, not only Africans, but also Latin American diplomats who told me that, a few have been on the record, and they have told me that they were retaliated against or at least they were threatened. So to me this is extremely important. I asked Secretary Clinton this question. I am still waiting for an answer on foreign aid in general. She did get back and say that IMF, World Bank has no conditionality vis-à-vis child limitation and abortion policies, and I do hope that is the true policy.

But if you can get back to or answer that directly I would deeply, deeply appreciate it. And I do have a few other questions but I guess that is a good start if you could, Mr. Gast.

Mr. GAST. Mr. Chairman, I'll start with your third question on child limitation. As you defined it, child limitation meaning the state dictating the number of children that a family can have, I can assure you that USAID policy is not supportive of that.

Mr. SMITH. And that would be encouraging as well, not just dictating?

Mr. GAST. No. No, not encouraging as well. And we have not spent resources or conditioned resources on that. I would be more than glad to share with you with regard to Nigeria——

Mr. SMITH. Please.

Mr. GAST [continuing]. Our health policy agenda that we have with the Nigerian Government, but I assure you that it does not include child limitation.

Your other two issues really are on human rights, autism and trafficking. And let me just mention that we absolutely support human rights directly through our work with civil society organizations, advocacy with the government. And one of the main issues that we have worked on over the last 4 years, the bill is sitting right before the President, and that is the rights for disabled persons. There are an estimated 20 million disabled persons in Nige-

ria, many of whom are discriminated against and many of whom do not have the services that they need to function. I can give you plenty of stories and I know that you have many stories as well, Congressman.

So within that is also support for children who suffer from autism. We are not directly supporting any of the work of very good groups, NGOs as well as faith based groups, but we do coordinate with them. And they have been very active in the advocacy area in supporting the passage of this policy.

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate that. And on the trafficking?

Mr. GAST. On the trafficking issue you are absolutely right. The report concludes that it has been the lack of enforcement which dropped it into Tier II status.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you.

Ms. Bass?

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Actually I want to follow up on what you were just saying. You said that there was a bill before the President about the disabled, and I am assuming you are talking about President Jonathan.

Mr. GAST. Yes.

Ms. BASS. And what is the bill? I mean what does it say?

Mr. GAST. What it does is it mandates, much like what we have here in the United States that public institutions and public buildings provide access and teaching for people with special needs.

Ms. BASS. Great, I appreciate that. So I want to ask a series of questions basically in three categories. One is about Boko Haram, the other is about corruption and then finally about USAID. And in general what I want to ask about USAID are some specific examples, if you could elaborate more, on programs. But when it comes to Boko Haram I think it has even been clear, Ambassador Carson has said several times that one of the primary goals is to discredit the current government. And I wanted to know toward what end. You know what I mean? In other words, oftentimes if you are going to create disruption or chaos you do have an end in mind. So what is the end? Are they trying to take over? It is only a couple hundred people so what is their objective?

Ambassador CARSON. I think it is an attempt to both discredit and to bring attention to the concerns, grievances, legitimate or illegitimate, of the people who are carrying out the activities. And there is indeed, by pointing out the enormous economic deprivation that exists in northern Nigeria is not to suggest that poor people are terrorists, but it is to suggest that that kind of environment helps to generate and feed upon the notion that the government is not providing adequate service delivery in all segments to the people of the country. And I think it is largely an effort to embarrass, discredit, bring attention to a set of grievances.

But I think the core elements of Boko Haram are also ideological in their orientation. I do not think they represent the views of the larger Muslim population that exists across Nigeria, but it is the notion that they have a set of grievances. But one of the things that has happened is that Boko Haram's leaders do not, in fact, put down on a piece of paper what they are actually striving for. And one of the things that the government has frequently said is, come

forth and tell us what it is that you want or want us to do. And they don't do that.

Ms. BASS. And I appreciate you pointing out that individuals who are identified as terrorists as opposed to the overall organization, and is the reason for that, I mean do you feel that if the organization was labeled that, that it would embolden them? In other words, it would increase their status if they were designated that way?

Ambassador CARSON. I think, Congresswoman Bass, it would serve to enhance their status, probably give them greater international notoriety amongst radicial Islamic groups, probably lead to more recruiting and probably more assistance. So that is one of the concerns that we elevate them to a higher level and a higher status than they deserve. But these three individuals and particular individuals who have shown desire not just to go after the Nigerian Government and Nigerian interests, but to go after larger Western, including American interests, and there is, in fact, a big distinction there, they are prepared to go after larger interests beyond those that are Nigeria and discrediting and embarrassing the Nigerian Government.

Ms. BASS. And how would you assess the Jonathan administration's strategy toward countering terrorism? I wanted to know that in general, but also to what extent are Nigerian intelligence and security forces cooperating with those of neighboring countries where AQIM is believed to operate, and where some members of Boko Haram have reportedly been trained?

Ambassador CARSON. Let me say that the government could be doing better both in trying to combat the Boko Haram threat and they certainly could be doing better in trying to increase service delivery across the north. I know that the government in neighboring states particularly Niger and Cameroon, to a certain extent, Chad, are all concerned about the Boko Haram threat because many of the people who live in southern Niger, southern Chad and in the northwestern part of Cameroon as well as going over across Benin and the upper parts of parts of Benin and Togo, are all ethnically linked to the same linguistic in the communities. So there is this concern about the spread of this kind of violence into their own countries.

Ms. BASS. One topic that we haven't talked about so far today is the drug issue, the drug trafficking. And I wanted to know if you could comment about that. Especially if there is a relationship, what is the Jonathan administration doing to address drug trafficking? Is there a relationship between Boko Haram and the drug industry?

Ambassador CARSON. I am not aware of any major links or connectivity between drug trafficking and the financing of Boko Haram. We do know that drug trafficking is a major problem all along the West African coast. It continues to be a serious problem in Nigeria because of the use of human traffickers moving drugs and because of the use of Lagos port and the airport for movement of narcotics into West Africa and into western Europe. So it is an issue.

I must say that a decade, a decade and a half ago we were in engaged very intensely with the Nigerians on trying to bring issues

of drug trafficking under some control. We had developed a number of programs. They have certainly been far, far more responsive and attentive to these issues in the last decade than they were a decade ago. But drug trafficking is a problem and this is largely a result of coming out of Central America across the Atlantic all along the West African coast.

Ms. BASS. And what actually are we doing to improve Nigeria's ability to control and patrol its waters?

Ambassador CARSON. Well, we, through the Department of Defense and AFRICOM, have maritime security programs in which we work with the Nigerian Navy and Coast Guard as well as with the navies of a number of West African states. We provide training. We, once a year, send an American frigate along the coast of West Africa where we invite coast-country sailors and naval officers to come aboard to look at how we monitor illegal traffic, how we improve port security, and these programs have been very effective in helping to train and improve the skills of Nigerian naval officers as well as naval officers along the West African coast; it is called the Africa Partnership Station and it is a very effective program. But we send naval trainers to the region to help in improving port security, management of shipping, patrolling of territorial waters for both illegal fishing as well as illegal navigation. So these things are very important.

Ms. BASS. Excellent. And moving on to corruption, I wanted to know your opinions about what steps President Jonathan is taking to counter corruption. What is your assessment of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, and what assistance, if any, is the United States or other donors providing to the EFCC to increase its capacity?

Ambassador CARSON. One of the things that we can say that is very positive about the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan is that he has put in place a very, very strong economic team. And I could go into that a great deal, but suffice it to say that the former Vice President of the World Bank, Dr. Ngozi, is the economic czar there, but equally important they have a very good Minister of Industry who was a former Finance Secretary. They have an excellent Minister of Agriculture and they have a very good Energy Minister.

Equally, on the financial issues of corruption one of the great concerns that we had during the era of President Yar'Adua and the transition when President Goodluck Jonathan was Acting President, was the ineffectiveness of the then Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Chairperson. We thought that person was doing certainly a less effective job than her predecessor and certainly not moving forward with the kinds of investigations and prosecutions that we thought should be done. We have engaged and we have talked to the Nigerian authorities about this. Two of the better appointments on the corruption side mirroring what has been done largely on the economic side, are the two principal people responsible for the battle against corruption in Nigeria. There is, in fact, a new Economic Financial Crimes commissioner. It is Ibrahim Lamorde, a person well known to us. Someone who has been to the United States. Someone who has shown a great deal of commitment to moving the process forward against individuals.

We see his appointment as a very positive sign. He was here in early June at the last Binational Commission.

Equally important is the reappointment of Mr. Nuhu Ribadu to take over a new commission that is supposed to audit the finances of the national oil company and manage and look at where the revenues from the oil industry are going.

Ms. BASS. Is that in part to——

Ambassador CARSON. Mr. Nuhu Ribadu, he is excellent. He had at one point been head of the EFCC, and because he, in fact, brought effective prosecutions against senior government officials was fired during the last days of the government of President Obasanjo. But Nuhu Ribadu, a committed reformer, a committed fighter against corruption along with Ibrahim Lamorde are indications that there is a seriousness of purpose by the government to fight corruption. Lots needs to be done. It has been a systemic problem in Nigeria for decades, but there are two people there matched up with the economic team who show commitment that they are prepared to take this task on.

Ms. BASS. Excellent. Thank you. And then finally moving to USAID and wanting you to give me a couple of examples. Is it accurate to say that northern Nigeria states of Bauchi—excuse me if I am mispronouncing it—or Sokoto, are the ones that are designated for so-called flagship programs that you were describing in Nigeria? And I wanted to know if you could give some more specific examples about what the programs entail and how would you assess the capacity and political will of these states' governments to address development challenges?

Mr. GAST. Thank you, Congresswoman Bass. Let me just start off by one thing. If you look at our programs you will see that approximately 90 percent of the funding, significant funding, over $600 million a year is directed in the health area, and that is largely because of need. If you look at under-five mortality, Nigeria ranks in the bottom five. And if you disaggregate that within country and look at the northern states, the rates are far worse than the average for the country. It has the second largest population living with HIV/AIDS in the world. There is the wild polio virus, maternal mortality is at the bottom and vaccination rates are low. And that is why we have a particular focus on health. However, it doesn't mean that we focus on health at the exclusion of other areas, and so we also have a robust agriculture program, also an energy program because the lack of power is recognized as a major constraint to further economic growth.

One of the things that we can best do in working with the Nigerian Government is help it better spend its own resources. It has significant resources. Ambassador Carson mentioned the Minister of Finance, Ngozi. One of the things that she has done very early on in her tenure is publish the expenditures of the government. Nigeria is extremely decentralized. Some have said it is even more decentralized than the U.S. So the implementation of programs really rests with the individual states and with the local government authorities within the states, and along the way there are leakages.

Now we chose several years ago, Bauchi and Sokoto, based on their own willingness to work with us as partners but also based

on performance criteria. And that means spending budgets, their own budgets, to support the basic needs of their population as well as transparency, and also looking at factors like corruption. So it means that we have an intensified effort with those two states. We would like to do more in the north but it is extremely difficult to work in the north because of the insecurity. So we have partnerships with both states and it is helping the government deliver the services directly to the people, and that means building their capacities. Building their capacities on the procurement side. Building their capacities on the service delivery. And where the government can't deliver services to the people, then we, in parallel, are working with the government to put a government face on delivering services.

Ms. BASS. Thank you. Thank you very much. I did ask one question in my opening about the petroleum and the U.S. companies' involvement in the flaring gas, and I wanted to know if someone could address that. Does that happen in our companies or are there——

Ambassador CARSON. Yes. Let me respond to that if I could very briefly. All the U.S. companies comply with Nigerian law and regulation. And American companies operating in Nigeria recognize that flaring of gas is an inefficient use of a valuable natural resource. They also recognize the environmental issues that come with flaring of gas, and many of them have on more than one occasion argued that there should be infrastructure and regulation and law put into place that would effectively use this gas for generation of electricity and other valuable commodities. But that infrastructure, that regulation does not exist for the most part, and they along with many other companies operating there do, in fact, flare gas as the——

Ms. BASS. Why don't they build the infrastructure?

Ambassador CARSON. I think it would take an enormous amount of money to do so and I think it would have to be done collectively and with some kind of regulation which does not exist.

Mr. GAST. If I may add, as Ambassador Carson pointed out, the government loses significant revenues. We estimate about $2.5 billion a year in gas flaring. And as the Assistant Secretary pointed out, the problem is really the lack of regulatory reforms that would allow the commercialization of the energy sector. Because once you have tariffs that are based on market prices, then it makes it economically viable to use the gas that is now flared as a fuel for natural gas power plants. So we are working with the NERC, the regulatory commission, and the government to begin a process of increasing the tariffs for power.

Ms. BASS. Okay. I guess I am just a little confused at our companies, because it sounded like you said that until there is a way to market it they can't help build the infrastructure?

Mr. GAST. So it is not economically viable now. Because if they were to use it as a fuel, as a source of fuel for power plants, they would not be able to collect the revenue necessary to offset the investment cost.

Ms. BASS. Okay, thank you.

Mr. TURNER [presiding]. Thank you. Representative Jackson Lee?

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Chairman and Ranking Member, thank you very much for your courtesies extended. I think I am going to focus on just one global question, Ambassador Carson. And to Mr. Gast, and you might contribute maybe from the perspective that you would know.

We all have our challenges, America has hers, and my colleagues who are here in the Foreign Affairs Committee, why I enjoy the opportunity to participate so much, because we are all seeking a common ground in this committee. But we know that the floor of the House now debating the repeal of the health care bill shows that we in America have disagreement, and I accept that premise.

But as a student of Nigeria, having had the opportunity to study, to live in Nigeria and to have found ourselves viewing Nigeria as one of our strongest allies for decades both in terms of friendship, terms of student exchange, terms of population growth. First in Atlanta and then in Houston has the largest population of Nigerians in the United States outside of the legacy of Brazil which has the tracking of Nigerians to Brazil.

So this dilemma that focuses on my city, since I am known to have come from the oil capital of the world, and we have many, many dealings with Nigeria, and my friend from California was asking about why the corporations can't do more, and frankly, I think some progress has been made but certainly the investment of oil profits has always been an issue, not only by the corporation, the U.S. corporation, but by the country itself. So the Boko Haram actions outrages me. And I would be equally outraged if I was a Christian driving into a mosque and attempting to disrupt the faith, people who are practicing their faith. I have gone to church in Nigeria. I worshiped in Nigeria.

And we also know that Nigeria, no matter who the President is, and we, as a sovereign nation, Ambassador Carson, respect the leadership of nations. We will not only reach out but we do do more than that when there are severe human rights violations. While I am not saying we affirm all sovereign states, but we have tried to work with the heads of state of Nigeria.

So here is my question. Why have we come to this? Why have we come to this? I ask this to the globalness of Nigeria. I ask this to the disparate views in Nigeria. I ask this to the tribal legacies of Nigeria, which I am very well aware of, and some people adhere to it and some don't. But you have a nation that has had 50 years plus, maybe not the best, of involvement with Western companies, and I certainly don't support that legacy as being perfect.

But are we at a point of organizations like the Boko Haram, near like al-Qaeda, why this divide between north and south? When I traveled in Nigeria as a student and went to school I did not have that understanding. I have the understanding much more now that Abuja being the capital and being in the North, but I did not have that understanding. Why are Nigerians facing Nigerians in conflict? That is not something that I can understand. And I see some frowned faces here, but you have northerners going into Christian churches, what are you doing that for? But more importantly, let me just pose the question. Why are we at this point of conflict?

And you can just finish the answer with us being more vigorous, meaning the U.S., in our intervention and assistance in what may

potentially be a very dangerous condition in that country being so large. It is the only question I have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the ranking member.

Ambassador CARSON. Congresswoman Jackson Lee, first of all, thank you for the question. Secondly, I am not going to be able in a——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Time frame.

Ambassador CARSON [continuing]. Short period of time to——

Ms. JACKSON LEE. I understand.

Ambassador CARSON [continuing]. Do justice with the kind of comprehensive response that you seek and deserve. Let me just make several quick global points.

First of all, we here in Washington recognize Nigeria to be one of the two most important countries in sub-Saharan Africa. We look at it as Africa's largest democracy, our largest trading partner, our fifth largest supplier of crude oil, and a country that we seek to strengthen, deepen and broaden our relationship with. So Nigeria is legitimately of great significance to us, and we don't want to ignore it.

Secondly, Nigeria faces the kinds of dilemmas that many African states have because of the large number of different ethnic and linguistic and religious groups that exist there. But the country, the people, have decided over time that the best way to manage the country, the governance, the society is through democratic means and democratic ways. I think we are seeing the kind of problems in northern Nigeria with respect to Boko Haram which does not represent the vast majority of the people in the North, which does not represent the views of the overwhelming number of Muslims, and who are a small group of individuals. But they are indeed trying to play on the effort to discredit, embarrass and to undermine the credibility of the central government.

And it is not just a central government led currently by a Christian leader. I want to point out again that Boko Haram was active under President Yar'Adua, the now deceased President as well. But the sense of hopelessness that build upon a lack of service delivery, a lack of opportunity, a lack of hope helps to contribute to this.

Mr. TURNER. I thank you, Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Gast. We have another panel actually, and we have kind of overstayed. But I want to thank you for your comments and I will continue to try and get an answer on the FTO for, as we go forward. I heard you were good. I had no idea.

Ambassador CARSON. I would be glad to share with you. We will certainly make my comments on the record known to you and I would be glad, Congressman Turner, to come up and talk in greater detail about it as well.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador and Mr. Gast.

So that panel is dismissed, and if the second panel——

Ambassador CARSON. We will follow up.

Mr. TURNER. You ready?

Thank you. We will come to order. Allow me to introduce the panel. Pastor Ays Oritsejafor. How did I do, not too good?

Mr. ORITSEJAFOR. Not bad.

Mr. TURNER. Didn't seem right.

Of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Pastor Oritsejafor is a minister from Delta State in Nigeria. He has taken his ministry to various local and international conferences in over 50 countries. The pastor has a television program and is a prolific author. As president of the Christian Association of Nigeria, he is on the front lines of the Muslim-Christian conflict in Nigeria and will speak to the ways in which Christians are increasingly coming under attack.

We have Dr. Darren Kew, University of Massachusetts, Boston. Darren Kew is an associate professor of conflict resolution and the executive director of the Center for Peace, Democracy and Development at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. He studies the relationships between conflict resolution methods particularly interface and interethnic peacebuilding, and democratic development in Africa. Much of his work focuses on the world of civil society groups in this development. He has also been a consultant on democracy and peace initiative to various governments and nongovernment organizations. He monitored the last four Nigerian elections and is author of numerous works on Nigerian politics and conflict resolution. Dr. Kew.

And we have Mr. Anslem Dornubari John-Miller, The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People. Mr. Anslem Dornubari John-Miller served as the chairman of the national Caretaker Committee of the National Union of Ogoni Students as well the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, the parent body under which the Ogoni nonviolent struggle in environment and social justice is being carried out.

While in a refugee camp in Benin, he founded the National Union of Ogoni Students where he educated the public on the situation in the land as well drew attention to the plight of the refugees who were predominantly students and youths. Once settled in the United States in 1996, he continued to work for Ogoni people where his efforts resulted in the resettlement of over 1,000 families in the U.S.

I welcome you and if you would, keep your statements, please, to 5 minutes and we will then go into questioning, okay?

Pastor?

STATEMENT OF PASTOR AYO ORITSEJAFOR, PRESIDENT, CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA

Mr. ORITSEJAFOR. Thank you very much. The chairman and members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to address this committee and for your interest in the situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and especially the increase in terrorist attacks targeting Christians and Christian institutions. Just this last weekend, 58 people were killed in Christian villages in Jos including a Federal senator and state lawmaker. Boko Haram already claimed responsibility for these coordinated attacks against the Christian community in Jos, and they also reaffirmed their earlier position saying that for Christians in Nigeria to know peace they must accept Islam as the only only true religion.

Boko Haram is not a northern problem, but a Nigerian problem with global implications. Nigeria is not a country divided by north and south, but a country divided between those who support freedom and equality in the eyes of the law, and those who promote

persecution and violence as a means to an end. To an outside observer it may appear as though Boko Haram is not a monolithic group, that it is fragmented and disorganized. I am here today to give you the Nigerian perspective.

Since its creation, the Boko Haram network has never hidden its agenda or intentions. Boko Haram has openly stated that they reject the Nigerian State and its Constitution and seek to impose Sharia law. To this end, Boko Haram has waged a systematic campaign of terror and violence. They seek an end to Western influence and the removal of the Christian presence in Nigeria. This is outright terrorism. It is not legitimate political activity or the airing of grievances.

By refusing to designate Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization, the United States is sending a very clear message, not just to the Federal Government of Nigeria, but to the world that the murder of innocent Christians, and Muslims who reject Islamism, and I make a clear distinction here between Islam and Islamism, are acceptable losses. It is hypocritical for the United States and the international community to say that they believe in freedom and equality when their actions do not support those who are being persecuted. A nondesignation for the group only serves to hamper the cause of justice and has emboldened Boko Haram to continue to strike out at those who are denied equal protection under the law.

The frequency, lethality and sophistication of Boko Haram's attacks raise disturbing questions regarding training, logistical support they have received from other like-minded international terrorist networks. In January 2012, the United Nations Security Council published a report stating that Boko Haram members from Nigeria received training in AQIM camps located in Mali and Chad during the summer of 2011. That same summer, Boko Haram carried out a bold terrorist attack against the United Nations building in Abuja. Boko Haram did not hesitate in claiming responsibility for the attack nor has it ever hesitated in claiming responsibility for its ongoing attacks against police, military, local businesses and increasingly churches and Christian institutions.

In Nigeria, my people are dying every single day. And it is only a matter of time before the international terrorist links and anti-democratic Islamist agenda of Boko Haram turns its attention to the United States. In fact, this may already be a reality, because in April 2012 the NYPD learned that a U.S. citizen or resident living on the East Coast had sent surveillance including maps and photographs of lower Manhattan and the Holland and Lincoln tunnels to an alleged member of Boko Haram based in Nigeria.

The State Department designated Boko Haram's current leader, Abubakar Shakau, and two others as special designated terrorists, but fell short of designating the organization. This would be the equivalent of designating bin Laden as a terrorist but failing to designate al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization.

Although I am aware that the designation of Boko Haram as foreign terrorist organization is not the final solution to all of Nigeria's problems, yet it is an important first step toward restoring the confidence of those who support freedom and equality in the eyes of the law. We to want to have freedom, freedom of religion, free-

dom to worship as we choose without fear. We want to have justice based on equality and not driven by discriminatory religious practices.

Let me remind us that this is not about economics at all, but about an ideology based on religious intolerance that has a history of sponsoring genocide across the globe. As Boko Haram increasingly turns toward genocide through the systematic targeting of Christians and Christian institutions in pursuit of its goals, history will not forget the actions or inactions of your great nation.

I thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to continuing our strong partnership with the country of America.

I thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Oritsejafor follows:]

Statement of Ayodele Joseph ORITSEJAFOR,
President of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)
Oversight Hearing
Before the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights
On "U.S. Policy Toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan
July 10, 2012

Chairman Smith and Members of the Subcommittee, I want to thank you for the opportunity today to address this committee and for your interest in the situation in the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and especially the increase in terrorist attacks targeting Christians and Christian Institutions. Just this last weekend, 58 people were killed in Christian villages in Jos, including a federal senator and a state lawmaker. Boko Haram already claimed responsibility for these coordinated attacks against the Christian community in Jos, and they also reaffirmed their earlier position saying that "for Christians in Nigeria to know peace they must accept Islam as the only true religion." Boko Haram is not only a northern problem, but a Nigerian problem with global implications. Nigeria is not a country divided by North and South, but a country divided between those who support freedom and equality in the eyes of the law, and those who promote persecution and violence as a means to an end.

To an outside observer it may appear as though Boko Haram is not a monolithic group; that it is fragmented and disorganized, but I am here today to give you the Nigerian perspective. Since its creation, the Boko Haram network has never hidden its agenda or intentions. Boko Haram has openly stated that they reject the Nigerian State and its Constitution and seek to impose Shari'ah Law. To this end, Boko Haram has waged a systematic campaign of terror and violence. They

seek an end to western influence and a removal of the Christian presence in Nigeria.

This is outright terrorism, not legitimate political activity or the airing of grievances. By refusing to designate Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization, the United States is sending a very clear message, not just to the Federal Government of Nigeria, but to the world – that the murder of innocent Christians, and Muslims who reject Islamism, and I make a clear distinction here between Islam and Islamism, are acceptable losses. It is hypocritical for the United States and the international community to say that they believe in freedom and equality, when their actions do not support those who are being persecuted.

A non-designation for the group only serves to hamper the cause of justice, and has emboldened Boko Haram to continue to strike out at those who are denied equal protection under the law.

The frequency, lethality and sophistication of Boko Haram's attacks raise disturbing questions regarding training and logistical support they have received from other like minded international terrorist networks. In January 2012 the United Nations Security Council published a report stating that Boko Haram members from Nigeria received training in AQIM camps located in Mali and Chad during the summer of 2011. That same summer Boko Haram carried out a bold terrorist attack against the United Nations building in Abuja. Boko Haram did not hesitate in claiming responsibility for the attack, nor has it ever hesitated in claiming responsibility for its ongoing attacks against police, military, local businesses, and increasingly churches and Christian institutions.

In Nigeria, my people are dying every single day, and it is only a matter of time before the international terrorist links and anti-democratic Islamist agenda of Boko Haram turns its attention to the United States. In fact, this may already be a reality, in April of 2012 the NYPD

learned that a U.S. resident living on the East Coast had sent surveillance, including maps and photographs of lower Manhattan and the Holland and Lincoln tunnels to an alleged member of Boko Haram based in Nigeria.

State Department designated Boko Haram's current leader; Abubaker Shekau and 2 others as "specially designated terrorists", but fell short of designating the organization. This would be the equivalent of designating Bin Laden as a terrorist, but failing to designate Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization.

Although I am aware that the designation of Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization is not the final solution to all of Nigeria's problems, yet it is an important first step towards restoring the confidence of those who support freedom and equality in the eyes of the law. We too, want to have freedom, freedom of religion, freedom to worship as we choose without fear, we want to have justice, based in equality and not driven by discriminatory religious practices. Let me remind us that this is not about economics but about an ideology that has a history of sponsoring genocide across the globe. As Boko Haram increasingly turns towards genocide through the systematic targeting of Christians and Christian institutions in pursuit of its goals, history will not forget the actions or the inactions of your great nation. I thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to the continuing our strong partnership with America.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. TURNER. And thank you, Pastor.

Dr. Kew?

STATEMENT OF DARREN KEW, PH.D, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, MCCORMACK GRADUATE SCHOOL, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS BOSTON

Mr. KEW. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and my thanks to the entire committee for inviting me to speak. I was asked to speak on Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria, and I have submitted written testimony. I am going to just read some of the highlights for you here now.

I think the key theme that I would like to start with is that there is not a grand conflict yet between Islam and Christianity in Nigeria, rather there is a collection of smaller conflicts that engage religion in different ways. And now we have this new challenge from Boko Haram that is trying to frame Nigerian politics in a religious light. And there are other actors that are trying to do so and to stitch these different conflicts together, which is why I think U.S. policy has to be very careful so as not to be perceived as taking one side or the other. I think that this would make things worse and would play into the hands of Boko Haram and others, and I will explain what I mean by that in a minute.

I do think that United States policies should take actions to isolate the extremists in these movements from the moderates and to reinforce Nigeria's own capacity to manage its own conflicts. Let me just aggregate these different conflicts a little bit so I can explain what I am saying.

There are multiple trends across, aggravating the Christian-Muslim divide in Nigeria and, I think, are responsible for the overall recent escalation. I think one of the overarching trends we need to begin with is very important, we don't hear as much about is the dramatic demographic that has happened in Nigeria over the last 20 years which is the rapid rise in the number of Christians across the Middle Belt and the northeast. This entire region, and in parts of the north as well, has seen the number of Christians nearly double every decade since at least the late 1970s. So this entire area is currently undergoing the sorts of growing pains that you would expect from any sort of society undergoing such rapid demographic transitions. And naturally there are some pockets in Muslim communities that resent this or feel threatened by Christian proselytizing across the region, and the rapid rise in the number of churches and just the impacts on daily life. So I think that this contextual element needs to be kept in view.

A second piece of this demographic shift has been ethnic minorities across this region who were alone and dominated by majorities in their states because of their switch to Christianity in recent decades are now part of a larger community. And this is very important political implications that has given them leverage in terms of trying to change the balance of power within their own states over access to government offices, access to resources and access to land, all of which are important pieces of the puzzle that we need to remember.

A second important trend to think about in what is explaining the current escalation phase we are in is the April 2011 elections

which has left an enduring anger in the North. As you recall, it pitted President Jonathan, a Christian southerner, against General Buhari, a northern Muslim, and this gave the election a religious cast, a religious light. And during this period as well, President Jonathan's supporters, particularly in the Middle Belt and the northeast, were appealing to Christian minorities as part of this Christian awakening politically in the region as part of his campaign strategy. So consequently, when President Jonathan won by such a wide margin in the elections in April 2011 amid so many accusations of rigging, there were a lot of perceptions in the North that the election had been stolen from General Buhari. And this led to outbreaks of violence as we know shortly after the elections, and that there is continuing anger in the north against the Jonathan administration since that time, which initially was fed by the fact that all of the service chiefs in the Nigerian military were southerners feeding this perception of a southern dominated government. And I think this perception is a very important piece that we need to remember as we are thinking about U.S. policy. And these angers in pockets of the north will rise again as it faces the prospect of President Jonathan running again in 2015.

I think, third, another important contextual factor here that we have talked about already is the massive poverty as well as the massive corruption in government. I think that has been covered already by other speakers so I don't need to expand on this. I think one part of this though is to note that the south has been growing much faster than the north and that unemployment and poverty in the north is a key piece of what is happening here.

Fourth is the growing militarization across the Middle Belt. We have seen an explosion in the number of Christian and Muslim militias across the region who are increasingly well armed with occasional informal relationships with both the police and military units in the area. There have been numerous atrocities committed by both sides with increasing impunity. Very few have been brought to book for what has been done. Jos and Plateau State in particular are the main flashpoint in this regard, and I hope we can talk a little bit about the specifics of that conflict in a few moments. We also have pastoral farmer conflicts across the region, desertification across northern Nigeria is pushing farmers into traditional pasturelands of Muslim Fulani herders, and with many of the farmers being Christians in some areas this has gone forward.

So lastly, let me just talk about Boko Haram for a moment. I think Boko Haram has risen in this very difficult context. For most of its early existence it had little to do with Christians and its primary anger was focused at the state and the security forces, particularly in Borno. But as you know, in the last 2 years there has been a tactical shift to target Christians for several purposes, and if I can just quickly go through those.

I think the purposes of the current uptick of Boko Haram violence has been to silence the moderates within Boko Haram, many of whom have repeatedly tried to engage the government in dialogue. Second, I think is to consolidate the control of the hardliners and the recent gains. Third, to reach out to disaffected youth in the north. Fourth, to capture this anger that I mentioned over the 2011 election. And fifth, to situate itself as the vanguard of Islam and

northern interests. So Boko Haram is asserting itself in these smaller conflicts in the Jos area and Kaduna and is actively trying to provoke Christian mobilization in order to forward its ends in a very limited way, but is also trying to portray the Jonathan government as a Christian bulwark.

So I think that lastly to end up that U.S. policy has to be very careful to not reinforce this particular view. There is a new national security advisor who is a northerner and who has made overtures to talk to both Boko Haram and the Christian——

Mr. TURNER. All right, we will save the rest for the Q&A, okay?

Mr. KEW. Okay, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kew follows:]

The Crisis in Christian-Muslim Relations in Nigeria

Testimony before the US House Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights

July 10, 2012

Darren Kew, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Conflict Resolution, Human Security, and Global Governance
&
Executive Director, Center for Peace, Democracy, and Development
University of Massachusetts, Boston

The recent escalation of violence between Nigeria's Muslim and Christian communities is not a single conflict between these two great religions. Rather, the crisis is a series of local and regional struggles, some of which feature religion as a strong motivation for conflict, while others ignite the Muslim-Christian fault line as a secondary or circumstantial matter. Recently, however, several actors have seen interest in trying to frame these localized conflicts as a single religious contest across the Christian-Muslim divide. US policy in the region should continue to support efforts to promote religious tolerance and improved governance in Nigeria, while avoiding actions that could feed the perception that the United States is ready to take sides.

A Complex, Explosive Context

With over 150 million people belonging to over 200 nationalities, and nearly evenly divided between Christians and Muslims in a federation of 36 states, Nigeria poses a difficult environment for peace and development under the best of circumstances. Several contextual factors are particularly important for understanding the recent escalation of violence igniting the religious divide:

1. Nigeria has undergone a **dramatic demographic shift** in its number of Christians over the last 20 years. Heavy Christian proselytizing in the minority-dominated regions of the "Middle Belt," in the northeast, and in the far Northern regions of the country has won numerous converts in these areas, fueling **resentment** among some members of Muslim communities. Some Islamic sects also proselytize in Christian majority regions, but they have been far less successful. Initially, both religions focused their expansion efforts on practitioners of traditional religions, but now that most of these have been converted, Christians and Muslims have largely turned the proselytizing race on each other. Ethnic minorities that were once alone and dominated by majority groups, particularly by the largely Muslim Hausa, have found **new political**

power in being part of a larger Christian community, giving them increasing leverage in the struggle over scarce resources.

2. The leading contenders for the **April 2011 presidential elections** were President Goodluck Jonathan, a southern Christian, and retired Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, a northern Muslim, giving the race religious undertones. Widespread perception among supporters of Gen. Buhari that President Jonathan's ruling party rigged him the victory led to outbreaks of violence in key cities of the north, particularly Kaduna, which is evenly divided between Muslims and Christians. The election left enduring frustrations across the north against the Jonathan government. President Jonathan's campaign also actively courted Christian minorities across the Middle Belt and northeast, which further framed the contest in religious terms and fueled the growing Christian political awakening in these areas. These northern frustrations are certain to **resurface if President Jonathan runs again for office in 2015**, as expected.

3. **Massive poverty amid a conspicuously corrupt political elite** on both sides of the religious divide fuels widespread anger at the Nigerian state and increases the attractiveness of radical movements of all types. Economic growth on average of over 6% annually for the last decade is encouraging, but much of this growth has been concentrated in the south.

4. **Growing militarization in the Middle Belt and northeast** is increasing the destructiveness of violence and the pace of escalation. Christian and Muslim militias across these areas, particularly in Jos/Plateau state, are increasingly well armed, and occasionally benefit from informal relationships with police and military units. **Numerous atrocities are alleged to have been committed by both sides** against the other in reciprocal acts of violence. This spread of loosely organized paramilitary activity has exacerbated an array of local conflicts, with several particularly noteworthy trends:

    a. **Pastoralist-farmer conflicts** across the region are aggravated by desertification, which is reducing the size of arable land just as Nigeria's rapid population growth creates greater demand. In locales where predominantly Christian farmers have moved into traditional grazing lands for Muslim Fulani herders, conflicts have aggravated religious tensions.
    b. **Jos/Plateau state** remains the main religious flashpoint in the region, where longstanding disputes over control of scarce land and local government resources have sparked numerous bouts of violence over the last 15 years, particularly during local election cycles. Politicians from local Christian majorities in the state, seeking to build political capital, have often appealed to religion and systematically excluded the local Hausa minority from access to state resources. Although the Hausa are a minority in Jos, the capital of Plateau state, they are the

largest ethnic group in Nigeria overall, fueling fears among the other groups of a Hausa influx and political dominance.

c. Numerous **pockets of internally displaced persons** from previous bouts of violence across the region have been largely ignored by the government and forced to fend for themselves. Youth from both religions living in these desperate conditions have proven to be extremely susceptible to militant activity.
d. Christian and Muslim clerics in recent years have been **preaching hate messages** – ranging from the subtle to the blatant – from the pulpit largely unchecked by religious or government authorities. More decentralized sects such as Pentecostal churches or itinerant imams loosely affiliated with the Izala movement among Muslims have been particularly prone to these messages, which contribute to escalation.

The Boko Haram Challenge

These factors alone have heightened religious tensions across Nigeria, but the recent rise of a militant Islamic movement, known as Boko Haram, has aggravated the entire Christian-Muslim fault line and provoked reprisals from Christian communities. For most of its existence, Boko Haram was little concerned with Nigeria's Christians, and focused its attentions on spreading its interpretation of Islam within the nation's Muslim community, particularly in the northeastern states of Borno and Bauchi. Its shift to military operations in 2008-09 occurred with a devout Muslim, President Yar'Adua, as head of state, and its primary targets were the Nigerian security forces – the police, military, and the internal intelligence operatives of the State Security Service (SSS) – and the Borno state governor at the time.

Consequently, Boko Haram's move to targeting Christian churches and communities over the last two years appears to be largely a **tactical shift** in its operations in order to take advantage of growing northern frustrations with the Jonathan government, in order to situate itself as the Islamic alternative to the corrupt status quo, and to consolidate its recent gains. This shift raises several matters of concern:

- Boko Haram is a collection of groups, some of which are well armed and organized, particularly the hardliners, and others that are less organized and less interested in using violence to pursue the movement's goals of establishing an Islamist state in at least the northern half of Nigeria. Several of the more moderate factions of the movement have sought to initiate peace talks with the government in recent years, some of whom have been killed by hardliners for their efforts. Initiating a religious conflict with the Christians thus **strengthens the position of the hardliners**, forcing the moderates to choose sides and possibly creating more sympathizers for the movement when Christian militias counterattack. In most Boko Haram attacks on

churches, the movement has cited previous attacks on Muslims as validation for its acts. The movement justified its Christmas 2011 church bombings, for instance, as reprisals for Christian militant killings of Muslims during the Eid celebrations earlier in the year.

- Given that President Jonathan is a Christian and his supporters appealed to these sentiments in the 2011 campaign in the Middle Belt and northeast, targeting Christians allows Boko Haram to try to situate itself as **the protector of northern interests** and the embodiment of the region's frustrations. Until June 2012, all Nigeria's military chiefs were southerners, fueling perceptions even further that the Jonathan government was antagonistic to the north.
- The conflict in Jos and Plateau state offers an **ideal cause** for Boko Haram to play to Muslim senses of victimhood, so the movement has actively sought to insert itself in the conflict. Religiously charged Kaduna, which for the first time in its history now has a Christian governor, poses similar opportunities for Boko Haram, where it has also become more active.
- **Heavy-handed responses from the Nigerian police and military** to Boko Haram attacks in the past have tended to increase local support for the movement, as state security forces often use indiscriminate force resulting in numerous civilian casualties with little effect on Boko Haram itself.

In light of these issues and the general inability of the Nigerian government to stop the movement, Boko Haram currently holds the military initiative and faces an important **political choice.** It could continue its military offensive in the unlikely pursuit of total victory, or it could seek to build alliances in order to create its own political movement or some form of parallel party with which it is affiliated or which seeks to capture its message. The latter is likely preferred by moderates in the movement, some of whom have requested an amnesty process much like that in the Niger Delta.

Implications for US Policy

In June 2012, President Jonathan took an important step toward changing the terms of the struggle with Boko Haram by firing his National Security Advisor and replacing him with retired Col. Sambo Dasuki, a northern Muslim with family ties to the Sultan of Sokoto, the highest traditional ruler in the north to whom the more moderate factions of Boko Haram had appealed for mediation in the past. Col. Dasuki immediately announced his intention to engage both Boko Haram and the Christian militias, an important first step.

US engagement is particularly complicated by Boko Haram hardliners' efforts to situate themselves as Nigeria's Islamic vanguard and protector of northern interests and to portray the Jonathan government as a Christian bulwark. An invasive US policy presence could be framed by hardliners as the Christian superpower

supporting its local affiliates, and hand Boko Haram a useful recruiting tool while further delegitimizing the Jonathan government in the eyes of many northerners.

US policy, therefore, needs a subtle approach that seeks to isolate the hardliners in Boko Haram, strengthen the opportunities for dialogue with the moderates, and support Nigerian government reforms that can address the root causes of conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria. Several elements in such a strategy are recommended:

- Encourage the Nigerian government's new efforts to engage militant factions on both sides of the religious divide, in order to provide moderates in Boko Haram and other militias a clear alternative to the violence promoted by hardliners. Special effort should be made to encourage the moderates to steer Boko Haram (as well other Christian and Muslim militias) into the political process, where they can pursue their goals in a peaceful fashion with the promise of a broader audience.
- Target anti-terror efforts on key hardliners and factions to isolate them from the rest of the movement and from the moderate Muslim mainstream overall. The Obama administration's singling out of key Boko Haram hardliners as terrorists rather than the whole movement is a helpful approach in that regard.
- Continue US support for religious tolerance and Muslim-Christian dialogue efforts that engage local religious leaders and communities, building bridges and reducing the acceptability of hate speech. Where possible, the US government should also encourage Nigeria's national religious leaders to engage in meaningful dialogue that sends messages of tolerance and accommodation. In that regard, the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs should be encouraged to restart their interfaith reconciliation efforts.
- Unrest in the north is extremely likely if President Jonathan seeks reelection in 2015. US policy should continue to insist on further Nigerian election reforms that include the primaries of the ruling party in particular, to increase the likelihood of a fair contest and help to dampen perceptions of rigging by any candidate. The leader of Nigeria's political opposition in a race against President Jonathan is likely to be a northerner, and should be engaged by US policymakers as a legitimate opposition leader.
- Encourage the Jonathan administration to undertake a broad-based national development policy and serious anti-corruption efforts that address the underlying conflict drivers of poverty and poor governance.
- Encourage the Nigerian federal government to press its state governments to address local religious disputes and to prosecute crimes against humanity. Plateau state politicians in particular should be investigated for their roles in recent bouts of violence.
- Press the Nigerian government to make police reform a priority and to retool its military for more responsible crisis response capacity.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. John-Miller, please. Try to keep the comments to about 5 minutes.

Mr. JOHN-MILLER. I will try as much as I can.

STATEMENT OF MR. ANSLEM JOHN-MILLER, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE, MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE OGONI PEOPLE (MOSOP)

Mr. JOHN-MILLER. Mr. Chairman and all respected members of this committee, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to address you. I will be discussing some of the troubles with Nigeria and its Niger Delta region, particularly Ogoni-land and the people. My name once again is Anslem DornuBari John-Miller, and I represent here the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People and also one of its unit known as the Council of Ogoni Professionals.

It is an open secret that the culture of corruption is prevalent in every sphere of government without due regard for the rule of law, rather successive political regimes preoccupy themselves with ethnic and personal interests. The effects are a regressive pace of development, high youth unemployment, brain-drain due to emigration, massive poverty and a dangerously trending insecurity situation in the country.

The root causes of the problems in Nigeria is not far-fetched. It is mismanagement and corruption by those at the helm of affairs. As long as these problems are not adequately addressed, any expectation of development and stability in Nigeria will remain elusive. The solution is not a handout of food supplies, medical supplies or material needs. The solution is the United States' and international community's resolute demand on the leadership of Nigeria to implement a clear road map to drastically clean up its government of corrupt practices and looting of public resources, within a specific time frame. The problem is not that of lack of resources, it is a problem of mismanagement of resources.

Let me now address the issue of the Niger Delta. The issue of the Niger Delta became public and prominent as a result of the crisis in Ogoni that led to the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995. Since then the situation remains very politic. The steps so far taken by the Federal Government of Nigeria in an attempt to address the Ogoni crisis were to create the Niger Delta Development Commission, NDDC, and the Niger Delta Ministry. The establishment of these two entities run contrary to the core demands of the Ogoni people, namely devolution of power from the center. In effect, the establishment of these two agencies further concentrate power at the Federal level of government.

I would like to add that the NDDC and the Niger Delta Ministry is a colossal failure. All that has happened is the establishment of a bureacracy that is rooted in patronage. If that is not the case then the Niger Delta problem shouldn't have persisted and we should be having this hearing to talk about the issue of the Niger Delta.

On August 4, 2011, the United Nations released a comprehensive report on Ogoni, highlighting the precarious environmental, social and economic problems that has resulted as a result of 40 years of oil exploration in the area. That report calls for immediate imple-

mentation and recommended several steps to be taken by the government. Such include health reasons. They give instances where the health of the Ogoni people are at stake. Up until this moment that urgent report has been shelved somewhere else. The President of Nigeria who promised to implement it within 2 weeks and set up a presidential committee has not implemented it to this minute.

On the August 4, 2012, it will have been 1 year that that report was received. At the moment, all we received was a notification from the Minister of Environment stating that even before the committee, the presidential committee submitted its report, the Environment Minister stated publicly here in the United States that such funds for implementation of the report is not in the Nigerian budget. So any possibility of implementation in 2012 clearly is not available. The funds are not there. It is on record that Shell is entrusted in implementing the report and has stated that they have the funds to implement the report. But all that has happened is the President doesn't have the political will and is playing ethnic politics. That is why that report is shelved somewhere else and hasn't been implemented up until this moment.

The amnesty program could be credited for the reduced level of violence in the restive Niger Delta especially in the Ijaw areas. However, it is important to note that that peace is one of the graveyard. It is temporary. The clear demarcation between the activities and protestation of the Ogoni people is that on one hand we adopted a nonviolent approach while the Ijaws adopted a violent approach. In fact, there was no cogent agitation in the Ijaw area of Nigeria. All that happened were criminals who were looting and also stealing oil, siphoning oil. Because of that, the constraint on the legitimate demands of the people and propagated as if they were the new leaders of the people.

Where is the response of the government? Call this bunch of people, give them money, pay them bribes, give them also of the best things of life, and at the end of the day, outside of these funds, they cannot survive it. What they have done is to give a wrong signal, making the Ogoni people feel that it is only when you engage in violence that the Nigerian State can listen to you. I think that this committee has a lot to do in addressing the problems in Nigeria, and here are my specific recommendations. They will be very short.

One, this committee and the Congress should adopt the concurrent resolution, H.CON.RES.121 sponsored by Representative Bobby Rush and Fortenberry on April 27, 2012, calling for development of the Niger Delta. The second issue is that of political autonomy for the Ogoni people. A practical way of addressing the self-determination yearnings of the Ogoni people is the creation of a Bori State that guarantees political autonomy. The Ogoni State or the proposed Bori State and its neighboring minorities will have adequate representation at the federal.

I am also recommending that on the issue of corruption the U.S. Government should be proactive. They should take a second look at individuals in government who are engaged in corruption and sanction them. Restrict them from coming to the United States and as well as stopping the issuing of visas and all that. I also suggest that the refugees of Ogonis who are left behind in the United Na-

tions High Commissioner for Refugee camps in Benin Republic be resettled. And lastly, the U.S. Goverment through this committee should stop the ongoing killings happening in Sogho over a proposed banana plantation in Ogoniland.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. John-Miller follows:]

TESTIMONY OF ANSLEM DORNUBARI JOHN-MILLER
TO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON
AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS
JULY 10, 2012.

Mr. Chairman and all respected members of this committee, I thank you for giving me the opportunity to address you. I will be discussing some of the troubles with Nigeria and its Niger Delta region, particularly Ogoni-land and the Ogoni people.

My name is Anslem DornuBari John-Miller, Chairman, Caretaker Committee of the Council of Ogoni Professionals (COP International, USA), an umbrella body of Ogoni professionals in the United States of America. I also Chair the Advocacy & Fundraising Committee of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) Chicago Chapter. I was resettled in Chicago on September 17, 1996 after spending seven months in the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refugee Camp in Benin Republic, West Africa as a result of persecution in Nigeria for my role as the leader of the students' wing of MOSOP - the National Union of Ogoni Students (NUOS). I and the entire Ogoni people remain grateful to the United States for coming to our aid when we needed help.

OVERVIEW AND CURRENT SITUATION IN NIGERIA

Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with abundant human and natural resources, especially oil and gas. As such, Nigeria's strategic importance to regional stability and global energy supply cannot be overemphasized. It is this realization that instability in Nigeria will not only affect the country's over 130 million people and its large immigrant community in the United States, but will have far-reaching security implications on the West African sub-region and beyond, that led to the establishment of the US/Nigeria Bi-National Commission. That concern about the security situation in Nigeria is currently heightened by Islamic fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria, Suppression of minority rights to self-determination in the Niger-Delta and the lack of political will on the part of the Federal Government of Nigeria to seek genuine resolutions to these pertinent issues. It is common knowledge that despite the abundant natural resources, Nigeria continues to increasingly slide into miserable economic and social turmoil.

It is an open secret that the culture of corruption is prevalent in every sphere of government, without due regard for rule of law, rather successive political regimes preoccupy themselves with ethnic and or personal interests. The effects are: a regressive pace of development, high

youth unemployment, brain-drain due to emigration, massive poverty and a dangerously trending insecurity situation in the country.

The root cause of the problems in Nigeria is not far-fetched; it is mismanagement and corruption by those at the helm of affairs. As long as these problems are not adequately addressed, any expectation of development and stability in Nigeria will remain elusive. The solution is not a handout of food supplies, medical supplies, or material needs. The solution is the United States' and international community's resolute demand on the leadership of Nigeria to implement a clear roadmap to drastically clean-up its government of corrupt practices and looting of public resources within a specific time frame. The problem is not lack of resources, it a problem of mismanagement of resources.

These wanton public corruption and mismanagement of public resources as well as suppression of minority rights to self-determination has an adverse effect on the overall development and stability of Nigeria. The most affected areas are the oil-bearing ethnic minority communities of the Niger-Delta region, particularly Ogoni.

CURRENT SITUATION IN THE NIGER DELTA

The oil-rich Niger Delta is situated in Southern Nigeria. Oil was discovered in the area in 1956, and since then, the area had remained the main foreign exchange earner for Nigeria. The region had since the last three decades, account for 95 percent of Nigeria's export earnings and over 80 percent of the Federal Government's revenue. Despite the indisputable enormous contributions to national coffers, the area remains the least developed and the most environmentally destroyed region of Nigeria.

The Ogoni is an ethnic minority of about one-million people in the Niger-Delta. The Ogoni situation had been, and remains, the worst of all the other ethnic groups in the region. After many years of negotiations and dialogue failed to address the political, economic and environmental challenges facing the people resulting from oil exploration in Ogoniland, Ken Saro-Wiwa mobilized the Ogoni people in 1990 under the auspices of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP). He internationalized the campaign to save the people and their environment from further ruins by Shell Oil and the Nigerian government. The grievances and demands of the people were articulated in the historic Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR). The bill calls for, among other core demands, the Right to control and use a fair share of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni development and the Right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation.

Instead of addressing the concerns of the Ogoni people articulated in the OBR, the government resorted to suppression, repression and persecution. The height of it was on November 10, 1995 when against all international appeals, the government of Nigeria hung Ken Saro-Wiwa

and eight other Ogoni activists after being convicted by a military tribunal that was adjudged by international organizations such as the Commonwealth to be a kangaroo court.

The steps and processes implemented by the Federal Government of Nigeria in an attempt to address the Ogoni crisis were to create the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Niger Delta Ministry. The establishment of these two entities runs contrary to the core demands of the Ogoni people namely the devolution of power from the center. In effect, the establishment of these two agencies further concentrate power at the federal level of government.

On August 4, 2011, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) released a comprehensive report indicting the Nigerian Government and Shell for environmental devastation in Ogoniland and recommended immediate clean-up. It is sad to note that President Goodluck Jonathan has refused to implement the report - see article published in the Punch Newspaper of February 1, 2012, titled "Ogoni clean up not in 2012 budget - Minister. The President's insistence that he would prefer a clean-up of the entire Niger Delta instead of Ogoni is nothing but a convenient excuse to sweep the report under the carpet in the same manner that the 1996 United Nations Fact-Finding Mission Report and other reports on Ogoni and the Niger-Delta had been treated over the years.

While the Amnesty Program could be credited for the reduced level of violence in the restive Niger-Delta, especially in the Ijaw areas, it is important to note that any peace recorded is temporary because the underlining problems of environmental devastation and economic marginalization that led to the crisis are yet to be resolved. Granting Amnesty to militants who engaged in violence and other illegal activities on one hand and, ignoring the genuine demands of the Ogonis who are peaceful and non-violent in their agitations on the other hand is wrong, immoral and unjust. It is an encouragement for violence and a recipe for further disaster in the country. It is at a point where the Ogoni people are beginning to feel that nonviolence campaign may not work in Nigeria where morality or world opinion means nothing to the powers that be, especially now that the Ogoni people are beginning to feel abandoned by the international community because of the interest in the Nigerian oil supply.

RECOMMENDATIONS

* This Committee and the Congress should adopt the concurrent resolution - H. CON. RES. 121 submitted by Rep. Rush and Fortenberry on April 27, 2012.

* Political Autonomy: A practical way of addressing the self-determination yearnings of the Ogoni people is the creation of Bori State that guarantees political autonomy within Nigeria, at the minimum. Creation of a separate State for the Ogoni people and their neighboring minorities will ensure adequate and equal representation in Nigerian institutions of

governance, and also ensure equitable resource allocation. The manpower to run the affairs of the state is in abundance and the economic viability of a 'Bori State' is unquestionable. I earnestly appeal to the United States Government to impress on the Nigerian Government to take this issue very seriously in the upcoming Nigerian Constitutional Amendment exercise - (see attached Memorandum On The Creation Of Bori State), as this may be a lasting solution to the over a decade long problem in the Niger Delta and a pathway to true reconciliation between the Ogoni People, Nigeria Government and Shell Oil. The proposed Bori State will liaise with the Federal and Shell in the implementation of the UNEP Report.

*The Nigerian Government should be encouraged to immediately implement the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) Report on Ogoni because continued delay imposes eminent threats to the existence of the Ogoni people.

The US Congress is requested to prevail on the Nigerian authorities to stop Rivers state government from further attacks and killings of innocent villagers in Sogho community in Ogoni, where Rivers state security police is presently 'shooting aside' in a government's raid for a forceful expropriation of land in the already overcrowded Ogoni area.

* The United States Government should continue with its strategic engagement with Nigeria but such engagement should include a carrot and stick approach.

* To tackle corruption, the Congress should mandate the Justice Department to henceforth investigate and prosecute all Nigerian government officials who engage in corruption. Any loot recovered should be re-directed towards various poverty alleviation programs being undertaken by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in impoverished communities in Nigeria.

* U.S. Visas should not be issued to corrupt Nigerian officials and their immediate and extended families who benefit from such corrupt practices.

* The U.S. should mobilize the G8 Countries and other powerful financial institutions to freeze accounts of corrupt Nigerian officials.

* The remaining Ogoni refugees left behind in the UNHCR Camp in Benin Republic during the U.S. Resettlement exercise from 1996 to 2001 should be considered for resettlement, especially now that they are facing forced repatriation to Nigeria, while the government of Nigeria is yet to address the demands of the Ogoni people enshrined in the Ogoni Bill of Rights or have a rehabilitation plan.

* The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has not embarked on any developmental projects in Ogoni. I therefore appeal to the House to bring this concern to the attention of the USAID.

* The Nigerian Government should be encouraged to dialogue with true representatives of Ogoni people over the various other demands enshrined in the Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR). The government to date has not addressed any aspect of the Ogoni Bill of Rights.

Thank you all very much for your time. I must add that the hopes of the Ogoni people recline on the continue support of the United States of America.

Mr. TURNER. All right. Thank you. Because of time constraints we will submit questions, and answers will be part of the record. But I thank the panel for your reasoned testimony. Meeting is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:46 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515-0128

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Christopher H. Smith (R-NJ), Chairman

July 3, 2012

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, to be held in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building **(and available live via the Committee website at http://www.hcfa.house.gov)**:

DATE: Tuesday, July 10, 2012

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: U.S Policy Toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan

WITNESSES:

Panel I
The Honorable Johnnie Carson
Assistant Secretary of State
Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State

The Honorable Earl Gast
Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development

Panel II
Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor
President
Christian Association of Nigeria

Darren Kew, Ph.D
Associate Professor
McCormack Graduate School
University of Massachusetts Boston

Mr. Anslem John-Miller
U.S. Representative
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP)

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202/225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON *Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights* HEARING

Day *Tuesday* **Date** *July 10, 2012* **Room** *2200 Rayburn*

Starting Time *2:00 p.m.* **Ending Time** *4:47 p.m.*

Recesses [*1*] (*2:25* to *2:56*) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____) (____ to ____)

Presiding Member(s)

Rep. Chris Smith, Rep. Robert Turner

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session [✓]
Executive (closed) Session [ ]
Televised [✓]
Electronically Recorded (taped) [✓]
Stenographic Record [✓]

TITLE OF HEARING:

U.S Policy Toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Rep. Chris Smith, Rep. Karen Bass, Rep. Jeff Fortenberry, Rep. Robert Turner

NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: *(Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)*

*Rep. Shelia Jackson Lee**

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [✓] **No** [ ]
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

Prepared statement from Rep. Carnahan
Questions for the record from Rep. Smith to Ambassador Carson
Questions for the record from Rep. Smith to Assistant Administrator Gast
Questions for the record from Rep. Smith to Pastor Oritsejafor
Questions for the record from Rep. Smith to Dr. Kew
Questions for the record from Rep. Smith to Mr. John-Miller

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
or
TIME ADJOURNED *4:47 p.m.*

Shari Rickert
Subcommittee Staff Director

HONORABLE RUSS CARNAHAN (MO-03)
U.S. HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

"U.S. Policy toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan"
Tuesday, July 10, 2012 2:00 PM
2200 Rayburn House Office Building

Chairman Smith and Ranking Member Bass, thank you for holding this hearing on the situation in Nigeria, marked by the troubling increase in instability and violence in recent years.

Nigeria is crucial to U.S. interests in Sub-Saharan Africa and an increasingly important player for the global economy and security concerns at regional, continental, and international levels. Nigeria's government has mediated disputes in several African countries and is one of the top troop contributors to U.N. peacekeeping missions.

Since 2009, we've seen a disturbing rise in violence committed by Boko Haram, with the high profile attack last August on UN headquarters in Abuja and a litany of domestic targets including Nigeria's police, rival clerics, politicians, public institutions, and Christian communities. While these trends are deeply alarming and the U.S. must devote significant attention to the threats posed by Boko Haram, I believe that addressing the underlying root causes of instability must be our key focus.

In Nigeria, longstanding political and socioeconomic grievances led to the establishment and growth of Boko Haram, as well as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), a militant group of the oil-rich Niger Delta region. Many analysts emphasize that frustrations of the northern Nigerian population over neglect from the government remains a determining factor in Boko Haram's motivations, objectives, and ability to recruit.

I am particularly interested to hear more today about the U.S. strategy to respond to overarching issues—like governance challenges; oil sector corruption; insufficient health, education, and transportation infrastructure; economic mismanagement; and regional underdevelopment spurring ethno-religious tensions. All of these reflect broader systemic problems that exacerbate sources of instability in the country.

In closing, I would like to thank the witnesses for your expertise and presence here today. I look forward to your testimony.

Questions for Ambassador Johnnie Carson asked for the record of the hearing "U.S Policy Toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan" submitted by Rep. Chris Smith

July 10, 2012

How often do we name only individuals as terrorists, but not the group that they are affiliated with? When we do this, are we then implying that those individuals named as terrorists are acting out of sorts from the rest of the organization that is being designated?

When there are reports that Boko Haram did something, is it because the group claimed credit for it, or it is usually from someone who was victimized? What do you think the explanation is for the fact that there are claims made in the name of Boko Haram from individuals that we don't know anything about?

Could you provide an estimate to the number of members that are in Boko Haram?

Boko Haram has been reported to be allied with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab in Somalia and perhaps even the Taliban in Afghanistan. In light of these apparent alliances, how great of an international threat do you believe Boko Haram has become?

You have said previously that the problem in the North in Nigeria is largely due to underdevelopment, which is not a new problem. Since Nigeria is a long time ally of the United States, why has our Government not been able to more successfully encourage the Nigerian Government to commit to greater development in the North, or for that matter the Niger Delta region?

Staff from our subcommittee visited Nigeria a couple of months ago and found that elements of the Nigerian Government were more willing to communicate with our Government on matters involving counter-terrorism than each other. What is the administration doing to correct this situation?

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson by
Representative Christopher Smith (#1)
House Foreign Affairs Committee
July 10, 2012

Question:

Boko Haram has been reported to be allied with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM), al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Shabaab in Somalia and perhaps even the Taliban in Afghanistan. In light of these apparent alliances, how great of an international threat do you believe Boko Haram has become?

Answer:

We are very concerned about ongoing attacks against Nigerians and threats against U.S. and western interests in Nigeria. These large scale, coordinated attacks have disrupted economic and political activity in Northern Nigeria - the poorest region of the country –and inflamed ethnic tensions. Boko Haram is not a monolithic organization controlled by a single charismatic figure. Boko Haram is compromised of several groups, a larger group focused primarily on discrediting the Nigerian government, and a smaller, more dangerous group, increasingly sophisticated and increasingly lethal. This latter group has developed links with AQIM and has a broader, anti-Western jihadist agenda. Nonetheless, Boko Haram remains focused on Nigeria, so far attacking targets inside the country.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson by
Representative Christopher Smith (#2)
House Foreign Affairs Committee
July 10, 2012

Question:

You have said previously that the problem in the North in Nigeria is largely due to underdevelopment, which is not a new problem. Since Nigeria is a long time ally of the United States, why has our government not been able to more successfully encourage the Nigerian government to commit to greater development in the North or for that matter the Niger Delta region?

Answer:

The U.S. Nigeria Binational Commission (BNC), launched in 2010, provides a forum for engaging with senior Nigerian government leaders regularly on our shared interests in democracy, development, and security. Through this forum we are committed to helping Nigeria build the capacity to respond effectively and comprehensively to challenges facing Northern Nigeria and the Niger Delta. In addition, in FY 2012 we provide Nigeria $627 million in State Department and USAID bilateral foreign assistance to address some of these underlying issues, including significant funding to support the Global Health and Feed the Future Presidential Initiative. To address the security challenges it currently faces, the Nigerian government must demonstrate a commitment to effectively engage communities, increase public confidence in the professionalism of security units, and

pursue a lasting political response to the legitimate concerns of its population. Strong political action is needed to demonstrate to citizens in areas threatened by Boko Haram that the government understands and is prepared to comprehensively address the needs of its citizens. Leaders at all levels, including northern governors, traditional leaders, and local officials, must contribute to a way forward. For example, Borno State Governor Kashim Shettima is at the forefront of reducing poverty in Northeast Nigeria and recently announced a US $6 million poverty reduction program.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson by
Representative Christopher Smith (#3)
House Foreign Affairs Committee
July 10, 2012

Question:

Staff from our subcommittee visited Nigeria a couple of months ago and found that elements of the Nigerian Government were more willing to communicate with our Government on matters involving counter-terrorism than each other. What is the administration doing to correct this situation?

Answer:

To date, the Government of Nigeria (GON) has been largely unable to move ahead on some of our more concrete proposals, such as an intelligence fusion center meant to assist Nigeria with timely gathering and dissemination of information. Reliance on heavy-handed military-led security enforcement, often resulting in human rights violations, has further alienated populations in key areas. We will continue to provide carefully tailored counterterrorism assistance to Nigeria and to discuss cooperation through the U.S. –Nigeria Binational Commission working group on Regional Security. The appointment of National Security Advisor (NSA) Sambo Dasuki on June 22 and the appointment of a new Inspector General of Police earlier this year may be an opportunity to streamline information sharing. The Department's FY 2012 security assistance programs in Nigeria are focused on overall professionalization of the military and

building Nigeria's capacity to contribute to peacekeeping operations on the continent. We are also providing basic support to law enforcement entities and enhancing Nigeria's counterterrorism law enforcement's leadership and management, emergency response, and investigations capacity.

Mr. Smith. How large is Boko Haram?

Mr. Carson. The Nigerians claim 10,000 members, but we have not corroborated that figure. We think hundreds not thousands in general. We will be happy to provide more information in a classified setting.

Mr. Smith. Where do they get their money?

Mr. Carson. Some elements of Boko Haram fund their operations through robberies, extortion, and other criminal activities, while other more extremist elements receive funding from AQIM.

Mr. Smith. Where do they get their weapons?

Mr. Carson. The weapons typically come from arms proliferation stemming from Libya, government stocks (e.g. overrun police stations), and corrupt security officials.

Mr. Smith. Are their IEDs coming from Iran?

Mr. Carson. We have seen no evidence of this.

Mr. Smith. To what degree are false claims made in the name of Boko Haram?

Mr. Carson. Precise details on this aspect are difficult to judge given that any given day in Nigeria there can be ethnic, economic, political, or extremist violence that can be incorrectly attributed to one group or another.

Mr. Smith. Why isn't it, you know, designated a terrorist organization with the implications that would follow from that?

Mr. Carson. The State Department does not publicly comment on prospective additions to the list of designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Any potential designation decision would be made in accordance with the statutory criteria for FTO designations contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act. Boko Haram is a fractious organization comprised of criminal, political and terrorist elements. Designating individuals allows us to focus on those people most responsible for threats against U.S. citizens or interests and those committed to the use of extremist violence.

Questions for the Record Submitted to
USAID Assistant Administrator for Africa, Earl Gast from
the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health and Human Rights

"U.S Policy toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan."

July 10, 2012

QUESTION #1: If there is strong economic management as you have testified, then why are so many Nigerians still living in poverty, and why is development in the country so unevenly felt? How is the government cooperating with donors to reduce poverty and create jobs broadly throughout Nigeria?

ANSWER:

Nigeria has experienced strong economic growth over the past few years, averaging 6.6 percent over the past decade. Unfortunately, poverty remains a major concern, as the majority of Nigeria's wealth benefits only a small percentage of the population. Even with steady economic growth, Nigeria faces endemic corruption at all levels of society and poor governance. Several critical factors have constrained Nigeria's progress and threaten the country's overall stability and long-term prosperity: weak health systems; poor access to quality education systems; a massive and growing youth population combined with widespread unemployment; recurring outbreaks of sectarian, ethnic, and communal violence;. inadequate infrastructure; unreliable power supply; and lack of incentives and policies that promote private sector development. . Consequently, many Nigerians still live in poverty and development seems unevenly distributed.

Underpinning the aforementioned challenges is the core issue of governance. While Nigeria has undertaken important governance reforms in public financial management and in reducing public corruption, improving governance remains the main challenge at all levels of

government, and in particular at the state level. Fiscal decentralization provides Nigeria's 36 states and 774 local governments considerable policy autonomy, control of 50 percent of government revenues, and responsibility for delivery of public services which are often unevenly distributed. Capacity is weak in most states and improving governance will be a long term process. In addition to addressing governance challenges, efforts are underway to create an enabling environment for private sector investment in sectors that are conducive to job creation and critical for sustained growth, especially power and agriculture. Sustained broad-based economic growth and poverty reduction are critical to Nigeria's economic stability. In order to ensure that future growth is sustainable and benefits all Nigerians, the Nigeria government must continue its efforts to broaden and deepen its economic base.

There are significant signs that the Government of Nigeria is making progress toward greater donor cooperation which could ultimately reduce poverty and increase employment opportunities in Nigeria. On May 29, 2011, President Goodluck Jonathan and 26 state governors were sworn in for four year terms after elections that were characterized by observers as the freest and fairest in Nigeria's history. The government's new and very strong economic management team is poised to play a crucial role in carrying out sound macroeconomic policies and strengthening trade and investment to sustain the growth that will be needed to create jobs and address high unemployment. Additionally, through the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission, we are discussing and advancing our shared interests to sustain modest but important development gains. The Commission's five working groups meet regularly to deepen engagement and focus on governance, energy, security, agriculture, and the Niger Delta. The Government of Nigeria in partnership with the U.S. and other donors have been carrying out an ambitious agenda of reforms in public finance, banking, the electoral process, oil and gas, power,

telecommunications, ports, steel, and mining. These efforts will improve Nigeria's infrastructure and move the country further down the path toward long-term sustainable growth and prosperity for a greater number of Nigerians.

QUESTION #2: In contributing to development in northern Nigeria, how do you intend to avoid the charge of pacifying Boko Haram, which has used the underdevelopment of the North as a rallying cry?

ANSWER:

We are committed to helping the government of Nigeria develop a more balanced security strategy to counter Boko Haram, including a proactive criminal justice system that reduces impunity. This system will build confidence in the government by effectively investigating and prosecuting all incidents of violence throughout Nigeria. Additionally, we encourage the Government of Nigeria to address the political and socio-economic challenges of the north; effectively engage communities vulnerable to extremist influence; and promote human rights practices among its security forces.

To alleviate some of the consequences related to underdevelopment in Nigeria, USAID works in all 36 states of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria to improve the economic stability, security, and well-being of Nigerians. In the north specifically, USAID has active projects in all states but manages three concentrated projects in governance, health, and education under its Focus States Strategy in Sokoto and Bauchi. In the Delta Region, USAID is implementing 13 projects with a total life of program portfolio value of nearly $150 million.

While projects in all program sectors except education and governance are active in the Delta region, the majority of interventions are in health. The PEPFAR-funded HIV/AIDS program constitutes the largest share of the program portfolio in Nigeria with the United States Government providing 416,969 adults and pediatric patients with antiretroviral therapy (ART). While significant investments are being made in the north, HIV/AIDS activities are ongoing throughout the country.

USAID programs are also focused on addressing the drivers of conflict including poverty; disenfranchisement; lack of quality government services in health, water sanitation, and education; and frustration with corruption and weak government management. USAID recognizes the need for an increased focus on conflict prevention and mitigation, not only with stand-alone projects, but also to incorporate conflict prevention and mitigation as cross-cutting theme in all USAID programming in Nigeria. USAID/Nigeria is currently developing a new five-year country strategy which will identify opportunities to improve synergies across program sectors and also to collaborate with other donor programs in complementary sectors throughout Nigeria.

QUESTION #3: One of USAID's focal points in Nigeria is increasing capacity for civic engagement. There is a coalition of NGOs that are helping a maverick group of reform-minded National Assembly members. To what extent is USAID supporting this effort by civil society to help improve governance in Nigeria?

ANSWER:

USAID supports efforts by civil society to help improve governance in Nigeria by helping them to increase their membership base; improve internal organizational capacity;

support increased advocacy and watchdog functions; and promote increase participation in the electoral reform process. More specifically, USAID's activities with civil society organizations include mobilizing them to influence key democratic reforms at the national, state, and local levels; encouraging them to advocate for policy reform in various sectors, such as education, health, and economic growth; and emphasizing the importance of engaging marginalized populations, such as women, youth, and people living with disabilities.

USAID's work with civil society aims to improve service delivery at the state level and ensure implementation of several critical laws: the Public Procurement law, Freedom of Information law, Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency law, and the Petroleum Industry law. Lastly, through an advocacy project, civil society will encourage the National Assembly and the President of Nigeria to enact the People with Disability bill which seeks to protect the rights of people living with disabilities and ensure that no person with disability shall be discriminated against.

Questions for Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor asked for the record of the hearing "U.S Policy Toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan" submitted by Rep. Chris Smith

July 10, 2012

Christian evangelism in Nigeria has become much more successful than in the past. To what extent is this success increasing anti-Christian sentiment among Muslims? Is this success due largely to Muslim converts or converts from traditional religions?

Aside from Boko Haram, how strong would you say support is among Nigerian Muslims for the application of sharia law beyond their own communities? To what extent are northern political leaders using religious conflict in Nigeria for political purposes?

Member churches of CAN have become increasingly aggressive in preaching against Islam. Is this a reaction to the violence by Muslims against Christians, or are Christian pastors giving up on coexisting peacefully with Muslims?

It has been said that the internationalist elements of Islamists in Nigeria are not fully accepted by most Muslims, even in the North. Are most Muslims becoming radicalized? If so, what is the cause of this radicalization in Nigeria?

[Reponses not received at time of printing]

Questions for Dr. Darren Kew asked for the record of the hearing "U.S Policy Toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan."

July 10, 2012

Question: You reportedly support the refusal of the Administration to designate Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization because it would "internationalize" this group. In light of their training with groups such as MNLA in Mali and al-Shabaab in Somalia, aren't they already international? What benefit is there to refusing to acknowledge that this organization foments terrorism on a more than local scale?

Answer:

The problem with designating Boko Haram as an FTO is that, for now, the costs of doing so still far outweigh the benefits. There are several matters to consider in making this determination. First, Boko Haram is more of a composite movement than a single organization. It clearly has a group of hardliners at the center that are without a doubt terrorists by any definition, but they are currently surrounded by pockets of moderates who have shown repeated interest in negotiating with the Nigerian government. Boko Haram also has many part-time sympathizers, particularly semi-organized bands of youths in key urban centers, who are generally supportive of the movement and may assist it on occasion, but who may still be ambivalent about fully joining a violent struggle. Designating this movement as an FTO lumps all these factions together at the very time that the Nigerian government's new National Security Advisor is seeking to initiate talks with Boko Haram, which could divide the movement and possibly isolate the hardliners. An FTO designation now would hand the hardliners a public relations victory, since under their logic the condemnation of the United States is a badge of radical Islamist legitimacy, which in turn would undermine the moderates by making them appear less committed to the Islamist agenda by seeking to talk with the Jonathan administration backed by Washington. In addition, the FTO designation would make the Nigerian government appear even weaker, and signal to Boko Haram's part-timers that the hardliners are succeeding, which will bring more recruits deeper into the movement. Many in the North will also see this as the United States moving closer to the Jonathan administration and raise concerns, however unrealistic, that the US will take sides against Northern and Muslim interests, particularly in the 2015 elections.

Moreover, FTO designation does not put any additional tools in the hands of Washington or Abuja that they do not already have sufficient to gain any major impacts on Boko Haram at this time. The only real leverage the designation offers at the moment is for news headlines, mostly to shame the Nigerian government for its corruption and massive governance failures, and will reward Boko Haram with a useful public relations tool. This could also provoke it to attack direct US interests in Nigeria as a response. The Obama administration's policy of naming key leaders within Boko Haram as terrorists is a wiser approach than FTO designation for the time being, since it may help to exacerbate divisions within the movement's leadership, strengthen the hands of the moderates, and perhaps even provoke rifts within the movement that could hasten its demise or, in the least, slow it down long enough for Nigerian security forces to regain the initiative.

Lastly, designating Boko Haram an FTO will virtually prohibit any recipients of US foreign assistance, including any peace and conflict resolution activities, from having any contact with

its various factions and occasional affiliates. Because of the unclear boundaries of the movement that I explained above, designating it an FTO would force Nigerian groups receiving US assistance to sever contact with the vast array of moderate factions and part-timers found in most of the key Northern urban centers as well as many parts of the volatile Middle Belt region. Consequently, all US-funded conflict resolution activity in northern and middle Nigeria would likely ground to a halt, as would a wide variety of democracy-building and development activities.

I recommend that the Subcommittee reconsider the FTO designation matter **in approximately one year's time**, at which point we should have some evidence of whether or not the Nigerian government's efforts have made any progress with Boko Haram. I suggest that the Subcommittee consider the following criteria as a starting place when making decisions or recommendations on FTO status:

1. **Does the Nigerian government have an ongoing initiative to negotiate with Boko Haram?** If so, then the FTO designation is not likely to assist the negotiations. More helpful by mid-2013 could perhaps be for the Obama administration to follow up its designations of individual leaders as terrorists with requests for the International Criminal Court to undertake proceedings against them.

2. If the Jonathan administration does not have any credible efforts underway to seek a negotiated solution to the Boko Haram crisis, **does the Nigerian government have a serious and comprehensive counter-terror strategy it is pursuing?** If not, then the FTO designation could be used as leverage to shame the Nigerian government into more responsible action.

3. **Has Boko Haram carried out any major attacks outside the borders of Nigeria, or in the Niger Delta oil producing regions?** We have some evidence that Boko Haram has training and communication links with MNLA and al-Shabaab, but the movement's goals are primarily focused within northern Nigeria. If, however, Boko Haram shows sufficient operational sophistication and strategic interest in providing combat assistance to its allies outside Nigeria – or in pursuing its own military plans across borders – then some of the benefits of FTO designation to US law enforcement, defense, and other agencies may have sufficient benefits worth the political costs of doing so. The same may be said if Boko Haram is able to attack Nigeria's oil industry despite the firepower of the Niger Delta militias who stand in the way. Several such attacks would signal a major escalation in the crisis and would likely provoke counterattacks in the North from the Niger Delta militias, which could inflame the nation's primary ethnic divisions and warrant a more aggressive international response.

4. **Have any splinter groups broken away from Boko Haram, such that the boundaries of the movement are more clearly drawn around the hardliners alone?** If Boko Haram does in fact break apart so that the hardliners are more clearly separated from the rest of the movement, then an FTO designation may serve a similar useful purpose that designating the individual leaders as terrorists does now, perhaps helping to isolate the hardliners further. This could be especially true if a more moderate breakaway faction is engaged in talks with the Nigerian government to find a negotiated solution that can attract a sizeable portion of the part-time supporters of the movement.

Question: You stated in an article five years ago that more than 10,000 Nigerians had lost their lives in communal unrest since the return of democracy in 1999. Why has democracy not been more of a benefit to Nigerians in terms of providing for peaceful coexistence among the many ethnic groups that live there?

Answer: Cross-country studies have shown that transitional democracies everywhere are fairly consistently volatile, given the dramatic social, economic, and political changes necessary to move from authoritarian to democratic rule. In Nigeria's case, military rule gave way in 1999 to *de facto* oligarchy, under which a small group of very powerful individuals – primarily through the ruling Peoples Democratic Party – have managed to use their access to power to rig elections and enrich themselves at the expense of any sustained, broad-based development policies in the public interest. In addition, Nigeria's massive oil wealth brings tremendous revenues into the hands of the individuals controlling the state, giving them extensive resources to buy off and or squelch legitimate opposition.

Without viable political opposition supported by robust civil society engagement, Nigerian have few alternatives toward which to turn for peaceful political change and economic progress. This in turn has increased the likelihood that the most frustrated and desperate segments of society have been more willing to turn to violence to pursue their needs or to pre-empt any perceived threats to their culture, faith, or to the little they have. Moreover, many politicians and other social leaders see personal gains in stoking ethnic and religious tensions, which can sometimes rally supporters of common identity and isolate opponents from different backgrounds.

Question: Northerners, especially Muslims, reportedly feel they have been and continue to be marginalized by southern Christians. Besides the lack of development in the North, which also is the fault of northern political leaders, what rationale is there for such a view in the North?

Answer: Much of this view is based on two major issues for Northern opinion leaders. The first is that from late 2010 until June 2012, all of Nigeria's top military officers were southern Christians. In June 2012, President Jonathan appointed a northern Muslim as his National Security Advisor, but the rest of the service chiefs remain southerners. Second, President Jonathan's administration has been channelling a greater portion of government contracts to supporters in the South, particularly from his own Niger Delta region. This is customary patronage practice in Nigerian politics, but Northern critics of the administration have argued that President Jonathan has gone far beyond the level of his predecessors.

A third issue for many Northerners in feeling marginalized is the perception that the Nigerian media and Western coverage of Nigeria is dominated by Southerners and Christians. Consequently, these individuals feel that Islam is often associated in the media with terrorism, Christians as the only victims, and that Northern perspectives are often under-represented. In addition, many Northerners complain that Boko Haram, Fulani herder attacks on Christian farmers, and other violent activities from Muslim-dominated groups are closely covered in the media and roundly condemned, while coverage of Christian militia atrocities is sparse and often portrayed as resulting from self-defense actions provoked by Muslim attacks.

Question: Neither North nor South is religiously monolithic, as you have stated previously. Is coexistence of the country's two major religious groups still possible at this point? What can be done to maximize the opportunities for peace between the two monotheistic religions?

Answer: Nigeria is still far from the point where its two major religious groups could no longer coexist in the same nation. Numerous ethnic divisions – over 200 – still stretch across the country, and both Islam and Christianity enjoy several subdivisions, which together help to keep a broad spectrum of identity issues at play and to prevent narrow, exclusivist views of religion from dismantling the diversity of everyday life in Nigeria. In addition, many of the conflicts engaging religion across Nigeria are driven primarily or secondarily by other issues, such as resource control, poverty, corruption, and party and political machine politics. Consequently, efforts to address these additional conflict drivers will also help to defuse religious tensions, such as I outlined in my original testimony.

Direct actions can also be taken to foster Muslim-Christian peace in Nigeria. These include:

- Encourage the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Sultan of Sokoto to restart high-level Muslim-Christian dialogue efforts and to re-energize the Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC).
- Provide indirect assistance for moderate Christian and Muslim leaders, who represent the views of the vast majority of Nigerians, to voice their religious perspectives. Particular attention should be paid to alerting rank-and-file clergy to the dangers of hate speech. US assistance could perhaps be channeled through NIREC or local religious or community foundations.
- Provide assistance to bring moderate Christian and Muslim leaders and scholars from abroad to visit Nigeria, to stress the peaceful doctrines of both religions, and to discuss their own interfaith works. Such visits should be coordinated to support the activities of NIREC and other Nigerian interfaith initiatives.
- Provide additional assistance to the Nigerian media for the responsible coverage of religious matters and conflict circumstances.
- Continue US assistance for local interfaith initiatives through civil society organizations, community associations, and responsible religious and cultural associations.
- Ask the International Criminal Court to investigate the recent bouts of violence in Jos and Plateau state, supported by independent inquiries conducted by partnerships of local and international human rights organizations. Given the symbolic importance of the conflict in Jos for Muslim-Christian relations in Nigeria, an effort to address the impunity with which killing has occurred here could provide an important check on violence here and elsewhere.

Questions for Mr. Anslem John-Miller asked for the record of the hearing "U.S Policy Toward Nigeria: West Africa's Troubled Titan" submitted by Rep. Chris Smith

July 10, 2012

When Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues were on trial for their lives in the 1990s, there was an international groundswell of support for your people. However, since their execution in 1995, the plight the Ogoni people has faded from the headlines. To what extent is this seeming failure of nonviolence moving MOSOP toward less peaceful means of protest?

When the Niger Delta is mentioned in recent years, it is usually in the context of violent elements that bunker oil or kidnap people. How are groups such as MEND taking the lead in opposing the central government's mishandling of Niger Delta development?

Over the years, the Nigerian government, as part of its partnership with foreign oil companies, has required that part of the profits be devoted to development in the oil- producing regions of the country. However, corruption has prevented these funds from being applied to development projects. Now oil companies are creating their own projects. How successful would you say they have been?

You cite the United Nations environment Programme report of last year that called on the Nigerian government and Royal Dutch Shell to begin immediate clean-up of oil pollution in the Niger Delta. Why do you believe the Jonathan Administration has refused to correct an environmental problem that is so widely recognized internationally? Why do you feel the international community has tolerated his inaction on this issue?

[Reponses not received at time of printing]

○