

**2014 AND BEYOND: U.S. POLICY TOWARD
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, PART I**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
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THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
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2014 AND BEYOND: U.S. POLICY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, PART I

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST
AND SOUTH ASIA,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. CHABOT. The committee will come to order. This is the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. We want to welcome everyone here this afternoon.

I have a couple of housekeeping items here to get to before the ranking member and myself will give our opening statements and we will turn to the witnesses. We also understand that we may well be interrupted by votes on the floor here shortly, so we are going to try to get in as many things as we can before that happens.

I would first—I want to formally introduce our newest subcommittee member, the gentleman from New York Mr. Turner. We look forward to working with Mr. Turner on this subcommittee, hopefully for years to come, and we welcome you here this afternoon, Congressman Turner. Anything you would like to say?

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. Welcome. All right. Well done.

We would also like to recognize some very distinguished visitors who are here to observe the subcommittee this afternoon. And we would like to welcome a delegation of guests from Afghanistan who serve on the national security committees in the Afghani Parliament, members of both the Commission on Internal Affairs in the lower House and the Commission on Internal Security, Defense Affairs and Local Organs of the upper House.

We want to welcome them to the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia here, and we are very delighted to have you, and if you wouldn't mind standing, we would like to recognize you.

And last, but not least, I would like to note that the subcommittee is honored to have visiting here today a pair of scholars who are studying international politics at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. They would be embarrassed if I mentioned them by name, so I won't, but they know who they are. We welcome you here this afternoon, ladies. You don't have to clap for them, but we do welcome them.

And also I will go ahead and give my opening statement. I recognize myself for 5 minutes, and then we will recognize the very distinguished ranking member Mr. Ackerman for the same purpose.

I want to welcome all my colleagues to this hearing. One week ago the House Committee on Foreign Affairs heard the testimony of Secretary of State Clinton on the administration's policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although the details continue to change, the fundamental underlying policy remains the same, and it is driven by one key objective, withdrawal by the end of 2014.

Unfortunately, although the 2014 withdrawal date may be politically expedient, it is, in my view, strategically risky. The counterinsurgency strategy that President Obama announced at West Point in December 2009 depends on two key objectives, providing population centric security to create the space for governance, and an enduring commitment to fighting the insurgents to ensure that there is no doubt that they will ultimately lose.

Both of these are determined by setting and, more importantly, stating a withdrawal date. If Afghans and regional actors do not believe we are committed to their safety, then they are likely to accommodate insurgents in an attempt to hedge their bets in advance of our anticipated departure. Similarly, if the insurgents believe that we will depart by a certain date, they will likely be confident in their ultimate victory. This last point is especially important.

Reconciliation, which is the administration's current means of bridging the gap between the status quo and the 2014 withdrawal date, is, if at all possible, only so if the insurgents face certain defeat.

As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently noted, "if you negotiate while your forces are withdrawing, you are not in a great negotiating position."

I will confess that trying to make sense of the administration's policy calls to mind Yogi Berra's famous admonition that "when you come to a fork in the road, take it." This is what we appear to be doing, which is to say that it is not clear to me what we are doing.

The administration initially refrained from a strict counterterrorism strategy and opted instead for a more robust counterinsurgency campaign. It has not, however, allocated enough time, resources or energy to properly implement this policy. It appears to lack what Ambassador Crocker has referred to as "strategic patience."

Transition has begun, yet it is taking place under conditions that have yet to be defined alongside inconclusive information on the current conditions. In short, it is unclear what we are doing, when we are doing it, how we are doing it, and even when we are trying—what we are trying to accomplish beyond withdrawal as soon as possible.

As one reporter recently noted, the current strategy is an attempt to fold disparate policy elements into a comprehensive package as the administration tries to fashion an exit that will not leave Afghanistan open to civil war or the reestablishment of terrorist bases. Indeed it appears as though the administration is, at best, slouching toward the door instead of running to it.

The situation in which the administration finds itself is nothing short, in my view, of a strategic mess. Sound strategic thinking dictates that you first define your objective and then formulate your policy to achieve it. The current policy, however, has it backwards. Until 2014, we will try everything possible to salvage something that can be called victory, because withdrawal by 2014 appears to be the administration's sole objective. The result is a strategic race to the bottom in which objectives are stretched and sliced to fit the means that the administration is willing to employ on any given day.

And then there is Pakistan. As I am sure our witnesses will explain, the continued sanctuary offered to insurgents on the Pakistani side of the Afghan border short-circuits any gains that we are able to make against key insurgent groups and renders them unsustainable. And although Secretary Clinton testified that the administration has made clear to the Pakistanis that the time has come for this shelter to cease, I remain skeptical. These warnings have been issued for years to no avail.

I am also very concerned about the administration's latest plan, which involves using the Pakistani Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence, the ISI, to reach out to insurgents. Although it may make sense in the context of reconciliation, it risks rewarding the very elements which continue to be responsible for sheltering insurgents who kill Americans and Afghans alike.

None of this, of course, even begins to address the implications of this policy for India, which has been, continues to be, and, I hope, will remain a close ally and friend of the United States.

Unlike in some places, U.S. national security interests in South Asia are both dire and immediate. If we leave Afghanistan too soon, the odds are high that it will once again devolve into a state of affairs in which terrorists can once again thrive. If that is the case, I fear we may find ourselves not discussing our departure from Afghanistan, but our return.

And I would now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York, the distinguished ranking member of the committee, Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank my friend and chairman very much. I appreciate his remarks and thank him for calling this hearing.

Before I begin, I would just like as well to welcome our new colleague to the committee. Mr. Turner, welcome. I would point out that he is not only new to the committee, but he is a neighbor of mine back in my home county of Queens. Welcome, Bob.

There is an old saying well known to all of us: The enemy of my enemy is my friend. Unfortunately, this is nonsense. The enemy of my enemy is my enemy's enemy. That is it. There are no implied obligations or warranties. International politics has no freebies.

To state what should be obvious, but somehow is not, Pakistan, meaning both the nominally democratic civilian government and the unelected but ultimately decisive Pakistani military establishment, is not our friend. They are not our allies. They are not our partners. They are not on our team. They are not on our side. And no matter how much aid that we give them, no matter what military capabilities we provide them, and no matter what promises,

assurances or pledges we make to them, these facts are not going to change. Pakistan is on its own side, period.

Notwithstanding the considerable number of Pakistanis who would like to try life in the United States, or the great success of the many truly loyal Pakistani Americans who have done so and contribute so much to their new country, 75 percent of the Pakistanis in Pakistan have an unfavorable opinion of our country and believe that the United States is the source of that country's problems.

That is just a little piece of what \$22 billion of our taxpayers' money has brought us since 2002 in Pakistan. A considerable part of those funds have also enhanced Pakistan's nuclear weapons delivery capability, notwithstanding either our nonproliferation laws or the purported limitations that we have insisted upon with regard to the F-16 fighter bombers that we have sold them.

At the same time, there is simply no question that Pakistan has been a critical facilitator of our campaign to drive al-Qaeda out of Afghanistan and to dismantle and eliminate its capacity to conduct worldwide terrorist operations. Pakistan's tacit cooperation has also been essential to our efforts to help establish an independent, democratic government in Afghanistan. The bulk of the fuel, ammunition and other supplies for our troops are sent through Pakistan. Critical counterterrorist assets of ours depend on Pakistan's cooperation to operate effectively. Pakistan has been critical to the apprehension and delivery to justice of key figures in al Qaeda. So Pakistan is essential.

But Pakistan is also perfidious, and that is our problem in a nutshell. While cooperating with us, Pakistan has also been a critical facilitator of Taliban and other violent, radical Jihadist organizations attacking our troops, seeking to undermine the Afghan Government, and conducting terrorism against our allies. These facts are not secret. One need not have access to classified information to know the details of Pakistan's partnership with violent religious extremists. One only needs access to newspapers and magazines.

It is not a secret that the Afghan Taliban has been based in Quetta, Pakistan, since Afghanistan and the United States drove them out of Afghanistan in 2002. Quetta is not an especially big city, and the Taliban presence there isn't even particularly discreet. From Quetta the leadership of the Taliban every day is orchestrating attacks on our Government and on our troops.

It is not a secret that the Haqqani network is responsible for numerous attacks on the Afghan Government and our troops. It is not a secret that Lashkar-e-Tayibba, which was responsible for the horrific November 2008 massacre of civilians in Mumbai, India, an attack that clearly implicated the Pakistani military, operates openly in Pakistan.

The Government of Pakistan has made no effort to interfere, disrupt, arrest or shut down any of these groups or their activities. It is no secret that Osama bin Laden was living comfortably in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Pakistan insists it had no knowledge or complicity in his presence there. I would like to think that if the world's most wanted criminal in the history of criminals purchased a sizable parcel of land and built a secure compound less than a

mile from the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, just 32 miles from our Capital, we might just know about it.

Pakistan is not our pal, our buddy, or our chum. It is a sovereign state pursuing its own self-defined interests in what it perceives to be a tough neighborhood, but they contribute to making it tough. And to state yet another obvious fact, Pakistan's self-defined national interest has very little overlap with our own. In that small area where their interests and ours converge, we can and do cooperate. And the rest of the time they cooperate in varying levels of commission and omission, with the people killing our troops, conducting terrorist acts against our allies, and trying to bring down the Afghan Government.

Currently the United States has designated Iran, Syria, Sudan and Cuba as state sponsors of terrorism under U.S. law. Such a designation requires a ban on arms-related exports and sales, strict controls over exports of dual-use items, and a prohibition on economic assistance and imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions. But for our genuine need for cooperation in the campaign against al Qaeda, there appears to be very little standing in the way of designating Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism, very, very, very little.

Were that it was so, but it is time to wake up from the naive and sentimental dream that there is friendship and broad cooperation and accept reality. Pakistan's national interests are generally contrary to ours and that of our actual allies, and they pursue those contrary interests through the use of violent proxies and terrorism. That is not likely to change. It is time for our policy and our assistance to come back into relation with reality instead of fanciful expectation.

Paying Pakistan to kill bad guys makes sense. Bribing Pakistan, which is what our aid really is, for license and cooperation in the efforts to kill bad guys is also reasonable. But we need to rid ourselves of the absurd notion that we can change Pakistan, reform its government or create real trust. We have neither the capacity nor the capability, and we certainly don't have the spare billions to keep throwing away on those fool's errands. No more magical thinking. It is time to grow up and deal with Pakistan as it is, not as we wish it to be.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Ackerman.

The bells that you have heard, or at least the buzzing that you have heard, is the votes on the floor. What I am going to try to do is get the introductions in here now, and probably, Ambassador, we will get your testimony in, which is limited to 5 minutes. And then we will go over and vote, and then we will come back as soon as the votes are over and take the rest and then ask questions.

So I will try to go through these relatively quickly, although we have such a distinguished panel, there is an awful lot to say about them.

We will begin with Zalmay Khalilzad. Ambassador Khalilzad is president of Gryphon Partners, a consulting and investment firm focused on the Middle East and Central Asia. From 2007 to 2009, he served as the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Prior to that he served as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005, and then as U.S. Ambassador to Iraq from 2005

to 2007. He also served as U.S. Special Presidential Envoy to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2003. Ambassador Khalilzad sits on the board of the National Endowment for Democracy. He is also a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Next we have Lieutenant General David W. Barno. General Barno, a highly decorated military officer with over 30 years of service, has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States and around the world.

In 2003, he was selected to establish a new three-star operational headquarters in Afghanistan and take command of the 20,000 U.S. and coalition forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. From 2006 to 2010, General Barno served as the director of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. He frequently serves as an expert consultant on counterinsurgency and irregular warfare, professional military education and the changing character of conflict.

We next have Ashley J. Tellis. Dr. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, specializing in international security, defense and Asian-specific issues. While on assignment to the U.S. Department of State as senior adviser to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, he was intimately involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India. Previously he was commissioned into the Foreign Service and served as senior adviser to the Ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi. He also served on the National Security Council staff as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Strategic Planning and Southwest Asia. In addition to numerous Carnegie and RAND reports, his academic publications have appeared in many edited volumes and journals.

And finally, we have C. Christine Fair. Dr. Fair is an assistant professor in the Center for Peace and Security Studies within Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. Previously she has served as senior political scientist with the RAND Corporation, a political officer to the United Nations Mission to Afghanistan and Kabul, and as senior research associate at USIP's Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. She is also a senior fellow with the counterterrorism center at West Point.

Dr. Fair holds a bachelor in biological chemistry, a master's in public policy, as well as a master's and Ph.D. in South Asian languages and civilizations, all from the University of Chicago.

As I say, a very distinguished panel here this afternoon.

Ambassador Khalilzad, if you wouldn't mind beginning. Now, everyone gets 5 minutes, so we would ask you to stick within that. There is a lighting system. When the red light comes on, we ask you to all stop if at all possible, and then we are going to go over and vote. We will be back and hear the rest.

Ambassador Khalilzad, you are recognized for 5 minutes. If you will just push the button there, that will turn the mike on.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ZALMAY KHALILZAD, PH.D.,
COUNSELOR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES**

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman, Mr. Turner. It is a pleasure to be here, and thank you

for the opportunity to testify. I have submitted a longer statement for the record, and, with your permission, I will summarize.

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. Without objection, that will be included in the record, the full statement.

Mr. KHALILZAD. I am delighted to be here with my colleagues, particularly General Barno, with whom I had the pleasure of serving in Afghanistan.

This hearing is about U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan 2014 and beyond. The degree to which the U.S. exceeds in achieving key objectives over the next 3 years will determine policy options beyond 2014.

We face a range of possible futures and a corresponding range of required adaptations and responses. At one end of the spectrum, the U.S. and Afghanistan could conclude a long-term strategic partnership agreement. Pakistan could support an Afghan agreement and bringing U.S.-Afghan relations, as well as U.S.-Pakistan relations, more in alignment. And the Afghan Government could make progress on governance issues. In such a scenario the U.S. role could shift to toward sustaining an internal Afghan settlement, turning the Afghan security force—training the Afghan security forces, providing a regional military overwatch against remaining al Qaeda and affiliate threats, and promoting Afghan economic development, reducing Pakistan's reliance on militants to counter regional rivals, and assisting it in establishing enduring reserves of strategic strength to pursue its legitimate interests and compete, and regional economic integration.

In both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the U.S. would assist in strengthening democratic institutions and accountable government. The U.S. in such a scenario would be able to reduce its military presence in Afghanistan without assuming a significant increase in risk.

At the other end of the spectrum, Pakistan could continue to support the insurgency in Afghanistan, the Afghan Government could remain on a path of denial regarding governance issues, and reconciliation efforts with the Taliban are unsuccessful.

In such a scenario, the U.S. would need to consider a strategy of isolation and containment against Pakistan. Containment would require a larger residual U.S. force, and Afghan forces would need to be bolstered to withstand Pakistan's possible escalation of pressure.

But sustaining such a posture will be difficult if the Afghan Government continues its refusal to deal seriously with issues such as corruption and rule of law. Proceeding with a major withdrawal of U.S. troops in such a scenario would likely worsen the situation in Afghanistan, especially if other responsible regional powers such as India do not compensate for the U.S. withdrawal.

Of course, there are a number of potential scenarios in between the two that I mentioned. The U.S., in my judgment, can increase the likelihood of a positive scenario in 2014 by taking two steps now. First, we should implement a two-stage policy to induce Pakistan to support a reasonable Afghan settlement. Stage one would consist of a high-level U.S.-Afghan effort with Pakistan to determine its legitimate interests in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan and Pakistan should not be a source of security problems for each other. As part of a settlement, Pakistan would need to end its military support for the insurgents and use its influence to bring insurgent groups to the negotiating table for reconciliation.

Since changing the Pakistani posture and getting to an Afghan settlement will be difficult, no doubt, the U.S. can increase prospects for positive movement by complementing its own bilateral efforts with each of these two countries by engaging other big power stakeholders in Afghanistan's stability—China, India, Russia, European and Asian allies, and a number of regional states—and developing a joint approach to an Afghan settlement.

If Islamabad refuses to cooperate, Washington will need to consider escalating pressure in stage 2 by dramatically reducing military assistance, curtailing and imposing additional conditions on support programs to Pakistan through international financial institutions such as IMF, increasing military operations against the Haqqani network and irreconcilable Taliban in Pakistan, reaching out to Taliban willing to reconcile without coordinating such effort with Pakistan, and decreasing reliance on Pakistan by expanding the northern corridor to transport goods to Pakistan.

Mr. CHABOT. Mr. Ambassador, I hate to cut you off.

Mr. KHALILZAD. Can I say one more sentence?

Mr. CHABOT. Yes.

Mr. KHALILZAD. In addition, of course, we will have to push the Afghan Government to tackle governance issues that it has refused to do. In the aftermath of signing a partnership agreement and a sharper focus on Pakistan, in my judgment, there will be an opportunity for perhaps decreasing the gap between us and the Afghan Government and increasing the room for cooperation.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. We appreciate it.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Khalilzad follows:]

Zalmay Khalilzad

Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
President, Gryphon Partners

3 November 2011

“2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I”

House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia

Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, and Committee members: thank you for the opportunity to testify on the strategy of the United States toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, both in the near term and in the years beyond 2014 -- when the Afghan government is scheduled to assume the lead for security operations nationwide.

In short, what happens in 2014 and beyond will depend on the success or failure of U.S. strategy between now and then, especially with regards to the following goals:

- Eliminating terrorist sanctuaries in the region;
- Catalyzing a strategic shift in Pakistani policy from supporting those who are fighting NATO and Afghan forces — the Taliban, the Haqqani network and others – to facilitating a political settlement in Afghanistan;
- Persuading the Afghan government to deal with governance issues such as corruption and the rule of law;
- Transferring security responsibilities to the Afghan government; and
- Pursuing a positive outlook for the region based on economic integration and the establishment of a New Silk Road that would benefit all countries.

If the US achieve these objectives, Afghanistan as well as the surrounding region will cross important thresholds toward self-sustaining stability. If the US falls short, the future will remain difficult and violent.

Success in achieving these objectives would allow the US to reduce its military footprint while maintaining its ability to support an internal Afghan settlement, provide over watch of the region, and prevent al Qaeda and other terrorist groups from reestablishing sanctuaries in the country.

Failure would create a dilemma for the US. Either the US would need to pursue an active policy of containment against Pakistan -- which would require a much larger U.S. presence in Afghanistan -- or accept significantly greater risks to US national security.

Three main factors will determine whether the United States can achieve the objectives necessary to stabilize the region.

(1) Pakistani Policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan: Will Islamabad continue to try to inflict a strategic defeat on the United States in Afghanistan, or will it change its policies?

So far Pakistan, the U.S., and Afghanistan have not been working together. Indeed, they have been mostly working at cross purposes. This puts the US and Afghan governments in a difficult position with few obvious options. The US may have been better-positioned had it dealt with the Pakistan problem five or six years ago, when threats to escalate pressure would have been viewed as much more credible. Now, the impression in the region is that the US seeks to disengage from the conflict.

Secretary Clinton's recent trip to Islamabad indicates that the Obama Administration appreciates the importance of addressing Pakistan's policies. But it is not clear that the administration's diplomacy, including Secretary Clinton's trip, has convinced Pakistan to make necessary changes. Militant groups continue to operate from Pakistani territory against the US and Afghanistan.

Changing Pakistani attitudes will not be easy. Many in Islamabad believe that the United States is on its way out of Afghanistan due to domestic political and economic circumstances. They also believe that the United States has been, and continues to be, insensitive to Pakistani concerns given Washington's ongoing efforts to strengthen ties with India.

To induce Pakistan to change its Afghan policy in a positive direction, the United States should be prepared to respect legitimate Pakistani concerns in Afghanistan. Afghanistan should not be a source of security problems for Pakistan. However, if Islamabad refuses to cooperate, Washington will need to consider several adjustments to induce a change in Pakistani behavior. The US should consider: dramatic reduction in military assistance; curtailment of support programs to Pakistan through international financial institutions like the IMF; and increased military operations against militant Taliban headquarters and related facilities on Pakistani territory.

(2) The Performance of the Afghan Government: Will the Afghan government implement far-reaching governance reforms?

Especially in recent years, the Afghan government has refused to deal seriously with key national issues such as corruption and the rule of law. This is causing a growing gap between the central government and the Afghan people.

The United States is in the final phase of negotiations with the Afghan government on a strategic partnership agreement. Although factions opposing the agreement are organizing with the support of hostile neighbors, most Afghans support the deal and regard it as important to their country's success.

If remaining issues are resolved and the agreement is signed, it will be important for the United States to follow up by pushing the Afghan government on governance issues such as fighting corruption and consolidating democracy and the rule of law. President Karzai has implied that he is not moving on governance issues due to a crisis of confidence with the US. He has indicated that he will undertake reforms once the future of U.S.-Afghan relations has been clarified. Whether pro-reform movements in Afghan society mobilize effectively will be an important factor in how Karzai and others in the Kabul proceed. Many traditional leaders, civic society groups, and Afghanistan's large youth cohort strongly desire an end to corruption and respect for the rule of law.

(3) Role of major powers and other neighbors: What kind of a role will the US and other major powers play in catalyzing progress?

Cementing a long-term U.S. and NATO military presence in Afghanistan will do a great deal to enable counterterrorism missions in the region and bolster the size and capacity of the Afghan National Security forces. As the U.S. and NATO reduce deployments to Afghanistan, part of the resulting savings should be shifted to supporting Afghan security forces until the regional situation stabilizes or until the Afghan economy can support those costs.

If necessary, the US should be prepared to assume the burdens of continuing counterterrorism operations and building up Afghanistan's security forces unilaterally. Sustained US involvement on these fronts is essential to prevent counterproductive hedging by Afghan political players and regional powers. If the United States is committed to Afghan security, potentially destabilizing actors will accommodate the reality of the US presence. If US commitment appears to be waning, internal spoilers and regional powers will refuse to cooperate and will maneuver for advantage in a post-American Afghanistan.

The United States can increase the likelihood of Pakistani cooperation by coordinating its approach with other stakeholders in regional stability. China, India, Russia, our European and Asian allies and a number of regional states have large interests in play. US leadership could galvanize multilateral support for a reasonable settlement.

Besides facilitating an Afghanistan-Pakistan settlement, the US should focus on promoting Afghan development. US efforts – preferably in conjunction with allies – should focus on three areas: strengthening Afghan institutions so that aid can be delivered reliably through the Afghan government; engaging the private sector in helping Afghanistan develop its agriculture sector and mineral wealth; and creating the New Silk Road to connect Central and South Asia. Currently the New Silk Road initiative is largely a slogan. Specific negotiations need to commence quickly to reduce barriers to trade and develop roads, rails, pipelines, and other necessary infrastructure projects.

The degree to which the US succeeds in achieving key objectives over the next three years will determine U.S. policy options beyond 2014. Rather than planning for a single-point prescription,

the US should conceive of a range of possible futures and a corresponding range of required responses.

At one end of the spectrum, the United States could succeed in achieving the objectives enumerated above. The U.S. role in this scenario could shift toward sustaining an internal Afghan settlement, providing a regional military over watch, and promoting regional economic integration. If Pakistan supports a regional settlement and the Afghan government moves on governance issues, the United States will be able to reduce its military presence in the country without assuming a significant increase in risk. Provided that the US negotiates a long-term strategic partnership with Afghanistan and leaves a sizable enough residual force after 2014, Afghan forces will be able to assume responsibility for most of the country's security problems such as the remaining al-Qaida sanctuaries in the country.

U.S. economic assistance at this point would need to focus on stimulating Afghanistan's economy to reduce the country's reliance on foreign aid. U.S. diplomacy could facilitate this goal by promoting regional economic integration through the New Silk Road initiative. Proactive U.S. engagement would also be necessary in ensuring the implementation of any reconciliation agreement and in pushing for progress on rule of law, human rights and related governance issues. Ongoing assistance also would be needed for Pakistan with the right balance of economic, political and military support.

At the other end of the spectrum, the United States could fail to achieve key intermediate objectives in the run up to 2014. If Pakistan continues to support the insurgency, the Afghan government remains on its path of denial regarding governance issues, and reconciliation efforts between the Taliban and the Afghan government falter, the United States would face greater challenges, riskier options, and a more protracted period of heavy engagement.

Proactive regional and major power diplomacy now will better position the US to win support from key players should a containment strategy become necessary. The U.S. should start supplementing its bilateral approach to securing a reasonable settlement with a broader diplomatic initiative to exert pressure on Pakistan.

A containment strategy against Pakistan would inevitably inform U.S. policies toward Afghanistan. The residual U.S. force would have to be larger and Afghan forces would need to be bolstered further to withstanding Pakistan's possible escalation of indirect or direct military pressure.

Proceeding with a major withdrawal of U.S. troops in this scenario, especially if other regional powers such as India do not compensate with greater engagement, would likely worsen the situation in Afghanistan. It could put an unbearable burden on Afghan security forces while encouraging key Afghan players to hedge in destabilizing ways.

In any scenario, the United States would be unwise to disengage from the region. The potential reemergence of a terrorist threat from al Qaeda and other groups, which inflicted such great harm on the US and the world ten years ago, must be taken seriously. The US must uphold its commitments to friends and partners in the region who joined our side after 9/11.

As in Europe and East Asia in the postwar period, consolidating U.S. security interests requires engagement for the long haul in Southwest Asia. While the US can calibrate what precise level of engagement is needed based on circumstances on the ground, there should be no ambiguity about the United States' commitment to success.

Despite the challenges, the overall U.S. economic and security role in the region provides it with important leverage in shaping events over the next three years. U.S. policy will play a critical role in determining the options that exist in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2014 and beyond.

Thank you and I'll be happy to take your questions.

Mr. CHABOT. We are going to be in recess now where we are going to vote. Apparently it is not going to be too long. We only have a couple of votes. Thank you. We will be right back.

[Recess.]

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. The committee will come back to order once again. Sorry for the interruption there. And we are back now from votes and ready to go, so we are going to go with General Barno now. And, General, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL DAVID W. BARNO,
SENIOR ADVISOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR A NEW
AMERICAN SECURITY**

General BARNO. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you very much for granting us all the opportunity to testify today. I am certainly honored to be in this distinguished group of long-term friends here, especially Ambassador Khalilzad, who spent 19 months together with me in Kabul here some years back. So I look forward to our opportunity to talk today.

Over the last several years, I have had a number of chances to speak in front of this committee and others in the House and Senate about Afghanistan. I recently returned from a 7-day trip to Afghanistan and so have some current outlook based upon traveling around the country that I will try and share portions of in my opening statement and other aspects in my written report.

I also have two sons that are Army captains in the U.S. Army, and both have served in Afghanistan and will continue to serve there as our presence is sustained in the coming years. So I have got a family connection and a lot of equity in the Afghan project for many years to come.

This report in my written testimony is drawn just from my just-completed trip to Afghanistan. I also traveled to Pakistan earlier this year and have some insights from that.

I would start by making the larger strategic point, perhaps, about our presence in Afghanistan, and that is that the United States continues to have vital national security interests at stake in South and Central Asia, and these interests transcend our current presence and our current military activities in Afghanistan itself.

The vital importance of protecting these interests must not become obscured by too narrow a focus on Afghanistan or our impending drawdown. In fact, I would argue that our drawdown must be shaped with the ultimate protection of our long-term vital interests first in mind.

I had identified three vital U.S. security interests that should dominate our thinking as we continue to adjust our force presence in Afghanistan. This narrows down what I think we need to do and protect in the region. First, we need to prevent the region's use—and the region, I would say here, would include Afghanistan, Pakistan, surrounding states—prevent the region's use as a base for terror groups to attack the United States or our allies, avoiding a repeat of another 9/11.

Secondly, I think we need to ensure that nuclear weapons in the region do not fall into the hands of terrorists or otherwise proliferate. And this takes us clearly to Pakistan.

And, third, I think we have an interest, a vital interest, in preventing a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan.

Protecting these vital U.S. interests in the coming years must be the ultimate objective of our upcoming transition in Afghanistan. If the outcome of our transition and drawdown puts these vital U.S. interests at risk, we will have failed entirely in our mission in Afghanistan, one that has cost the United States over 1,300 lives, hundreds of billions of dollars, and 10 years of great sacrifice.

So a few observations, perhaps, from my recent trip. First, on success, it is unclear, traveling around Afghanistan, visiting with many American units and American diplomats over the last week or so—it is relatively unclear that the U.S. or the international community has a precise or clear definition of the end state of the conflict, one which equals success.

There are many outlooks on where we are going, what is Afghan good enough, what is acceptable or unacceptable in terms of the outcomes, but this lack of an agreed-upon definition of success, and also an agreed-upon long-term U.S. presence, undercuts our aims and our claims of an enduring commitment to Afghanistan and to the region.

There is deep uncertainty about the long-term seriousness of the U.S. commitment, and that colors every aspect of our involvement and distorts the judgments of our friends and foes alike. Signing this strategic partnership agreement is extraordinarily important.

Secondly, on sustainability, nearly all U.S. commanders recognize that the significant success that has been achieved over the last 18 months is fragile and reversible. Unspoken often is the reality that these gains that have been achieved at significant cost in blood and treasure by the United States ultimately have to be sustained by Afghan security forces. While there is an energetic program in place to recruit, train and organize these forces, I found less evidence of a structure and an organization designed to advise and assist these forces in combat as the U.S. begins to draw down its combat presence in Afghanistan.

Today most of the counterinsurgency fight is taken on by American units without the Afghan forces playing a central role. I think that needs to change in the coming years, and we need to focus on preparing the Afghans and getting them into the fight, reorganizing our military effort to do that.


Finally, on troop morale, 10 years into a very hard fight, the U.S. military that is deployed in Afghanistan, Army, Marines, Air Force, Navy, is a superbly trained and well-led force. Their morale is high, and they continue to take the fight to the enemy aggressively every day. They are arguably the most militarily proficient units we have ever fielded, aggressive, focused, tactically skilled, agile and immensely professional.

All Americans should be proud of these young men and women. They deserve our full support and undimmed admiration for as long as we ask them to sustain this very tough fight. They are true American heroes.

Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, General. Thank you for your service and your sons as well.

[The prepared statement of General Barno follows:]



November 3, 2011

Testimony Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee

Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia

Lieutenant General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.)

Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security


Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you very much for granting me the opportunity to testify today. I am honored to take part in this session.

In my Congressional testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee (February 2009), HASC Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs (March 2009), and full House Armed Services Committee (April 2009, July 2011), I had the opportunity to outline my assessment of the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and offer some prescriptions. This report is drawn from impressions gathered on a just completed seven-day visit to Afghanistan, updating my earlier perspective and looking at the road ahead.

Progress Amidst a Changing U.S. Strategic Context

In early 2009, it became evident the international effort in Afghanistan was “drifting toward failure” and success could be achieved only if dramatic changes were applied -- most of all, a dramatic re-assertion of American leadership. Success required “Leadership plus Strategy plus Resources.” In 2009, our efforts were falling deeply short in all three components of this equation.

While much has changed in Afghanistan since 2009, even more has changed in the global strategic context for the United States -- the arena within which the Afghan conflict is being fought. The impacts of the U.S. housing, auto and financial meltdowns in late 2008 continue to be keenly felt domestically today. U.S. debt and deficits have reached unprecedented levels, impacting our ability to sustain costly military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in ways not felt even two years ago. In Europe, the Eurozone economic crisis combined with deep declines in military spending across the NATO alliance offer scant support for any expectation that the United States will get more out of our allies, the uneven NATO performance in Libya notwithstanding. Osama bin Laden has been killed in a daring U.S. strike into the heart of Pakistan that calls into deep question the efficacy of our fraught ally in Islamabad. The American people are weary of war, and polls indicate majorities of Americans favor ending the Afghan war rapidly. Around the world, friends and allies worry about a United States in decline, and seek reassurance about the long-term U.S. commitment to sustained engagement as a global leader as they view our economic troubles with grave concern. As a nation, the United States is clearly navigating in much different waters today than two years ago -- and our policies in Afghanistan must be shaped in light of these indisputable facts.




That said, the United States continues to have vital national security interests at stake in South and Central Asia -- interests that transcend Afghanistan itself. The vital importance of protecting these interests must not become obscured by a too-narrow focus on Afghanistan or on our impending drawdown there. *In fact, our drawdown must be shaped with the ultimate protection of long-term vital U.S. interests foremost.*

Protecting three vital U.S. security interests should dominate our thinking as we begin to drawdown forces in Afghanistan: 1) Preventing the region's use as a base for terror groups to attack the United States and our allies 2) Ensuring nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of terrorists and 3) Preventing a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. Protecting these vital U.S. interests in the coming years must be the penultimate objective of our coming transition in Afghanistan. If the outcome of this transition ultimately puts these vital U.S. interests at grave risk, we will have failed entirely in our mission in Afghanistan -- one that has cost the United States over 1,400 lives, hundreds of billions of dollars and over ten years of great sacrifice.

* * * * *

The Situation: Fall 2011

An assessment of our efforts in Afghanistan in November 2011 suggests re-examining the three variables of the success equation posed in early 2009. In each of these variables -- leadership, strategy and resources -- the United States has dramatically improved its position in the last two-plus years. Generals Stanley McChrystal, David Petraeus and now John Allen have brought immense talent and counter-insurgency experience to bear in Afghanistan, and their exceptional military leadership has had a markedly positive effect on the war. At the same time, our strategy has shifted from a muddled, NATO-centric "don't fracture the alliance" approach to one focused on counter-insurgency principles, tailored for the unique environment of Afghanistan, and infused with assertive American leadership of the heretofore fractured multi-national effort. Finally, resources have been increased dramatically, enabling this new leadership armed with a new strategy to make substantial gains toward a successful outcome. President Bush began, and President Obama dramatically increased, a major reinforcement of troops shifting the U.S. component from 33,000 to nearly 100,000 troops on the ground today. Our allies have also increased their numbers during this period, although in limited ways that are now declining. Aid and development dollars have grown, and increased numbers of civilians have deployed to work with the U.S. military in the counter-insurgency effort. The combination of these significant changes in leadership, strategy and resources have turned around a mission that was clearly on the road to failure in early 2009 -- reversing a period of decline wherein the whole of NATO's effect was far less than the sum of its parts, and one in



which the Taliban had escalated their attacks and seized the initiative, putting NATO on its back foot. In notable ways, much of this has now changed.


An infusion of nearly 70,000 additional U.S. troops has dramatically reversed the Taliban's momentum and taken away their de facto control of large swathes of southern Afghanistan, notably Kandahar and Helmand provinces, the birthplace of the Taliban. The results of fighting in the East have been more mixed, largely as a result of coalition efforts directing the military "main effort" to the south. Major upticks in "kinetic" operations targeting the Taliban leadership have badly damaged the continuity of the organization, while creating important leverage toward bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. While the ultimate effect of this campaign against the diverse groups that comprise the Taliban is not yet certain, there is little question that sustained military pressure remains a crucial component in incentivizing any negotiations.

In the areas where the Taliban has been rolled back, Afghan governance has improved, businesses have returned, and prosperity and personal security notably improved. Sustaining these fragile and hard-won gains will likely prove to be the top challenge of 2012 and beyond -- and will ultimately be a central test for growing Afghan security forces and government. Americans cannot secure these gains over the long haul -- only Afghans can.

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have also dramatically grown and improved during this period. Under the dynamic leadership of Lt. General Bill Caldwell, commander of NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan, the ANSF now comprise 164,000 Army and 126,000 police, up from 79,000 and 95,000 respectively in early 2009. More importantly, their quality, training and equipment has steadily improved, posturing them to take on the counter-insurgency fight as the U.S. transition begins this summer and continues into next year and beyond.

Yet while the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan today has largely seized the battlefield initiative from the Taliban, serious difficulties remain. Sustaining the success of the last 18 months will be perhaps even more problematic than the campaign that has wrenched the momentum away from the enemy, and now has put him on his back foot. Corruption and lack of Afghan capacity remain crippling problems, and little progress has emerged in these areas. Next door, relations between the United States and Pakistan have declined to perhaps their lowest point in recent memory, a development that will have immense potential influence on the shape of the next several years in Afghanistan. Similarly, cross-border tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan remain a significant barrier to a comprehensive regional security framework.

As General Allen and Ambassador Ryan Crocker now fully take charge of this effort, they face major challenges. The United States is well served by having these two incredibly skilled and experienced



professionals at the helm in Afghanistan during this critical period. America has chosen well in selecting these two dedicated and exceptional leaders -- and their talents are about to be tried.


Observations

Some observations from my recent trip outline the scope of the challenges:

Success and End Game: It is unclear whether the United States or the international community in Afghanistan has an adequately clear definition of the end state of the conflict which equates to "success." Disparate outlooks on where we are going, what is "Afghan good enough," what is acceptable or unacceptable in terms of outcomes on corruption, women's rights, democratic government, local reconciliation, militias permeate all aspects of our effort. The lack of an agreed-upon long term U.S. presence undercuts our claims of enduring commitment. Deep uncertainty about the long-term seriousness of the U.S. commitment colors every aspect of our involvement, and distorts judgments by friends and foes alike about our staying power in the region.

Sustainability: Nearly all U.S. commanders commenting on the success that has been achieved in recent months will note that gains are "fragile and reversible." Often unspoken is the fundamental reality that gains, often achieved at significant cost in blood and treasure by U.S. forces, must ultimately be sustained by Afghan national security forces (ANSF). Yet while there is an energetic program in place to recruit, train, organize and equip Afghan forces, there is much less evidence of a forcefully led structure designed to advise ANSF forces in combat operations, and maximize their effectiveness. This responsibility is largely borne today by conventional U.S. combat units – and the result is that U.S. units, normally on one year or seven month tours, concentrate on completing the mission assigned during their tour, largely without the Afghans playing a central role. Afghan security forces must be more rapidly and more widely placed into the lead for COIN efforts; if they fall short, now is the time to find that out and adjust our training and advisory effort accordingly. If the COIN mission cannot be performed successfully by ANSF, all of our gains are not sustainable.


Transition to Afghan Lead: The definition and commonly understood grass roots meaning of "transition" in Afghanistan needs refinement. When will U.S. troops no longer be able to conduct independent combat operations without a police warrant? When will U.S. combat units no longer be allowed to operate off their bases? How is Transition to Lead Security Responsibility (TLSR) different from the transition and consolidation driven by U.S. troop reductions? I posed this question during my recent trip: "How will this U.S. infantry battalion's mission change after transition? Answer: "It won't." Needless to say, that response tells a confusing story.



Organizing Toward a Primary Advisory Role: A large infusion of U.S. forces and dollars since early 2009 has created an “American ecosystem” in parts of the south and southwest of Afghanistan, notably in the provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. A crucial test of the gains experienced in these areas will be whether the Afghan government and security forces can maintain this elaborate system with far fewer dollars and in the face of the reality that U.S. troops will no longer be in the lead. In my judgment, a much greater investment needs to be made by U.S. forces now in enabling the Afghans to take lead, sooner. Organizing major parts of the remaining U.S. force more clearly toward the “Advise and Assist” mission is needed sooner, not later. If U.S. units were “handing off” their battlespace at the end of their current 9-month or 12-month tours to ANSF (as opposed to American) combat units, our approach would be radically different in terms of developing those very same ANSF units. Put another way, if rotation back to the United States was contingent on the status of training and readiness of local ANSF units to take over, the focus of current U.S. units on their counterparts would change markedly toward better preparing the Afghans. We need to redirect and accelerate these efforts.

Time for a Mission Change?: The current mission of U.S./ISAF forces in Afghanistan is COIN – directly leading military operations designed to protect the population and degrade the Taliban. This mission statement drives all manner of decisions from deployments of troops to determining the composition of the remaining force after the surge of 33,000 is withdrawn by October 2012. As long as “COIN” is the primary U.S. mission, American units will be taking the field determined to attack the Taliban and provide wide area security – and ANSF will remain in the back seat. Changing the U.S. mission no later than fall of 2012 to “security force assistance” rather than “COIN” will shift the U.S. main effort to a central focus on training, advising and enabling the ANSF. This will accelerate a shift to a more indirect approach by U.S. conventional units, and allow for a “test drive” of ANSF capabilities while we retain sufficient forces to backstop and adjust to identified shortfalls.

NATO: While non-U.S. NATO nations and nearly two dozen other countries provide various forms of military capability in Afghanistan, the “tax” upon U.S. forces to sustain these commitments as we begin to draw down our forces may become prohibitive. From the substantial amount of senior leader time devoted to “coalition maintenance” to the U.S. military resources (medevac, ISR, helicopter lift) set aside to enable NATO allies to conduct basic military missions, the cost of this portion of the effort is growing, not shrinking. NATO forces unable to provide largely self-sufficient forces outside of the primary combat zones (e.g. the North and West) should not be drawing from an ever-decreasing pool of U.S. assets in a drawdown period for their basic support. NATO structural requirements also contribute to vast headquarters bureaucracy across all NATO formations, thousands of whom never “leave the wire.” ISAF HQ today boasts 38 NATO generals, twelve times the number found in the U.S. HQ that ISAF replaced in 2007.




Afghan National Security Forces: An effective ANSF will ultimately be the ticket for U.S. combat forces to come home from Afghanistan. An ANSF enabled with U.S. advisors and access to other U.S. “enablers” – fires, air support, and logistics – will increasingly assume the direct COIN mission from U.S. combat forces in coming years. However, the very large number of U.S. combat forces now in Afghanistan now perversely mitigates against giving ANSF that mission – Americans can simply do it faster and better. U.S. forces need to look at reorganization in order to create a military structure that is first and foremost empowered and resourced to get Afghans into the COIN fight – not simply fight that fight ourselves while the Afghans are often largely on the sidelines. The overall U.S. advisory effort in Afghanistan today is fragmented, non-standard, decentralized and largely lacking any bureaucratic power or centralized senior leadership. A designated advisory command needs to be considered to give the vital advise and assist effort the senior leadership, resources and priority that is required for the next phase of the war.

Special Forces and the Village Stability Program: The Combined Forces Special Operations Command-Afghanistan has refined and grown local security force program known as the Village Stability Program (VSP), training and mentoring a growing number of Afghan Local Police. While this program is controversial in some circles (including President Karzai), in my judgment it offers the best prospect for local ownership of village security. It also provides a sustainable model that can be expanded and overseen by small numbers of U.S. Special Forces as the direct combat role of U.S. forces winds down. Its current cap of 30,000 should be expanded and its funding increased as a cost effective way to provide security owned by Afghan local leaders.

The Quetta Shura Taliban: The QST is on their back foot in southern and southwestern Afghanistan. They have been driven out of areas in which they traditionally held sway, and have been roughly rebuffed by U.S. forces in their attempts to reclaim this territory over the last five months. However, they remain resilient, adaptable to new tactics such as assassinations and high visibility attacks, and largely find a protected sanctuary for their senior leadership in Pakistan. They are biding their time for “the day after the Americans are gone.” In many areas, local fighters can often be generated at will for Taliban activities in response to the “invaders”; charting the locations where detainees are captured highlights the preponderant numbers captured close to their homes. The Afghan government is in a competition with the Taliban for security and governance. This competition revolves around two key questions: Can the ANSF sustain security gains made over the last 18 months, and can the Afghan government out-govern the Taliban during and after the U.S. drawdown?

Haqqani Network: The HQN remains the most dangerous of the insurgent groups operating in Afghanistan, and is largely based in the Waziristan tribal areas of Pakistan. Most accounts attribute the bulk of recent deadly attacks in Kabul and elsewhere in eastern Afghanistan to the Haqqanis. This organization is highly lethal and closely tied to al Qaeda. Given the limited U.S. ability to act directly




against the Haqqanis in Pakistan, and in light of Pakistan's inability or unwillingness to do so, the United States must look to leverage all the tools at our disposal to degrade and undermine this group. The formal designation of the Haqqani Network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization would allow the full force of international law to be brought against them and their supporters. This needs to happen as soon as possible, and be extended to any facilitators of their terrorist efforts as well.

Pakistan: Building on the experiences of my week-long trip to Pakistan in January 2011, I judge the current outlook as mixed. Pakistan continues to operate on multiple conflicting fronts, hedging against a future without a significant international and U.S. presence in Afghanistan. They remain utterly paranoid about Indian involvement in Afghanistan, and see the Taliban as a proxy against Indian support for the former northern alliance (and Baluch separatists that threaten Islamabad). An unstable Afghanistan may be seen as a better outcome for Pakistan than an Afghanistan with a large, well-equipped army that is supported by India. Pakistan is increasingly worried about the Haqqani Network and has been publicly quiescent about reported covert efforts by the U.S. to attack HQN. Iran and Pakistan may be complicit in undermining Afghan stability and hedging against U.S. goals.

Afghan Government Corruption: There is little positive to report on this front despite significant efforts by ISAF and the U.S. embassy. In my estimation, few substantive and lasting dents have been made in the pervasive corruption of Afghan government at most if not all levels. Massive infusions of U.S. dollars for development have fueled massive corruption on an unprecedented scale. One modest area of solid improvement is the new ISAF focus on military contracting standards and corruption avoidance in these large dollar enterprises.

The Afghan Economy and Stability: The removal beginning later this year of substantial numbers of troops and the support dollars and contracts that accompany them has potential to cause a dramatic recession in the Afghan economy. A sizeable portion of Afghan GDP is driven by these international contracts. The years 2012 through the end of 2014 will see major volatility in western military spending as bases are closed and consolidated, contracts finished, support staff dismissed and the 2009-2011 surge in western military spending reversed. It is unclear what effect this will have on the overall Afghan economy, on youth employment (especially in urban areas such as Kabul) or on nation-wide stability writ large. One issue to monitor carefully is whether a surge of unemployment linked to the military drawdown could create conditions of severe political unrest.

"Campaign Continuity:" Ten years into the war, the degree to which "first year enthusiasm" permeates all military and embassy efforts is striking. Six to seven month or even one year tours have guaranteed that military units and U.S. civilians will never accumulate a longitudinal perspective on the long arc of Afghan events- the "ten one year wars" phenomenon is pervasive. One senior U.S. civilian with a rare 18 months in Afghanistan described it: "It would be comical if it were not tragic. People spend 12 months



rolling the boulder up the hill only to see it roll back to the bottom when they go home. The next group arrives and then spends eight months trying to decide how to move the boulder.” Army units continue to arrive in Afghanistan on their first tour of duty, to include two- and three-star headquarters. While combat units at brigade and below arguably require force-wide rotation to maintain equity for arduous close combat duty, the same cannot be said of flag headquarters. This fair sharing of deployments has steepened the learning curve of units already dealing with the continuity challenge of one year (or less) rotations. Few military units we encountered had any visibility on events in their battlespace more than eighteen months in the past.

Troop Morale: Ten years into a very hard fight, the U.S. military deployed in Afghanistan -- Army, Marines, Air Force, Navy -- is a superbly trained and well-led force. Their morale is high, and they continue to take the fight to the enemy aggressively every single day. These are arguably the most militarily proficient units we have ever fielded -- aggressive, focused, tactically skilled, agile and immensely professional. All Americans should be proud of these young men and women -- they deserve our full support and undimmed admiration for as long as we ask them to sustain this very tough fight. They are true American heroes, and every one of us stands in their debt for their gritty everyday courage and their personal sacrifices.

Conclusion

While significant success has been achieved by U.S. and NATO forces since 2009, whether the Afghan government and security forces can sustain these gains is open to question. Accelerating the ANSF ownership of this fight while sufficient U.S. and NATO forces remain available to backstop shortfalls and adapt to problems is a needed corrective. The drawdown of U.S. forces has in fact provided a forcing function for the U.S. military headquarters to realign and re-prioritize its efforts, shaving headquarters and staff and focusing on critical tasks. However, the enemy has not been defeated, merely set back on his heels. Whether he remains knocked out or not will ultimately be determined by the fighting spirit and capabilities of Afghan security forces -- not U.S. or NATO troops. One (or more) additional fighting seasons with U.S. forces in the lead is unlikely to change that equation substantively -- especially given the external sanctuary enjoyed by the Taliban, and their demonstrated resilience and adaptability. It is time to consider a change of mission for U.S. forces effective no later than October of 2012, aimed at the long-term advise and assist requirement. The U.S. military needs to look closely at how to re-organize its remaining 68,000 forces today. We must find out sooner, rather than later, if the ANSF with U.S. advisory support and enablers can be an effective COIN force, and sustain the hard-won gains of the last two years. Only if the ANSF can effectively fight to sustain these will this entire effort ultimately be a sustainable one, and can U.S. policy objectives be met.

Mr. CHABOT. Dr. Tellis, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

**STATEMENT OF ASHLEY J. TELLIS, PH.D., SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

Mr. TELLIS. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for inviting us to testify this afternoon on the administration's policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. I have submitted a longer statement, and I request that to be entered into the Record.

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. Without objection, the full statement will be entered into the record.

Mr. TELLIS. I will focus my oral remarks right now on the specific issue of the challenges facing the administration's strategy. As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement, the administration's strategy is shaped by the realities of the security transition, which are coming in 2014.

As best one can tell today, the transition will be completed on schedule. But whether it will be a successful transition is an entirely different matter. I think there are two reasons to suspect the success of this transition. First, even though Afghan National Security Forces have made remarkable progress in recent years, they are still not up to the task of independently being able to protect their country against internal and external threats. And second, President Obama's decision to withdraw the surge troops in 2012 rather than after denies U.S. commanders the opportunity to further decimate the Taliban, especially in the east, before the security transition takes place.

These two facts, taken together, create an enormous conundrum for the success of the transition. And the administration has attempted to bridge the gap between what is required and what is available by focusing its resources on reconciliation with the Taliban. Reconciliation with the Taliban is a sensible strategy in principle, but it faces enormous obstacles to success in practice. For starters, it is not clear whether the Taliban have a genuine interest in reconciliation. They also do not believe that they have been decisively defeated by the United States at this point in time, and they certainly look to the security transition as heralding the moment when the United States will leave the region, thus leaving a weak Afghan state behind as easy pickings.

Furthermore, the fact that the security partnership that we are negotiating with Afghanistan is likely to leave a long-term U.S. presence will make the Afghan Taliban leadership even more skeptical of accepting a reconciliation on these terms.

All these issues, however, are manageable in comparison to the challenges posed by Pakistan. Pakistan's commitment to a strategy of managed jihadism and its policy of providing sanctuary to the Taliban will not change in the near term for the very simple reason American objectives and Pakistani objectives are objectively incompatible in Afghanistan.

What the United States seeks to do is to leave behind an Afghanistan after 2014, a state that is capable, effective and independent. What Pakistan wants in Afghanistan after 2014 is an Afghanistan that is anything but capable, effective and independent. And for Pakistan, the shura, the Haqqani network and all its affiliates are

really instruments for enforcing the subordination of Afghanistan to Pakistan over the long term.

Given this fact, the administration's reliance on Pakistan to forge a reconciliation policy is a dangerous gamble. It is simply not clear that Islamabad can come up with a solution that protects its ambitions, while at the same time advancing American and Afghan interests with respect to stability.

So what does that leave us in terms of what we ought to do? I think we ought to continue the efforts of reconciliation and regional support for reconciliation, but without any illusions about their success. I believe Afghan ownership of this process is critical, and the administration ought not to dilute it.

Second and most important, we ought to recommit strongly to hardening the Afghan state, which means comprehensively strengthening its state capacity and continuing a commitment to fund Afghan National Security Forces over the long term.

Third, we need to ensure that the strategic partnership reach of Afghanistan allows the United States sufficient basing rights to deploy the appropriate mix of air and ground forces both to satisfy our long-term counterterrorism objectives, as well as to be able to support Afghan National Security Force operations when required. In this connection, I would emphasize that we ought to not agree to the current Pakistani demand for the cease-fire as a precondition for negotiating with the insurgents.

Fourth, I would urge the administration to strongly reconsider the current withdrawal plan to at least permit the surge force to stay in Afghanistan beyond 2012, and I would urge that we continue the expansion of the northern distribution network as a hedge against Pakistan's continued failures.

Where Pakistan is concerned, I would make simply three points. First, we need to clearly terminate all conventional warfighting military equipment transfers that are paid for by the taxpayers; we ought to review the coalition support funds that are coming to provide to Pakistan; and, third, we ought to support civilian aid only if we can get Pakistan to make changes in its own state capacity to mobilize domestic resources.

Thank you for your attention, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Tellis follows:]



**2014 AND BEYOND:
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN,
PART I**

Testimony by **Ashley J. Tellis**
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House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
November 3, 2011

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for your invitation to testify on U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan. I will focus my remarks today on the Administration's current strategy and its prospects for success, given the evolving situation in the region.

Preparing for the 2014 Security Transition in Afghanistan

Led by the United States, the international community committed itself at the Lisbon Summit to complete a security transition in Afghanistan by 2014. By this date, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) will assume full responsibility for its internal and external security, thus permitting the international coalition to transition from active combat operations and to progressively begin the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. To meet this goal, the GIROA, in collaboration with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), is currently in the process of identifying the areas that will be handed over to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in three tranches.

The first tranche announced by President Hamid Karzai in March this year involved the transfer of security responsibility in all districts of Bamyan, Panjshir, and Kabul provinces (with the exception of the Surobi district in Kabul), as well as the municipalities of Mazar-e-Sharif (Balkh province), Herat (Herat province), Lashkar Gah (Helmand province), and Mehtar Lam (Laghman province). This handover, which began in July, involved areas that were "either relatively free of insurgent activity or have a heavy presence of U.S. and NATO troops that can intervene anytime Afghan security forces become overwhelmed," as Alex Rodriguez summarized it in the *Los Angeles Times* (Alex Rodriguez, "Karzai lists areas due for security transfer," *Los Angeles Times*, March 23, 2011).

The GIROA and the ISAF leadership are now completing discussions on which areas would revert to Afghan responsibility in the second tranche. Based on remarks by both American military officers and Afghan officials, it is likely that Afghan forces will assume responsibility for some dangerous and contested areas right away—when coalition forces are still present in the country in substantial strength—while preparing themselves for assuming nationwide control in the third tranche, which will likely begin in 2013 and continue well into the following year. If this timetable holds, the security transition envisaged by the international community at Lisbon will be completed by 2014, when coalition forces will cease to have primary responsibility for assuring Afghan security.

But, Can the Security Transition Deliver?

It is unclear, however, whether this transition will be successful on the above timelines for two reasons. First, although the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) has made remarkable progress in building up the ANSF in recent years, it is unlikely that these indigenous forces—military, police, and militia—will be capable of independently securing the country against the wide range of terrorist and insurgent groups that will still be present in the region in 2014. Second, President Barack Obama's decision to withdraw the surge forces from Afghanistan by September 2012—which in effect means that American troops will begin rotating out of the country starting in spring next year *before* the second fighting

season is even fully underway—will prevent U.S. military commanders from being able to complete what they have so effectively begun: decimating the mid-level command structure of the Taliban, which serves as the vital link between the *rabbani shura* (the leadership council) based in Quetta, Pakistan, and their foot soldiers in the field. President Obama’s decision to withdraw the entire surge force by 2012—rather than keep it deployed in Afghanistan until the security transition is concluded—thus denies the ISAF the opportunity to expand the successful clearing operations already begun in the south to eastern Afghanistan. The still-maturing ANSF will thus be left with a much more difficult task than would be the case if U.S. forces were present in strength and were able to clear the east as well before the security transition was complete.

The vicious interaction of the ANSF’s immaturity and the premature diminution of U.S. combat power in Afghanistan makes it very likely that, although the security transition will proceed on schedule, the Afghan state will still be incapable of autonomously neutralizing the threats posed by the Taliban insurgency and the terrorist groups—such as al-Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Haqqani network—which support its operations in different ways. If the GIROA fails to neutralize these threats, as is to be expected at least in the initial phase following the security transition, the United States and its coalition partners will have no choice but to support Afghan counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban and its affiliates, because a defeat here implies the potential collapse of the Afghan state and a return to warlordism and civil strife, all of which produce the enabling conditions for an upsurge in global terrorism. Consequently, even if the security transition is successful as a process in and of itself, it will not eliminate the threats to the American homeland and the homelands of our allies if the ANSF remains incapable of independently neutralizing the myriad security threats in Afghanistan.

Enter Political Reconciliation as *Deus Ex Machina*

The Administration has attempted to resolve this conundrum by promoting reconciliation with the Taliban. This approach is premised on the calculation that a political solution to the conflict would, by definition, minimize the burdens facing the ANSF in regards to security en route to and after the transition; it would also enable the Administration to proceed with progressively larger troop withdrawals from Afghanistan as peace gradually returns. Consistent with this logic, the Administration has initiated a series of overtures towards both the Quetta *shura* and the Haqqani network in the hope of exploring the prospects for reconciliation. The Karzai government, using its own intermediaries and the High Peace Council headed by the late Burhanuddin Rabbani, has also embarked on parallel outreach efforts towards the Quetta *shura*, the Haqqani network, and the Hizb-i-Islami (Gulbuddin) headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

While reaching out to these adversaries is sensible in principle, this effort has not yet yielded much fruit in practice—and is unlikely to do so in any meaningful way at least in time to assure a peaceful security transition in 2014. The reasons for this failure are many and intractable.

To begin, it is still not clear whether the Quetta *shura* has any genuine interest in reconciliation with the GIROA on the terms laid out by the United States: the insurgents

must renounce violence; irrevocably cut their ties with al-Qaeda; and abide by the Afghan constitution, including its protections for women and minorities. The *shura*'s acceptance of these terms would be tantamount to accepting defeat after a decade of war. While it is possible that the Afghan Taliban *might* be willing to cut ties with al-Qaeda as part of a larger settlement with the GIROA—though the evidence today at the operational level only corroborates how deeply intertwined these two groups have become—it is patently unclear why the insurgent leadership would want to accept such peace terms right now, no matter how uncomfortable they may be with their Pakistani protectors and how desirous they are of returning to their own country.

For starters, they believe that so far they have only been hurt, but not decisively defeated, by the ISAF's military operations. And, more to the point, they are convinced that NATO forces are irrevocably headed out the door by 2014 and will leave behind a fragile Afghan state that constitutes easy pickings. For an insurgency, whose members have survived over thirty years of bitter and unrelenting war, to surrender on the eve of the departure of its most capable opponents defies reason—and the recent assassination of the GIROA's principal envoy, Burhanuddin Rabbani, by the Taliban signals that the *shura* may not perceive an urgency for peace that matches the Administration's need for a successful reconciliation as part of the security transition. Rabbani's killing has now dulled even Karzai's enthusiasm for negotiations with the Taliban, and it has deepened skepticism throughout Afghanistan about the prospects for a peaceful termination to the conflict.

Furthermore, other factors complicate the *shura*'s incentives for a settlement. Even if it is assumed that the Taliban can stomach an Afghan constitution that respects gender rights and the rights of minorities—a difficult proposition given their antediluvian ideology and repressive social practices—it would be much harder for the movement to accept what President Karzai and the United States are now mutually negotiating even as they encourage the Taliban to reconcile: a strategic partnership declaration (SPD) that promises a long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan.

Almost every analysis of the motivations underlying the Taliban insurgency concludes that whatever the myriad grievances of the rebels may be in regard to government corruption, tribal rivalries, and liberal social practices, they are united in their opposition to the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan. If that is the case, the prospect that the *shura* would reconcile with the GIROA is dim. At a time when the insurgent leadership does not believe that it has been conclusively defeated, when it is convinced that its adversaries are headed for the exit, and when its principal antagonist offers a peace but at the price of accepting continued foreign military presence in their country, the attractiveness of reconciliation quickly becomes evanescent.

This last issue of foreign military forces creates a chicken-and-egg conundrum: of course, an SPD that did not provide for an American presence would make reconciliation with the GIROA a tad more attractive for the Taliban, but given that even reconciliation does not eliminate the prospect of future power struggles in Afghanistan, there are fewer incentives for Karzai to pursue reconciliation if he could not assure himself of an enduring American presence that protects him and his regime's interests. In other words, the American protection that makes reconciliation viable for the GIROA makes it unacceptable for the Taliban.

Given these realities, it is not surprising that the Administration's initiatives regarding reconciliation have not borne much fruit thus far. The Haqqani network has declared that it will not be party to separate peace talks with the Administration, deferring instead to the Quetta *shura* as the lead interlocutor for any negotiations. The *shura*, by all accounts, still appears to evince some sort of interest in discussions—but not with Kabul, only with Washington. This insistence, of course, undermines the Administration's position that reconciliation ultimately must be an Afghan-led process, but even this problem is manageable in comparison to some of the others discussed above. In any event, despite several Administration conversations with the *shura*'s representative thus far—identified in press reports as Tayeb Agha, a secretary to Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban *emir*—it is still not clear how committed the insurgent leadership is to a negotiated end to the war or whether the *shura* is simply playing the United States as it bides its time waiting for the transition.

At the End of the Day, the Problem is Pakistan

Although the prospects for political reconciliation are undermined by many challenges, at the end of the day there is none as vexing as the problematic role of Pakistan. This is a quandary with multiple dimensions. The most obvious reason why the Quetta *shura* has reduced incentives to reconcile with the GIROA is because they—and their fighters embedded currently in communities along the frontier—enjoy substantial immunity to coalition military action because of the sanctuary provided by Pakistan. So long as the coalition either cannot or will not breach this sanctuary out of respect for Pakistan's sovereignty, two consequences obtain: first, the *shura* will not feel compelled to reconcile with the GIROA because their security and their warfighting capabilities cannot be held at risk by military actions; and, second, Pakistan becomes the kingmaker, determining the success or failure of Afghan reconciliation because of the pressure it can apply on the *shura* and its affiliates with regard to decisions relating to war and peace.

Recognizing this fact, the Obama Administration has sought to persuade Pakistan—through a combination of public and private entreaties as well as pressure—to encourage the Quetta *shura* and its constituents to enter into a dialogue with the United States and with Afghanistan. Despite repeated efforts, however, the Administration's initiatives have not produced much thus far for the simple reason that American and Pakistani objectives on this issue are fundamentally at odds. The United States seeks to leave behind after 2014 an Afghanistan that is united, capable, and independent. Pakistan, in contrast, seeks an Afghanistan that, although nominally unified, is anything but capable and independent. Specifically, it desires an Afghanistan that would be at least deferential to, if not dependent on, Islamabad where Kabul's critical strategic and foreign policy choices are concerned.

Stated precisely, Pakistan seeks an Afghanistan that is strong enough to prevent its internal problems from spilling over into Pakistan, but not so strong as to be able to pursue independent policies that might compete with Pakistan's own interests. Key military leaders who drive Pakistan's national policies on this matter seem to hold the belief that a return to the pre-2001 past is still possible—a situation where Afghanistan remains somewhat chaotic, but “manageable,” non-threatening, and decidedly subordinate to Pakistan in the

international arena. The persistence of this conviction enables Rawalpindi—the headquarters of the Pakistani military where all these decisions are made—to avoid unpleasant choices about cutting ties with the insurgency and grants it the latitude to attempt pushing the United States without forcing a complete break in bilateral relations.

A stable but subordinate Afghanistan thus remains Pakistan's ultimate strategic goal: such subservience on the part of Kabul would permit Islamabad to gain an advantage in regard to managing both its independent rivalry with Afghanistan and the challenges posed by the evolving Afghan-Indian geopolitical partnership. Unfortunately for Pakistan, if the international community succeeds in its current endeavors in Afghanistan, it would end up leaving behind a state that would be anything but deferential to Pakistan—thus justifying in Rawalpindi the problematic strategy that is intended to prevent exactly this outcome.

Pakistan's continuing support for the Quetta *shura* and the Haqqani network remain the key instrument by which it seeks to secure its strategic aims vis-à-vis Afghanistan. By aiding these groups, protecting them, and supporting their operations, Pakistan seeks to use them as bargaining chips in its negotiations with Kabul. These negotiations are aimed ultimately at securing Afghanistan's acceptance of Pakistan's western boundaries, Islamabad's authority over the Pakistani Pashtuns, and constraints on Afghan-Indian ties (and Afghanistan's strategic policies more generally) as determined by Pakistan. Because the Pakistani military believes that the Quetta *shura* and the Haqqani network would be relatively sympathetic to its interests on these issues—in comparison to other elements in Afghan society—it has continued, and will continue, to protect these assets despite the larger efforts of the United States to defeat them.

It is not obvious, however, that the Quetta *shura* will be as supportive of Islamabad's interests as the Pakistani "deep state" often believes; the Haqqanis may be more pliable on this count, but they are also less influential in Afghan society and hence matter less in comparison. Given the choices available to Pakistan, however, the *shura* and the Haqqanis are judged to be better investments for advancing Pakistani interests in Afghanistan than those currently dominating politics in Kabul and, consequently, they will enjoy Pakistan's continued support against all U.S. efforts at interdicting them. In the game of chicken between Rawalpindi and Washington since the killing of Osama bin Laden, the United States has already blinked on this score: after initially insisting both publicly and privately that Pakistan target the insurgents through military action (including in North Waziristan), the Administration has now settled on simply urging Pakistan to bring the insurgent groups to the negotiating table.

For a country that denied having any relationship with the insurgents for almost a decade, Pakistan presently appears willing to consider the U.S. request—but on its own terms. For example, senior Pakistani military leaders have repeatedly urged U.S. officials to cease combat operations against the insurgents on the grounds that fighting while talking was incompatible; similarly, they have resisted American pleas for expanded Pakistani military action against the insurgents on the grounds that it would undermine their ability to intercede with the militants in future negotiations. The Pakistani military has also demanded from its American interlocutors greater clarity about the desired end-state in Afghanistan, thus conditioning its willingness to bring the insurgents to the table on some assurance that

they will become part of a future governing regime in Afghanistan that protects Pakistan's interests.

Because such assurances cannot be offered by the United States—and will not be offered presently by President Karzai even if he wanted to—without undermining the current constitutional order in Afghanistan, Pakistan has declined thus far to issue any public appeals to the insurgents urging them to participate in the peace process. According to senior Afghan officials who have discussed this matter privately, Pakistan has also declined to offer safe passage to any *shura* leaders resident in its territories who may be inclined to discuss reconciliation directly with Kabul. More tellingly, it has gone out of its way to target Afghan Taliban leaders who have displayed any inclination for independent negotiations with the GIROA. And, finally, Pakistan has betrayed no interest in providing Afghan officials with access to those Taliban leaders detained by Islamabad, despite repeated Afghan requests on this score.

The current strategy of the Pakistani military leadership thus suggests that they are prepared to assist with Afghan reconciliation only if it advances their conception of what constitutes a desirable outcome—a malleable regime in Kabul post-2014—and only if they are permitted to play the paramount role in midwifing this result. Unfortunately, this approach—however understandable from a Pakistani perspective—only ends up further alienating the GIROA and the Afghans more broadly. It makes them even more determined to resist Pakistani domination and further deepens their reliance on India—actions that, in turn, only reinforce the destructive Pakistani behaviors that generated the cycle of distrust in the first place.

Unfortunately for the United States, there are no easy ways out of this predicament. If the Administration surrenders to the Pakistani demand for a controlling interest in the reconciliation process and its outcome, it will lose the GIROA as a partner in Afghanistan and alienate key Afghan constituencies including the Pashtuns; it will also stoke an ethnic backlash within the country and pave the way for deepened regional competition involving India, Iran, and the Central Asian republics, which are certain to coalesce to prevent any Pakistani domination of Afghanistan. If the Administration supports the GIROA—as it should—it runs the risk that Pakistan will continue to play its subversive games: supporting the Taliban insurgency while offering only as much counterinsurgency and counterterrorism cooperation as is necessary to keep American assistance flowing, and maintaining the appearance of assisting reconciliation while withholding true cooperation until such time as it is assured that its proxies will enjoy the guaranteed access to power that provides Pakistan with dominant influence in Afghanistan.

The Administration's recent decision to accord Pakistan a principal role in the reconciliation negotiations, therefore, represents a dangerous gamble. Although born out of frustration rather than predilection, it could end up not in a breakthrough but in a frustrating stalemate. Clearly, Pakistan cannot be excluded from the reconciliation process, nor should it be. But it is hard to imagine how Rawalpindi can proffer a solution here that advances its own interests while being simultaneously acceptable to Kabul. A satisfactory outcome would require either Pakistan to give up on its goal of dominating Afghanistan, or Kabul to give up on its objective of avoiding subordination to Islamabad: either of these two outcomes could make political reconciliation with the Taliban feasible, but neither eventuality seems in sight. As a result, the Administration's new reliance on Pakistan to catalyze the reconciliation process,

far from providing a fillip to “fight, talk, and build,” could actually provoke endless prevarication that is intended mainly to wait out the American drawdown in Afghanistan.

The only two solutions that the United States had in principle to defeat this Pakistani strategy now lie beyond reach. A comprehensive military success against the Taliban could have rendered the need for reconciliation less pressing, but neither the Bush nor the Obama Administration allocated the resources necessary to procure this outcome when circumstances were favorable; neither Administration was successful in confronting Pakistan over the sanctuaries either, thus leaving the U.S. military with the horrendous task of attempting to defeat a well-protected insurgency without sufficient manpower or the ability to target its foreign sources of support.

An ironclad American commitment to invest and endure in Afghanistan would have enabled the coalition to defeat the Pakistani strategy as well because, whatever Islamabad’s local advantages may be, Pakistan cannot end up victorious in any sustained strategic competition with the United States. American misgivings about the costs of the Afghan war, the merit of the stakes involved, and the integrity of its Afghan partners, all combined, however, to provoke a strategic mistake by the Obama Administration: announcing a public deadline for withdrawal from Afghanistan. The net effect of this unfortunate announcement has not been increased pressure for arriving at a political solution; rather, it has only motivated the insurgents to run down the clock while also inducing Pakistan to protect its proxies all the more zealously because of the expectation that they will become indispensable for advancing Rawalpindi’s interests in the aftermath of the coming security transition. The administration’s new reliance on Pakistan to shepherd reconciliation will only provide Rawalpindi with more opportunities to achieve these aims—and, in the process, animate greater Afghan and regional opposition to Pakistan. These dynamics cumulatively will also contribute to further undermining American aims in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The Obama Administration’s strategy of “fight, talk, and build” is, therefore, subverted not by any intrinsic illogic but by the welter of contradictions embedded in the corrosive external environment within which it must be implemented. Even the administration’s otherwise sensible emphasis on strengthening the Afghan and Pakistani states and integrating them into a larger regional trading order is still subject to the risks of being undermined by the persistent Pakistani military discomfort with economic integration within the greater Southern Asian region—although to its credit, President Asif Zardari’s civilian government in Pakistan has persisted in pushing the boundaries of the possible in this regard.

The larger problem, however, remains the dangerous game of “managed jihadism” still played by Pakistan. Rawalpindi continues to solicit and accept American assistance in fighting some terrorist groups, such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Tehrik-e-Taliban Mohmand (TTM), the Tehrik-e-Nefaz-e-Shari’at-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), and the Lashkar-e-Islami (LI), which directly target Pakistan, even as it supports other militant groups, such as the Quetta *shura*, the Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which attack the interests of its coalition partners.

To date, the United States and the international community have failed to change this troublesome Pakistani behavior. Persuasion has had little impact because the Pakistani military, which dominates national security policymaking within the country, has a deeply

entrenched and pernicious worldview that is not susceptible to change without a dramatic transformation of the Pakistani state itself—something that is nowhere in sight right now. Even bribery by the United States in the form of generous military and civilian assistance has made no difference, because the Pakistani military has calculated that it can pursue its current subversive policies without fear of retaliation because Pakistan is too important to be punished or to be allowed to fail. And meaningful coercion by Washington has never been tried because of our dependence on Pakistan for continued prosecution of the counterterrorism campaign inside their country and for the ground and air lines of communications supporting U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, a reliance that has reinforced Rawalpindi's belief that it is immune to the most consequential American threats.

Where Do We Go From Here?

When all is said and done, there is no denying the fact that the situation in the region is unfavorable for the success of the Administration's policy, at least insofar as that policy is centered on the hope of reconciliation as a means of bridging the limitations in indigenous Afghan capabilities in the context of the coming security transition. If the United States is to snatch some success in these circumstances, it will require not jettisoning reconciliation so much as recommitting to the "hardening" of the Afghan state. Confronting the problems of governmental corruption will be important in this connection, but they cannot constitute the central part of the enterprise; the international community has made its own modest contributions to the prevalence of corruption in Afghanistan and this cancer will not be eradicated anytime soon even if President Karzai were to act with as much virtue as the United States demands. Rather, the focus of buttressing Afghanistan must rest on aiding the evolution of political devolution, assuring a peaceful transition of presidential power in accordance with current constitutional constraints, and comprehensively strengthening administrative organs of state, especially the ANSF. That Pakistan will continue to play an unhelpful role as this effort persists must simply be accepted as a fact of life. Yet, meaningful success can nonetheless be achieved despite Rawalpindi's interference—if success in this context is defined as leaving behind after 2014 an Afghan state that is durable enough to ensure that the Taliban can never regain the meaningful control in Afghanistan that would permit al-Qaeda and other global terrorist groups to return and operate with impunity.

Ensuring such a modicum of success will require many policy adjustments, but the most important—which are conveyed telegraphically here—include:

- Ensuring that the strategic partnership agreement that the Administration is currently negotiating with Afghanistan provides the United States with sufficient basing rights to deploy the appropriate mix of air and ground forces necessary to conduct counterterrorism operations and support the ANSF as appropriate over the long term.
- Funding, in cooperation with the international community, the entire complement of Afghan national security forces committed to in current NATO-ISAF-GIROA plans.
- Delaying the withdrawal of surge troops already provided to U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan beyond 2012 so as to enable them to consolidate coalition control in the south and in the east before the security transition.

- Assisting Afghanistan in regard to regional economic integration, development of its administrative capacity, and management of its economy so as to strengthen its capacity in the coming era of diminished external assistance.
- Accelerating the expansion of the Northern Distribution Network as a hedge against continued reliance on Pakistan for air and ground lines of communication into Afghanistan.

Although Pakistani cooperation is necessary for a stable security transition, it would be unwise to rely too heavily on the hope that the Pakistani military will change its current strategy towards Afghanistan or the United States in the near term. What is most important where Pakistan is concerned, therefore, is that the Administration and the Congress shed their illusions about what can be expected from either Islamabad or Rawalpindi. The history of the last decade proves abundantly that a genuinely strategic partnership between the United States and Pakistan will remain beyond reach for some time to come. The U.S.-Pakistan relationship—unfortunately—will remain “transactional” in the foreseeable future, irrespective of whether either side chooses to acknowledge it—and this condition will persist so long as the Pakistani military continues to dominate the commanding heights of national decision-making within the country. While U.S. policy may not be able to transform Pakistani behavior—and the last few years provide proof positive—it should at least cease to subsidize Rawalpindi’s egregious conduct through the frittering away of resources provided at pains by the American taxpayer. At the very least, therefore, a new policy towards Pakistan must include:

- Terminating all U.S. transfers of conventional warfighting equipment that have no relevance to Pakistani counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and which are financed by American taxpayers.
- Reviewing the expenditures related to Coalition Support Funds, with the intent of replacing such transfers over time with direct counterterrorism assistance provided for meeting specified counterterrorism targets.
- Continuing U.S. civilian aid to Pakistan for a while longer but conditioning it on Pakistan’s support for accelerated South Asian economic integration and structural changes in its state capacity to mobilize domestic resources.
- Supporting the civilian government in Pakistan more forthrightly despite its serious current weaknesses.

None of these policy changes by themselves will suffice to transform Pakistan into a successful state or to shift the Pakistani military’s current strategies in more helpful directions. But they will signal the limits of American patience and spare the American taxpayer the indignity of having to subsidize Pakistani state actions that directly threaten American lives and interests, while at the same time, hopefully providing Pakistan with an opportunity to pause and reflect on whether provoking a dangerous rupture in its relations with the United States advances its own regional position and improves its security.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the Subcommittee, for your kind attention and your consideration.

Mr. CHABOT. Dr. Fair, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF C. CHRISTINE FAIR, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, EDMUND A. WALSH SCHOOL OF FOREIGN SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Ms. FAIR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, esteemed colleagues. I have also submitted a written statement I would like to request be entered into the permanent record.

Mr. CHABOT. Yes. Without objection, it is entered into the record in full.

Ms. FAIR. The last decade has made it very clear the strategic interests of the United States and Pakistan are absolutely in opposition. Despite this fact, the United States expanded its military posture in Pakistan, which deepened its dependence on Pakistan during a period when the latter was ever more determined to undermine U.S. goals there.

This raises obvious questions about how the United States can secure its interests in the region when Pakistan is dedicated to undermining them. In my written statement, I lay out a number of possible engagement strategies toward Pakistan in the near and medium terms, and I will simply briefly recount them here.

But I do believe that the year 2014 offers a window to reoptimize our position in Afghanistan and forge a more sustainable and effective relationship with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, between now and then, the United States will remain poised on the knife's edge of logistical dependence upon Pakistan.

However, a logistical transaction is not the basis for a strategic relationship. The United States should be practical. It is renting access to Pakistan's air and ground space for its operations in Afghanistan and in Pakistan. There should be no illusions of anything else.

This does not mean that the United States should disengage in the near term; however, while the U.S. repositions itself in Afghanistan, U.S. goals for engaging Pakistan should be modest, as detailed in my written statement.

Looking to the next 10 years, things are no better. As you well know, Pakistan presents a dangerous set of threats to U.S. interests, worse over the coming decade. There are few prospects that Pakistan will be less dangerous.

U.S. dependence upon Pakistan for its Afghan efforts has precluded realistic thinking about how the United States can effectively manage its Pakistan predicament, and, unfortunately, the ongoing outrage over Pakistan perfidy, coupled with the global economic crisis, has promoted policymakers to simply propose ceasing or stringently conditioning all aid to Pakistan. These urges must be resisted.

However, this does not mean that the United States should continue its decade-long policy of seeking to appease Pakistan and induce its cooperation through large-scale economic and military assistance. This policy has simply failed for years.

Over 2 years ago I argued that the United States cannot, through various inducements that it has tried, persuade Pakistan to abandon its strategic use of militants and other noxious policies; that it has to move toward reorienting its efforts toward containing

and mitigating the various threats that emanate from Pakistan. And I believe that that time has come. And as the Americans begin to retract their large-scale counterinsurgency posture in Afghanistan, we need to gather the political fortitude to actually enact these steps.

First, Washington needs to embrace the fundamental transactional nature of its relationship with Pakistan, but expect Pakistan to fully deliver on each transaction. A strategic relationship is not possible when our strategic interests diverge, and, in any event, Pakistan has repulsed such offers; for example, the two times a status of forces agreement has been offered to Pakistan.

U.S. efforts to elicit changes in Pakistani society through its extended aid, also not likely to fructify. We should try to develop democratic institutions only when there is a credible Pakistani partner at the other side of the table.

We should engage the military, but we should treat it like a military. There is no reason why the provision of strategic systems should continue when those weapons systems are for India, not for its insurgency or terrorism problems. The remaining training and weapon systems the U.S. provides should be for counterterrorism and COIN activities, and we should treat the military like the military. This means the Secretary of State doesn't meet the Chief of Army Staff. And our goal of engaging the military should not be to transform, but, quite frankly, to observe.

But, most importantly, we need to really think hard about what it means to contain the threat that emanates from Pakistan. We have considerable tools, and there is no reason why this Congress couldn't make more: Designating persons in the ISI and military where there is credible evidence that they have participated in supporting terrorism or nuclear terrorism, denying them and their families visas, enforcing current laws, routing out Pakistan counterintelligence efforts in this country. Waivers are always preferable to simply misrepresenting Pakistan's record in terms of certification requirements, and, in extremis, stating clearly that Pakistan is a state that supports terrorism. This requires political courage which can only be done when our posturing on Afghanistan begins to change.

In conclusion, we do have to remember that our ultimate goal vis-à-vis Pakistan is that it not become a North Korea, one that is removed and disengaged from the international community with no incentive to change, so there is a need to engage. There is also a need to hold Pakistan accountable for its actions.

And let me put on the table, perhaps thinking about the relationship that the United States had with the Soviet Union. We had no illusions of amity. We stayed involved. We had a diplomatic presence there. We had military ties where appropriate. We cooperated where possible with civil society. In the case of Pakistan, this could mean modest cooperation on peacekeeping operations, climate change, water security, et cetera. But most importantly, we need to recognize that our interests clash, and that in the very near and continuing future, we will be operating against each other as much as we cooperate with each other, and I am going to suggest that more of the latter than the former.

So while this is an imperfect paradigm for U.S. relations with Pakistan, I think it merits your consideration.

Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Doctor.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Fair follows:]

"2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I"

November 3, 1011

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia

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U.S.-Pakistan Relations: Ten Years after 9/11

Officials and voters in the United States often cite a "trust deficit" to explain the perennially tumultuous relationship between the United States and Pakistan over the last ten years. Pakistani officials, commentators, and citizens alike frequently describe how, in their view, the United States "used" Pakistan then abandoned it when expedient. This narrative is inevitably only a part of the story. It generally fails to note that Pakistan, each time that it engaged with the United States, did so to service its own strategic aims while professing commitment to those of its partner.

During the Cold War, Pakistan formally allied with the United States through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, formally the Baghdad Pact) and the Southeast Treaty Organization (SEATO). While it nominally espoused U.S. objectives, its principle motivations were driven by the need to build up its armed forces vis-à-vis India, which had fared far better from the partitioning of the British Raj than had Pakistan.ⁱ

During the anti-Soviet Jihad, Pakistan again partnered with the United States. Pakistan, however, had already formulated its Afghan policy in the mid-1970s, long before the Soviets rolled across the Amu Darya. While Pakistanis often claim that the United States used Pakistan to oust the Soviets, an equally important counter-narrative is that Pakistan took advantage of U.S. strategy to pursue its own. Most importantly, due to the need to work with Pakistan, the United States waved nuclear-related sanctions that had first been applied in 1979, under the Symington Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act. During the anti-Soviet jihad, Pakistan was able to expand its military and acquire U.S. weapons systems while continuing to make important progress in developing a nuclear weapon.ⁱⁱ

Ten years into the most recent engagement, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, it has again become abundantly clear that Pakistan's strategic interests diverge starkly from those of the United States. Most observers of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship admit that Pakistan's allies—such as the Haqqani Network, the Afghan Taliban and Islamist militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, among others—are America's foes. It is equally clear that America's ascendant ally in the region—India—is Pakistan's nemesis. Thus what bedevils U.S.-Pakistan relations is not pervasive distrust but rather a surplus of certitude: certitude that, for the foreseeable future, U.S. and Pakistani strategic interests have only a small—and quickly vanishing—area of overlap.

U.S. policy makers have been reluctant to embrace this unpleasant reality because it raises serious questions about how the United States can secure its interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan and beyond. But the mounting evidence that the United States and Pakistan share fundamentally orthogonal goals on *most* issues of interest to the United States can no longer be ignored or deferred. After a brief recounting of the last decade and its discontents, this written statement lays out a number of possible engagement strategies towards Pakistan in the near and medium term.

This is Not the Strategic Partnership the US Imagined: How Did We Get Here?

Over the last ten years, the United States has pursued relations with India and Pakistan under the rubric of "dehyphenation." That is, Washington has interacted with New Delhi and Islamabad without regard to their long-standing and intractable security competition.ⁱⁱⁱ Proponents

of this policy tend to advocate vertically integrating U.S. policies towards India and Pakistan while minimizing the real collateral effects that engaging either India or Pakistan has on the other. While this has been an elegant rhetorical argument motivating foreign policy, its practicality has been belied by the zero-sum nature of Indo-Pakistan competition itself.

While the United States has sought to cultivate Pakistan's support in the struggle against violent Islamist extremism, at a significant cost to the Pakistani state, the United States has also pledged its support to help India become a global power, including military assistance and the infamous Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Equally problematic, the United States has encouraged Indian involvement in Afghanistan without regard to Pakistan's concerns and often without any genuine consideration—much less assessment—of what India is actually doing apart from its stated activities.

On the other hand, U.S. cupidity towards Pakistan has overwhelmingly emphasized the provision of support to Pakistan's military. India has long complained—with considerable justification—that U.S. assistance has been directed into Pakistan's growing nuclear arsenal and that the weapons systems provided to Pakistan—such as F-16s—have greater utility against India than against Pakistan's domestic insurgents and terrorists.

Whether Islamabad and/or Rawalpindi believed that Pakistan's abandonment of the Afghanistan Taliban in 2001 would be temporary or whether this overture signaled a genuine willingness to change course will likely never be known. However, a perusal of President Pervez Musharraf's September 19, 2001 speech reminds us that Pakistan acquiesced to U.S. demands not because of an inherent strategic alignment but rather to counter any Indian advantages. He explained to the Pakistani public that

They want to isolate us, get us declared a terrorist state... In this situation if we make the wrong decisions it can be very bad for us. Our critical concerns are our sovereignty, second our economy, third our strategic assets (nuclear and missiles), and forth our Kashmir cause. All four will be harmed if we make the wrong decision. When we make these decisions they must be according to Islam.^{iv}

While the United States greeted this speech as a sign that Pakistan would actively cooperate, a close reading of the speech reveals a tone of resignation. The ultimate aim of the speech was not to reverse decades of dangerous Islamist politics (including supporting militancy) but to convince Pakistanis that Pakistan must act to counter Indian advantages in a post-9/11 global order..

It is important to acknowledge that Pakistan offered unprecedented assistance to the United States, including port and airfield access, ground lines of control, and air space. Without Pakistan's support, the U.S. ability to launch Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001 would have been in question.^v Moreover, Pakistan assisted in the capture of numerous high-value al Qaeda operatives. Notably, however, Pakistan did *not* remand high-level Taliban to the United States. Quite the contrary. From at least 2004 onward, Pakistan resumed its support for the Taliban. Indeed this support was likely an important factor in the Taliban's resurgence in 2005, the consequences of which the United States, as well as its Afghan and other partners, continue to suffer.

Since 2004, Pakistan has also undertaken a selective set of operations against Pakistani Islamist militants. Many of these militant commanders organized under the rubric of the Pakistan Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan) in 2007. While Pakistan has lost many citizens and members of the armed forces in this conflict, it is too often forgotten that Pakistan's war against its own terrorists and insurgents is selective. It focuses upon those commanders within the Pakistani Taliban who will not cease targeting Pakistan while considering those (e.g. Maulvi Nazir, Gul Bahadur) who target American forces in Afghanistan to be allies.^{vi} While Pakistan's losses are truly tragic, Pakistanis tend to blame the United States for these deaths rather than their government, which has cultivated the militants for decades. While it is true that the U.S.-led war on terror and Pakistan's participation in that effort galvanized the current insurgency, it is also true that had Pakistan not cultivated these proxies in the first place the Pakistani Taliban would be far less capable—if it even existed at all.

Thus, howsoever crucial Pakistan's contributions have been, they have been eclipsed by Pakistan's contribution to the problem of instability, insurgency and terrorism. Pakistan—despite numerous assurances to the contrary—continues to support groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which has attacked Americans and its allies in Afghanistan since 2004 and which perpetrated the November 2008 Mumbai outrage in which several Americans were also killed. This is in addition to the terrorism campaign that LeT and numerous other groups have sustained in India since 1990 with support from Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI.)

The United States has appropriated some \$22 billion in economic and security assistance as well as military reimbursement between FY2002 and FY 2011 to Pakistan. (This is divided between \$14 billion in security assistance and military reimbursements and \$7.4 billion in economic assistance).^{vii} Admittedly, obligations are not the same as disbursement, and this remains an important bone of contention between the United States and Pakistan. But irrespective of the precise sum in question, the simple fact remains that while Pakistan has benefited from U.S. assistance under the explicit expectation that it help the United States in its struggle against Islamist terrorism in the region, Pakistan has in fact supported the very groups against which the United States is fighting. It is the Taliban and the Haqqani network that are responsible for the majority of U.S. and coalition fatalities in Afghanistan, yet these very groups are suspected of being a "strategic arm of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Agency."^{viii} Pakistan is the firefighter, the arsonist and the vendor of a variety of propellants.

From "Af-Pak" to "Pak-Af": Sever and Saunter

Since 2005, with the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, U.S. focus has slowly but surely moved from al Qaeda in Afghanistan to the Taliban, if for no other reason than that al Qaeda has largely moved from Afghanistan to Pakistan. While the United States in late 2005 finally acknowledged that Pakistan was indeed supporting the Afghan Taliban, it did not pressure Pakistan to act against the Taliban because it remained focused on al Qaeda. As the U.S. concentrated more on the Taliban, it became increasingly insistent that Pakistan do more to disable that group. However, in the same period, Pakistan redoubled its commitment to the Afghan Taliban while sustaining its long-term commitment to the Haqqani Network.

It should be forthrightly conceded that from Pakistan's point of view the developments in the region were deeply injurious to Pakistan's security interests. India, under the U.S. security umbrella and with U.S. approval and encouragement, had re-ensconced itself in Afghanistan. The U.S. strategic partnership with India signaled to Pakistan that America's long-term partner in the region was India. Implicit in Washington's pursuit of New Delhi as a partner is the recognition of India as the regional hegemon and a growing extra-regional power of some consequence. The United States has simply failed to grasp that Pakistan *will not*, in any policy-relevant future, accept Indian hegemony. To do so would be to concede defeat for Pakistan's expanding revisionist goals, which first focused upon changing the territorial status quo over Kashmir and which increasingly involve undermining India's expansion in the region.

In the face of the emerging recognition that Pakistan and the United States have divergent – if not actually conflicting—interests, the United States deepened its military posture in Afghanistan. Proponents of counterinsurgency argued for a larger footprint and eventually prevailed upon the Obama administration to surge U.S. troops in Afghanistan. Opponents of this approach (such as this author) were doubtful that U.S. COIN efforts in Afghanistan could ever fructify given the limited numbers of combat troops available, the niggard contribution of combat troops of our allies and their less than robust capabilities, a broken U.S. aid agency, a surprisingly shallow understanding of the region, persistent lack of language skills, and an Afghan partner that seemed more vested in securing its own corrupt patronage networks than providing any semblance of governance that could displace the Taliban and allied network of militant commanders.^{ix}

While progress in Afghanistan—or lack thereof—remains subject to debate, what is quite clear is that the United States has put itself in a very precarious situation. In expanding its military commitment in Afghanistan, it deepened its dependence upon Pakistan during a period when Pakistan and U.S. interests were rapidly diverging. Thus American officials struggle to explain to American taxpayers why it is that the United States continues to see Pakistan as an ally even while the United States is largely at war with Pakistan's proxies in Afghanistan. How strange is it that the United States has leveraged itself to Pakistan for access to ground and air lines of control to fight a counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, when the very insurgents are supported by Pakistan and it is Pakistan that is most likely to determine the outcome of that fight, likely in a way that is injurious to U.S. interests and investments?

The United States needs to work quickly to re-optimize its position in Afghanistan. While the United States remains dependent upon Pakistan, it has virtually no political will to compel Pakistan to cease support for the Taliban and the Haqqani network much less group like LeT. The year 2014 offers the United States an important opportunity to shift away from counterproductive counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and move towards a more sustainable relationship with both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Near-Term Engagement with Pakistan?

In the near term, the United States will remain poised on the knife's edge of logistical dependence upon Pakistan. Americans should not mistake a logistical transaction for a strategic relationship. Pakistan has consistently demonstrated that it does not want a strategic relationship with the United States; rather it has sought to maximize economic, political and military gains while

minimizing its commitment to the United States. The United States should adopt a more pragmatic tone about the nature of this relationship. Pakistan is essentially renting out its air and ground lines of communication, and the two countries should settle upon a price for what is mainly a business transaction. Similarly, the United States needs continued access to Pakistani territory to sustain the drone campaign. Pakistan cooperates in both of these activities because it has benefited from doing so. *If* Pakistan wants a strategic relationship or a relationship that is more expansive than a transactional relationship, the initiative should be on Pakistan to propose such an engagement.

This does not mean that the United States should disengage. However, while the U.S. repositions itself in Afghanistan, U.S. goals for engaging Pakistan should be modest. To date large-scale aid projects have simply failed to deliver due to the deep deficiencies in USAID's current business model, a past over-reliance upon institutional contractors, an inability to identify credible and appropriate Pakistani NGOs as US partners, a paucity of genuine reform-minded Pakistani governmental partners, and a security posture that prevents Americans from leaving their enclaves. Added to this list of debilitating challenges, the Pakistan government has recently placed absurd restrictions upon U.S. diplomatic officials after the Raymond Davis affair and the unilateral U.S. raid that resulted in the demise of Osama Bin Laden. (The United States government has not placed reciprocal restrictions upon Pakistani diplomats.) No amount of U.S. assistance to Pakistan can attenuate deep-seated anti-American antipathy, and indeed the instrumentalization of U.S. aid only fosters Pakistani cynicism that the United States attempts to help Pakistan only when its own aims are being served.

United States assistance to Pakistan should focus on tangibles such as power and infrastructure rather than areas, such as education, curriculum reform, and social issues, that are deeply inflammatory. The United States should quickly move to a less ambitious aid program that is demand-driven rather than supply-driven. If the United State wants to invest in human development, it should consider doing so through multilateral development agencies, which are more capable of delivering results.

The Next Ten Years of U.S.-Pakistan Relations?

Over the coming decade, there are few prospects for a major rapprochement between the United States and Pakistan, particularly if that rapprochement requires either that Pakistan abandon its militant proxies and aggressive regional revisionism or the United States alter its relationship with India.

Equally disconcerting is the likely reality that, as India continues its rise, Pakistan's reliance upon Islamist militancy, the only tool that it has to change India's trajectory, will *increase*, not decrease. The fact that Pakistan is suffering grievously as a result of this policy does not diminish the confidence of the ISI and the army that they can continue to manage their fissiparous former and current proxies. Increased destabilization in Pakistan as well as increasing accounts of militant infiltration of the armed forces raise a number of disconcerting questions about Pakistan's command and control of its nuclear assets as well as more quotidian concerns about the possibility of a Pakistan-based terrorist group conducting a mass-casualty operation in India that sparks a conventional war. The United States should expect that whatever political order is created in Afghanistan to enable the United States to wrap up large-scale counterinsurgency efforts, Pakistan

will expeditiously seek to undermine it—unless that order was what Pakistan wanted in the first place. Pakistan has a greater willingness to bear the costs needed to shape Afghanistan according to its strategic needs than does the United States.

Worse, the increasing propensity of small numbers of Muslims in Europe and North America to radicalize and undertake training in Pakistan (and increasingly in Yemen and Somalia) threatens to bring Pakistan into a serious collision course with the United States and the international community.

The realization that Osama bin Laden had been ensconced for years in Abbottabad—a military cantonment and home of the Pakistan Military Academy—was profoundly vexing for U.S. officials who have to answer for U.S. budgetary decisions in a crushing financial crisis. Pakistan's inordinate interest in capturing those who collaborated with the United States rather than understanding how Bin Laden enjoyed such sanctuary has only exasperated U.S. patience with Pakistan. Admittedly, the unilateral U.S. raid deeply humiliated Pakistan's military. As the Pakistan military has maintained control over Pakistan based upon its self-proclaimed unique ability to protect Pakistan, this was another blow to an institution that has sustained many challenges over the last ten years.

The ongoing outrage over Pakistan's duplicity, coupled with the global economic crisis, has prompted many U.S. lawmakers to propose ceasing all support to Pakistan or stringently conditioning all aid to Pakistan upon its cooperation in combating terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

While these impulses are understandable, they must be resisted. Pakistan right now is extremely vulnerable and combative. Its decisions are deeply troubling, whether we consider its expanded interference in Afghanistan or its rejection of International Monetary Fund assistance. It is imperative that Pakistan not become North Korea: a rogue regime that is disengaged from most of the international community.

However this does mean that the United States should continue its decade-long policy of seeking to induce Pakistan's cooperation with large-scale economic and military assistance. What the last ten years have demonstrated is that these incentives have had no effect on Pakistan's fundamental strategic calculus. Given that *political* allurements (e.g. a conditions-based nuclear deal, active U.S. efforts to resolve disputes with India, ensuring an explicitly pro-Pakistan regime in Afghanistan, etc.) are politically poisonous in the United States given Pakistan's problematic record, Washington has no choice but to acknowledge that U.S. and Pakistan interests and allies are fundamentally incompatible while also understanding the essential need to stay engaged in spite of this fact.

Pakistan, for its part, is tired of participating in a war effort with the United States—albeit on highly selective terms—that is fomenting increased domestic tension, while the United States seems deaf or indifferent to its security concerns. These center on India's defense modernization and the U.S. role in facilitating it; the impact of the U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal on Pakistan's own nuclear program; the nature of India's presence in Afghanistan (particularly given Pakistani beliefs that India is supporting subversive elements in Pakistan from Afghanistan) and other related issues.

I propose a somewhat radical way of reframing our relations with Pakistan. In 2009, I argued that if U.S. efforts to persuade Pakistan to abandon its strategic use of militants and other policies deleterious to U.S. interests and international security failed, then the “United States and its partners will have to reorient their efforts toward containing or mitigating the various threats that emanate from Pakistan.”^{xx} I believe that this time has come to adopt this approach and the United States should take advantage of the draw-down in Afghanistan to make such a strategy possible. There are several components of this proposed approach.

First, rather than continuing to frame U.S.-Pakistan relations within the context of a “strategic dialogue,” the United States should scale back its pursuit of Pakistan and resist framing the relationship—or lack thereof—in civilizational terms. The United States appears as if it is an uxorious suitor while Pakistan’s demurrals only increase the price of engagement. Pragmatism must replace optimism as the guiding principle. This should be a gradual process. Pakistan has been accustomed to U.S. efforts to engage and to use financial incentives to influence Pakistani decision-making. Any rapid de-escalation could well catalyze an even more precipitous decline in U.S.-Pakistan relations with ever more dangerous consequences. And this certainly cannot be undertaken given the current dependence upon Pakistani cooperation with U.S. efforts in Afghanistan.

Second, rather than seeking to forge a strategic partnership with a country that does not seek such one, the United States should simply embrace the fundamental transactional nature of its relations with Pakistan but expect Pakistan to fully deliver on each transaction.

Third, U.S. efforts to elicit changes in Pakistani society through its USAID program are misguided. First USAID’s efficacy can be and *should* be questioned. The U.S. Congress has had numerous hearings about aid to Pakistan—and Afghanistan—and the objective results of these engagements have been less than satisfactory given the price tag. This does not mean that the United States should not continue to help Pakistan with its problems. However, it should do so with less publicity and with greater focus on projects that are executable such as power, roads and other infrastructure. No doubt such efforts will suffer from corruption. However, the United States at least has the ability to ensure that minimal quality standards are in force for these projects. And, as noted above for the short term, in the future the United States should rely more upon the United Nations Development Program and similar multilateral platforms.

Fourth, the United States should still seek to develop democratic and civilian institutions *when* there is a clear demand from a Pakistani partner. This partner should have an executable plan, with metrics to monitor success in outcomes, and this Pakistani partner must have their own financial resources invested in the project. There is no hope for Pakistan to become a stable country that does not negatively affect the security of the region without greater civilian control of the military. But the United States cannot force such changes.

That said, the United States has for too long encouraged the army’s praetorianism. The conditions on security assistance that were enshrined in Kerry-Lugar-Berman were a good start. Unfortunately, the language of the bill offers Pakistan and the United States many loopholes even if the conditions are not met, as evidenced by Secretary of State Clinton’s March 2011 certification that Pakistan was fulfilling its obligations to help fight terrorism among other issues. This certification was issued even while the United States was planning the Bin Laden raid. It would have

been better for the administration to have sought a waiver, which would have signaled to the Pakistanis that U.S. national security interests would prevail—for the time being.

Fifth, the United States should engage Pakistan's military as it does with any other military. The International Military Education Training (IMET) program is important. Where possible, it should be expanded. However engaging Pakistan's military does not mean the provision of strategic weapon systems or other weapon systems that are more suitable for fighting its revisionist conflict with India than domestic terrorism and insurgency. This also means treating the Pakistan military like a military. There is no reason why the US Secretary of State should meet with the Chief of Army Staff routinely, much less the head of the ISI. The United States should follow its diplomatic protocol. While the desire to go to the source of power is understandable, there is no reason to believe that engaging the army chief directly produces better cooperation or even that the army chief or ISI chief are honest interlocutors in the first place. The United States needs to attenuate its khaki addiction.

Most importantly, the goal of engaging this army and other armed forces should be observation rather than transformation. Because the army will dominate security policy on things about which the United States cares deeply, *it must* continue to engage the army, but on a sustainable scale.

Sixth, the United States also needs to continue working with Pakistan's intelligence and law enforcement agencies on issues of importance to both, such as international crime and terrorism, regional developments of mutual concern, tackling Pakistan's domestic terrorism, cooperative anti-narcotics efforts, fortifying physical security of important institutions and infrastructure against terrorist attacks, and so forth. But these should not be the public cornerstone of our relationship. They should remain quiet and out of the public eye.

Seventh, the United States must take advantage of its growing independence from Pakistan to erect increasingly robust containment initiatives that directly pertain to support for terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and murderous abuse of human rights (as we have seen in Balochistan and elsewhere). The United States has considerable tools at its disposal to do so and can certainly innovate new ones where current legislation is inadequate.

- The Leahy Amendment was crafted precisely to punish security forces that engage in human rights excesses, while having the ultimate aim of rehabilitation rather than permanent isolation. U.S. unwillingness to apply this law has contributed to the sense of impunity that pervades Pakistan's military, police and intelligence agencies. Regrettably, the U.S. record of respecting rule of law and human rights in Pakistan is not unblemished. The United States has directly benefited from Pakistan's policies of detainment without charge and of "enforced disappearances." The "disappeared" Pakistanis remain a source of outrage in Pakistan, as there is no way of locating these persons and accounting for their whereabouts. Unless the United States is prepared to lead by example, it should have little expectation that Pakistan will do better on its own.^{xi}
- The United States should consider sanctioning or designating specific persons within Pakistan's government when there is credible evidence that the individual is supporting

terrorism or nuclear proliferation. The U.S. Congress could consider visa restrictions on such persons and their families.

- The United States should not certify that Pakistan is in compliance with U.S. laws when it is not (e.g. Secretary Clinton's March 2009 certification that Pakistan was complying with Kerry-Lugar-Berman requirements). If engaging Pakistan despite these failures is critical, a waiver should be sought as a potent signal that Pakistan is not fulfilling its obligations and that future assistance is contingent upon U.S. needs rather than on some idea that Pakistan is carrying out its side of the bargain faithfully. Issuing dubious certifications also confuses Pakistanis about what their government is or is not doing and makes it hard for the United States to explain the eventual cessation of assistance that could arise from Pakistan's failure to perform per the terms of reference in the assistance.
- The United States should move aggressively to counter Pakistan's militant networks *outside* of Pakistan. I recognize that operating against Lashkar-e-Taiba's headquarters in the Punjab and elsewhere will be nearly impossible and subject to the limits of tradecraft. Similar concerns exist for operating against the Afghan Taliban in Quetta, Karachi and other cities. However, nearly every one of these groups has an extensive network in the Gulf, the rest of South Asia, South East Asia, Europe and North America. There is no reason why the United States should not be more aggressive targeting these nodes of activity, be it through monitoring financial transactions, identifying individuals facilitating the groups and working with host-nations to conduct police and other raids upon these organizations and their facilitators.
- Where possible the United States needs to expend diplomatic effort to ensure that as many of Pakistan's partners as possible adopt a common approach. China will be an obvious problem. However, even China ultimately voted at the UNSC to designate Jamaat-ul-Dawa (LeT's new operational name) a terrorist organization in 2009, though it had declined to do so a year before.

Conclusions

In short, the United States must engage where it can, with clear thinking about the nature of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and an honest assessment of whether the terrorists Pakistan is helping the United States to eliminate are more important than the terrorists they continue to nurture. The United States should try to invest in positive social change when there is an opportunity to do so and a vested partner to work with. This engagement must be focused, transactional and have the near-term goal of monitoring the army and the intelligence agency, *not* transforming these institutions over any policy-relevant time scale. This is simply beyond the capabilities of the United States.

Such an approach is more sustainable, financially and politically, given the beleaguered state of the U.S. and Pakistani publics, who are exhausted with the other's ostensible perfidy. Finding such a sustainable and functional relationship rather than an inflated, expensive program that fails to meet the most fundamental objectives may be the best way to stay engaged in Pakistan over the long haul. The stakes *are* high. The United States cannot afford to walk away even it can't afford to stay engaged as it has been. The security of Americans and Pakistanis alike depends upon these two countries getting their bilateral relationship "as right" as is realistically possible.

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NEXT: Derek Reveron, Afghanistan and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy

ⁱ Dennis Kux, *the United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001)

ⁱⁱ Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 103–5, 167–68; Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 83–84; and Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan* (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 79–81.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ashley J. Tellis, "South Asia: U.S. Policy Choices," in *Taking Charge: A Bipartisan Report to the President-Elect on Foreign Policy and National Security-Discussion Papers*, eds. Frank Carlucci, Robert E. Hunter, and Zalmay Khalilzad (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001): p. 88, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1306z1.html; also see Ashley J. Tellis, "The Merits of Dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. Success in Engaging India and Pakistan," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 31, no. 4 (Autumn 2008): pp. 21–42, http://twq.com/08autumn/docs/08autumn_tellis.pdf. See my critique of this in the context of the last decade in C. Christine Fair, "Under the Shrinking US Security Umbrella: India's End Game in Afghanistan?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Spring 2011), pp. 187-189.

^{iv} President Pervez Musharraf, "President Address to the Nation," [sic] September 19, 2001. Available at <http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2006/07/13/address-19-september-2001/>.

^v For a detailed inventory of Pakistan's extensive assistance, see C. Christine Fair, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India*. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2004).

^{vi} Seth G. Jones and C. Christine Fair, *Counterinsurgency in Pakistan* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010).

^{vii} K. Alan Kronstadt, "Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A summary," CRS Report R41832, October 20, 2011.

^{viii} Admiral Michael Mullen, U.S. Navy, Chairman Joint Chiefs Of Staff Before The Senate Armed Services Committee on Afghanistan And Iraq," September 22, 2011. <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/09%20September/Mullen%2009-22-11.pdf>

^{ix} For a useful debate on these two positions, see Gilles Dorransoro, *Fixing a Failed Strategy in Afghanistan* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009) and Ashley J. Tellis, *Reconciling With the Taliban?: Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan* (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April, 2009).

^x C. Christine Fair, "Time for Sober Realism: US-Pakistan Relations," *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (April 2009), p. 166-167.

^{xi} Human Rights Watch, "We Can Torture, Kill, or Keep You for Years" Enforced Disappearances by Pakistan Security Forces in Balochistan," New York, 2011. <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0711Webinside.pdf>.

Mr. CHABOT. I want to thank the entire panel now, and we will recognize ourselves here back and forth for 5 minutes each, and I will recognize myself first for that time.

In my opening statement I outlined my deep concern over the administration's announcement of withdrawal by 2014. This strikes me as an overly ambitious plan that signals to the entire region that, far from being committed, we plan to leave respectively as soon as possible.

Just this morning it was reported in the Wall Street Journal that "The Obama administration is exploring a shift in the military's mission in Afghanistan to an advisory role as soon as next year, a move that would scale back U.S. combat duties well ahead of their scheduled conclusion at the end of 2014."

I am astonished at how this is progressing, with no time being allotted to test the waters. More to the point, we are doing it with an ill-prepared government, an ill-prepared military in their case, not ours, obviously, and a government incapable of sustaining its economic needs.

What do you believe will be the likely result of this? And if I could give each of you a relatively short period of time, and we will just go down the line there, and we will begin with the Ambassador.

Mr. KHALILZAD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I share your concern about the speed of withdrawal; that I think giving the surge forces another fighting season that the military had suggested would have been a more prudent approach, in my judgment.

I do not know about the announcement, the press announcement today, how seriously to take that, whether it is just testing a hypothesis. I don't think that an approach as contained in the article today would advance security in Afghanistan. It will have the opposite effect, because as long as insurgency continues and is getting support from Pakistan, we would be accepting a much larger risk should we pursue that option as described in the article.

I do want to say one other thing, Mr. Chairman, with regard to withdrawal. As I understand it, we are committed—the administration has said it is committed to a strategic partnership agreement beyond 2014; that the leadership in terms of responsibility for security will transfer to the Afghans, and there will be some reduction, a significant reduction perhaps, by U.S. forces.

But as to how much forces will stay to pursue objectives with regard to Afghanistan and in the region, that is being discussed and negotiated. My own judgment is that it will have to be a relatively robust presence for some time to come beyond 2014, and that is my understanding that that is what the administration is committed to. And I think that would be prudent, and the sooner we conclude that agreement, the better.

Thank you, Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

General, are you particularly concerned about the potential lack of a fighting season next year?

General BARNO. No, and I think there is actually some merit in this idea, and let me explain why. The size of the force as it steps

down will remain the same. What will change potentially is the mission assigned the force.

One of the things that struck me and surprised me in my visit last week in Afghanistan was that American forces are prosecuting the counterinsurgency fight with American infantry battalions in the lead. We are prepared to keep American battalions in the lead for a long time.

I think a change of mission to security force assistance over the next year or so, perhaps beginning next summer, next fall, to make that remaining military force we have there, which is going to be at least 68,000 troops, focus on preparing the Afghans and helping to advise the Afghans and enable them in this fight is the way to go. I think we would rather find out that the Afghans are unable to do this while we have a large force there, relatively speaking, with 68,000 than to kick this can down the road and let Americans take on full responsibility until very late in the game.

The last point I would make, Mr. Chairman, as Ambassador Khalilzad noted, the 2014 date is not a withdrawal to a zero number. The end of 2014 is when we transition security lead over to the Afghan forces. The residual force for the Americans there at that point is undetermined.

I personally think that force needs to be 25- to 35,000 Americans who do counterterrorism on the one side and also provide advisers and support for the Afghan forces that continue the counterinsurgency fight. That shuts the light at the end of the Taliban's tunnel if that happens.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

I yield myself an additional 2 minutes, if it is okay, so I can give 1 minute to Dr. Tellis and Dr. Fair.

Dr. Tellis.

Mr. TELLIS. I think the shift to an advisory role, if the report is true, is acceptable if that does not come at the cost of precluding combat. That is, the U.S. must be willing to stay involved in combat operations.

Mr. CHABOT. And I think the general is nodding in agreement there; is that correct, General? And so is the Ambassador. Okay.

Mr. TELLIS. The other point I would make, though, is if we go in this direction, it will have to be packaged carefully, because the region will draw very different conclusions from the conclusions being drawn in this panel. They will see this as the first step toward disengagement and will act accordingly.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Dr. Tellis.

Dr. Fair.

Ms. FAIR. I very much agree with what General Barno has said, although I certainly share Dr. Tellis' concerns about messaging. But let me just say very clearly we haven't had a Pakistan strategy, and I am very dubious that even if we were to defeat a Taliban 3.0, that as long as Pakistan is dedicated to erecting an order which is fundamentally orthogonal to our own, no matter what we do, at some point when we retract our position to a more normalized relationship with Afghanistan, Pakistan is simply going to continue doing what it has always done, which is supporting violent nonstate actors, which it hopes will act on its behalf.

So it would be a genuine travesty if after all of this investment of lives and capital, American, Afghan and international, to simply throw it away because we have failed to put together a workable Pakistan strategy that makes any Afghan strategy functional.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

And the gentleman from New York is recognized for 7 minutes so that we can make it even.

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is okay, Mr. Chairman.

It seems to me that unless you set a deadline, nothing ever ends. If we didn't have a date that session ended in Congress, we would never get anything done. And it seems to me that I can't remember a year where 70 percent of the business of 2 years didn't take place in the last 10 weeks, and most of it toward the end of that.

How would that work if we didn't have a deadline in withdrawal? And if we say we should extend the time, what do we extend it to? And when that runs out, what do we do then? I will ask a different question if I have to.

General BARNO. Well, let me take a stab at that, if I could.

I think 1 year ago I would have said setting a deadline and identifying October 2012 as the end of the surge period would have been very unhelpful. After coming back from Afghanistan on this recent trip, I think it has had value in sharpening the focus of the command to determine what are the essential tasks that have to be done, where do those troops need to be, and how do we start thinking about getting the Afghans into the lead.

And so I actually return with a view that we need to continue to sharpen that focus, and that the force itself needs to be changed, and this may entail this mission change we talked about to hardening the Afghan state that includes the government, but it also includes making sure those Afghan security forces are hardened with American advisers, with American capabilities, and get into the fight and demonstrate their capabilities.

I think there is value in the end of 2014 as the "deadline" for the transition of the security lead, because, as you point out, it forces everyone to move toward that objective. But I don't think it should be the deadline for the American military commitment in Afghanistan.

Mr. KHALILZAD. I agree, Congressman Ackerman, with the importance of having targets and timelines. I completely agree with that. But I want to complement what General Barno has said on the hardening of Afghanistan with the point that we—part of the hardening has got to be political with the Afghan Government. And we will talk about the Pakistan dimension of the problem we face, but there is an Afghan Government dimension that deals with issues of rule of law and governance.

But if it doesn't, the gap between the government and the people will grow, and the military, no matter how much we build this, ultimately will not be sufficient to establish the kind of Afghan state, the vision, that I think General Barno or my friend Dr. Tellis described.

So that track, the Pakistan dimension, what we do, what the Afghans do, is extremely important. And, unfortunately, in more recent years, we have not been as able to get the Afghan Government to perform as well as it must for the objectives to be realized.

Mr. TELLIS. If I may—

Mr. ACKERMAN. Dr. Tellis.

Mr. TELLIS [continuing]. Just respond to that, too? I take your point that the deadline affects us in certain ways, and maybe in welcome ways. It provides focus to our campaign and forces us to do things smartly when we otherwise may not have. But we also have to recognize there are other groups there, the different objectives and different incentives. And for an adversary like the Taliban, what the deadline has done is simply given them room to hope that they can run down the clock, not to engage in serious negotiations with the government, with Afghanistan or with the coalition; to simply hold back their resources in the expectation that the real fight will come not before 2014, but after. So that is, you know, one of the consequences that we also have to keep in mind.

Now, we can mitigate this if we had a clearer vision of what the post-2014 U.S. presence in Afghanistan would look like. What is the force structure we intend to leave behind? What are the objectives to which these forces will be committed to, and what is the extent of our commitment to supporting the Government of Afghanistan in combat operations as required?

If these three other pieces of the puzzle are made more transparent, when the deadline was announced, then the downside with respect to perverse incentives with the Taliban could have been mitigated. Unfortunately, we didn't do that.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me ask a bigger-picture question. What should our aid package look like in Pakistan? What is essential? What is not essential? Dr. Fair.

Ms. FAIR. So I am a big skeptic of USAID in Pakistan. And just more generally, it is not really clear that USAID business model really works. Many of the things that USAID have tried to do have actually just been totally inappropriate. Things like curriculum reform, educational systems are deeply sensitive national issues.

And the worst thing is that USAID, for example, puts a budgetary amount on the table. It doesn't expect the Pakistanis to put an equivalent amount. All Pakistan does is simply shift the monies available to another account. We have no way, given our security posture, to actually make sure that those monies go where they need to go.

Holbrooke, of course, tried to change the paradigm by moving away from these institutional contractors where there were layers of overhead, whereby much of the funds actually came back here and tried to move toward Pakistani NGOs. But anyone who actually knows Pakistan well knows that apart from the government itself, Pakistanis hold NGOs to be even more unaccountable and dubious. So we went from one bad but well-characterized model to a model that wasn't terribly workable.

So, you know, I think some of the fundamental things we have tried to do have really been misguided. I think that there is an urgent need to do things like infrastructure. You can see from Pakistan's flooding that the dam infrastructure that it has is really no longer appropriate, given the changing in the monsoon patterns. There is an urgent need for electricity, for roads. Road building is really important. But these are projects that can be actually executed. We can oversee some degree of quality.

But, most importantly, this notion of USAID as a tool of counterinsurgency or counterterrorism, that USAID will make Pakistanis dislike us less and be more inclined to not support terrorism, there is no evidence for it, and it creates expectations that the United States simply can't meet.

So I am a big fan in Pakistan of doing away with these transformational goals and doing more with less.

Thank you.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman is recognized for an additional 2 minutes, and then, unfortunately, he is going to have to leave, and I have got you all to myself. So I will let the gentleman go ahead here.

Mr. ACKERMAN. And then you will really be in trouble.

What about on the military side, do they need F-16s?

Mr. TELLIS. What they need more than anything else is counterterrorism assistance.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Why are we giving them F-16s?

Mr. TELLIS. I don't know the answer to that, Congressman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I picked the wrong panel, probably, unless someone thinks they need that.

Mr. TELLIS. I don't think anyone can make the case that F-16s actually help Pakistan's counterinsurgency exchange.

General BARNO. I think militarily, though, the F-16 is not the weapon of choice for a counterinsurgency campaign and not terribly helpful for counterterrorism. They do need a helicopter lift. They do need training in which they are resistant to in terms of how to conduct counterinsurgency operations. And I think the intelligence cooperation continues to be an important area where our interests do overlap, particularly regarding al Qaeda, and I think continuing that would be wise.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Dr. Fair, you had said treat the Army, treat the military as the military, and the Secretary of State shouldn't be meeting with General Kayani; she should be meeting instead with Mr. Gilani. Who is running the country? Who is deciding the policy and foreign policy?

Ms. FAIR. You know, so there is a—I understand the compulsion to do one-stop shopping with the actual power center, but this idea just because we meet General Kayani or even General Pasha that somehow we are getting a more honest, transparent interaction is simply flawed. And, in fact, what we do is continue to bolster the political status of the military.

Mr. ACKERMAN. But who is making the decisions?

Ms. FAIR. Well, obviously on most issues of foreign policy that we care about vis-à-vis India, it is going to be the Army chief.

Mr. ACKERMAN. If the Secretary of State doesn't meet with the military, I don't think that is going to make them decide that the military shouldn't be making the decisions that a normalized kind of government—

Ms. FAIR. No, but it is about signaling the Pakistanis. And I have been going to Pakistan now for almost 20 years, and it is a perennial irritant to Pakistanis that Americans say that we support democracy and so forth, but if you actually look at our history, we supported the military.

And let us be very clear about the F-16 canard. We didn't give them the F-16s because we thought it would enhance their counterterrorism or their counterinsurgency capabilities. We did it to placate Musharraf, we did it to placate Kayani, and it hasn't gotten us anywhere.

If the Pakistanis want helicopters, they can buy helicopters. So far what they have wanted are weapon systems that can deal more effectively with India and have very little utility for their domestic threat. And we have—quite frankly, in our efforts to placate GHQ and to continue making the Director General of the ISI happy, we continue to go this path, and it completely undermines our regional interests in every possible way be it democratization of Pakistan, be it regional stability vis-à-vis India and Pakistan.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time has expired.

Dr. Tellis—if I could just go one question, and then I am going to let you go. You had mentioned the term “managed jihadism” in your statement. Could you define that term and maybe expound upon it a bit? And what is your opinion about its chances for success and its implications?

Mr. TELLIS. I think of managed jihadism as the Pakistani strategy of supporting some terrorist groups by fighting other terrorist groups simultaneously. In effect, Pakistan's strategy since 2001 has been a highly differentiated counterterrorism strategy. They have identified groups that threaten the Pakistani state, and they have gone after them with a great deal of energy and concentration, and they have solicited assistance from the United States in support of that campaign. But even as they do so, they have been quite liberal in continuing assistance and support to other terrorist groups that don't necessarily threaten the Pakistani state, but threaten Afghanistan, threaten India and, by extension, threaten the United States. And they believe that they are able to, in a sense, manage the contradiction in this policy quite well. That is, as long as the threats that they sustain don't ricochet, don't come back to haunt them, they think the policy serves its purpose. It keeps India on a tight leash, it keeps Afghanistan deferential to Pakistan, and it keeps the United States in a continuing payoff mode trying to bribe Pakistan to do the right thing.

Mr. CHABOT. Doctor, in that, I guess, double game they are playing, the implications for, say, U.S. lives, especially our troops on the ground, that doesn't seem to be a particular concern to them in this effort. Would you agree with that?

Mr. TELLIS. I think they have—I think it is of concern. They have made the calculation, and they find that the strategy still serves their interests. That is, even though the end result of the strategy is that U.S. troops are threatened, they believe that Pakistan is so important that the United States will simply not call their bluff, will simply not call them on the impact of the strategy. And if you look at the record over the last 10 years, I regret to say that they have turned out to be right.

Mr. CHABOT. Dr. Fair and Ambassador Khalilzad, I saw you kind of nodding your heads and chomping at the bit there, so I will go to both of you, if I could, and then I am going to go to the gentleman from Virginia here.

So, Dr. Fair.

Ms. FAIR. I really want to expand upon what Dr. Tellis has said. Let me give you a really good example of their coldhearted calculation that they can get away with this impunity. Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the group we have already heard about that did the 2008 massacre, so they have been attacking our troops in Afghanistan since at least 2006, and probably, according to my interlocutors, maybe as early as 2004. And we have done very little, if anything, about it. And I have been raising this publicly.

Another problem with their strategy—actually our understanding of their strategy is that many of the militant groups serve important domestic purposes for Pakistan. So, for example, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, I have written a piece recently in *Survival* where I lay out Lashkar-e-Tayyiba's important domestic strategy and the importance of Lashkar to the ISI. Even groups that they are going after decisively, they are ultimately strained because particularly the Daobandi groups, they have these overlapping networks, which means that part of those networks are in the Punjab, and as long as they stay in the Punjab, i.e., useful to kill Indians, they won't go in and root them out. But those Punjab-based groups are actually some of the most lethal parts of the Pakistan Taliban.

Very finally, the Pakistanis, I think, deliberately take advantage of the confusion between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistan Taliban. They will say, we have lost X thousand troops fighting them, we have lost 35,000 Pakistani lives. I want to point out to you that the Pakistan Taliban itself is—in the same way Afghan Taliban are not coherent, there are actually some Pakistan Taliban commanders that are allies of the Pakistan state because they have agreed to not target the Pakistani state, but target us. Twenty-three billion dollars later, this is where we are.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Doctor.

And, Dr. Khalilzad.

Mr. KHALILZAD. Mr. Chairman, I accept and agree with the notion that Pakistan has a differentiated approach, supporting some, opposing others. I also believe that Pakistan's strategy and policy can be affected. We have not been as focused on affecting their support for insurgency as we have become more recently. I think it has been only in the last few months where we have really been sharply focused on it. And we have shown over the past many years that we—as long as we got cooperation on al Qaeda, we did not press them very hard and didn't make them pay a high price for supporting insurgency in Afghanistan.

And so I don't want to say that the support for managed jihadism, as Dr. Tellis mentioned, is—independent of calculation, that it can't be influenced, it can't be shaped, and that is why I believe that we—as we increase the cost or as we—the message that the cost will grow for them out of this difficult time for us to do it as we—they think we are on our way out, but with an end point, as we described earlier, that there will be forces beyond 2014, and with the determination that we will impose costs if they don't change, and a willingness that we are willing to accept legitimate Pakistan interests be respected in Afghanistan, we may have a chance for something that may be acceptable to all sides to take place there.

And I think this is the challenge for our diplomacy to orchestrate the set of pressures on both ourselves and, more broadly, with other big stakeholders in that region to incentivize Pakistan to accept a reasonable settlement that respects that interest. If they don't, then the cost will be quite significant for them.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much.

General, let me conclude here with a final question, if you don't mind. In light of what has been said here about the confusing landscape of this, how frustrating is it for our military personnel or men and women on the ground when you are not quite clear who your friends and allies are, and who the enemy is, and that sort of thing?

General BARNO. Well, I think those military forces that are up against the Pakistani border have great frustration with—and this is particularly true in Eastern Afghanistan—with what they see of enemy elements coming across that border with impunity and attacking them inside of Afghanistan. And there have been numerous press reports. I heard reports while I was in Afghanistan from Americans about Taliban forces going right by Frontier Corps units from the Pakistani security services on their way in to attack Americans in Afghanistan.

And, of course, the border is certainly more respected by our forces than it is by the Taliban, and so we do have some restrictions on our ability to engage across that border even if we have known targets there, known threats to Americans. That gets into the details of the rules of engagement, which we can't discuss in the open forum here, but it is very frustrating and very difficult, and it puts our forces in the east along the border in many cases at a tactical disadvantage.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

And the gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia is recognized. And then we will wrap it up, because I have to meet with the Parliamentarians from Afghanistan who were here before. So the gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Tellis, how would you characterize the relationship between the Government of Pakistan or elements of the Government of Pakistan and the Haqqani network?

Mr. TELLIS. I think the Haqqani network for years has been supported by the ISI. It still continues to be supported by the ISI. And I do not see at this juncture why the ISI would retrench that support given the perception that there is going to be a security transition in Afghanistan. I think Admiral Mullen's characterization of the relationship between the Haqqanis and the ISI was absolutely on the mark.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Dr. Fair, what Dr. Tellis just described, if accurate, is antithetical to U.S. interests in the region; is it not?

Ms. FAIR. It absolutely is. I think one has to understand why Pakistan hangs onto these groups. This is probably where I get accused of being too soft on Pakistan, ironically. From Pakistan's optic over the last 10 years—and obviously Haqqani, we worked with them in the 1980s, and the Pakistanis make a lot of hay over that. But this is not the Haqqani. They are no longer working with us; they are working against us. But from the Pakistani point of

view, their regional concerns have actually been injured over the course of the last 10 years.

Many of Pakistan's concerns stem from India in Afghanistan. Now, we can debate whether or not it is empirically defensible, but that is how they do see the world. And the Haqqani network, though they don't control a lot of real estate in Afghanistan, they are very effective tools that they have used to kill Indians and obviously also to kill us.

So you sort of dilate upon what Dr. Tellis said. When we understand the strategic motivations of Pakistan, this is why I am very cynical about our ability to succeed in Afghanistan, because Pakistan actually has more will to stay the course than we do. Pakistan sees more strategic interests at stake in Afghanistan than we do. So it is out of a really serious plan to put more pressure on Pakistan to cease supporting these terrorist groups. I don't know what it means to succeed in Afghanistan even if that is possible.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Do you believe that the Pakistanis believe that the relationship with the United States has strategic value?

Ms. FAIR. I do not, in some very serious sense. I think what the Pakistanis have become very accustomed to is taking advantage of historical events, and this has been true of every single period of engaging them; of saying that they support our strategic interests, while taking advantage of our cupidity, our gullibility, to take the massive aid that they get in each of those periods and funnel it into systems that really target their security interests, which have always been and always will be Indiacentric. And I believe that is how the Pakistani establishment sees it.

I think we have been fools in trying to think that we can have a strategic relationship when our strategic interests differ. What they want is the goods without the obligation, and that is firmly what I believe.

Mr. CONNOLLY. I used to work up here during the Cold War. The relationship then was undergirded by the fact that the Indians tilted toward the Soviets, and the Pakistanis tilted toward us in the West. So one could at least explain away some aspects of the relationship, including our willingness to turn the other way on the proliferation issue at the time in the 1980s because of that Cold War metric.

But that is all gone, and India has in many ways become transformed, and the relationship between India and the United States is warming by the day at almost every level. And so how does that change the relationship you have just described? It seems to me the United States has some other options in the region, the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear power notwithstanding.

Ms. FAIR. Okay. So I think we can actually go back with the luxury of time and reread the Cold War history. The Pakistanis took advantage of our assistance to massively build up their armed forces, which had really—they didn't really inherent a full complement during partition. So in some sense the Pakistani motivation, they said, we are doing this for you.

Even their Afghan policy—I really would like to point this out—they had developed essentially the seven militant groups by the mid-1970s under the Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. By the time the Soviets had crossed the Amu Darya, they already had those groups into

play. So in some sense what the Pakistanis got from us was the ability to amplify the policies in the region that they had already wanted to pursue.

But I think your question about our relationship with India, this is something else we have to understand about Pakistan. They see our relationship with India, and indeed we basically said India is not only the regional power, it is a rising global power of significant consequence. What Pakistan sees in that is that we expect them to acquiesce to Indian hegemony. So Pakistan's interests vis-à-vis India no longer simply center around Kashmir, it centers around resisting India's rise. Pakistan can't change that fact militarily; no one diplomatically in the world, with the exception of possibly the Chinese, although they are kind of a declining asset from some sense. The only tool Pakistan has is militancy, and this means Pakistan becomes more dangerous, not less. And that is why we have to find some way of productively engaging Pakistan while also holding it accountable.

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman's time is expired.

I want to thank the panel very much for their insight.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. Oh, I am sorry, I didn't see you over there Dana.

I still want to thank you, but we will thank you for real in a minute here. We will recognize the gentleman from California, the ranking subcommittee chairman here, the gentleman from California, Mr. Dana Rohrabacher

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, we will see if you still thank them after I get done.

Hey, Zal, good to see you. Good to see all of you. Some of us go back a long way. Well, it has been all this time, Zal. Did you make some mistakes; was that it? Is this all your fault? I mean, we ended up—you were the guiding light when we set this thing in motion, and now it is all screwed up.

Mr. KHALILZAD. Well, I don't know if this is a moment of self-flagellation or not. I am not known for that.

Well, I believe more seriously that during the period that I had the honor of representing the United States in Afghanistan, that is what we are talking about, and I had General Barno with me, and I don't want them by saying he was with me that he should do self-flagellation as well. I thought we were doing very well, in my judgment. We liberated Afghanistan with very few Americans on the ground. We were very popular when we got there. Rather than governing Afghanistan, we catalyzed an agreement among them for a government. That government was a vast improvement over what they had before. An election, the Constitution, girls going to school and all that that you know.

But I think there are two issues on which we didn't do as well as we might have. One I believe they should be spending a lot of time on today, which is the sanctuary that was being developed in Pakistan for the Taliban and the other insurgents. We did not succeed with the effort that we made to bring that change about, although I remember that we did establish a trilateral commission, and that I was pressing very hard in Washington that we needed a mechanism to change parts of the situation in Pakistan. And one mechanism that we came about, and General Barno was actually

the chair of that, to bring Afghans, Pakistanis and us together to deal with this issue. But I think it is fair to say that our level of effort and what we tried did not produce the results we were seeking.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the number one thing you could point to was the fact that we did not pay attention to the sanctuaries?

Mr. KHALILZAD. In time.

The second issue, I believe it is in relation to Afghanistan. One, I think we initially underinvested in the Afghan security force buildup because we thought Afghanistan being poor, that we didn't want to plan for a big force that they couldn't support themselves. And so, therefore, we were planning for a small force, and only in later years did that change.

And second, I think that a working relationship, the trust relationship, that we had with the Afghan Government, which is related and a key issue for working together, has been undermined in more recent years. It is true that there is a huge—has been in recent years a great trust deficit between us and the Afghan leadership. And in combination, I think, of the Pakistan factor, the Afghan institutions, those two related, if the Pakistani issue had been dealt with, perhaps we wouldn't need as big an Afghan security force as we do now and the Afghan Government trust issue have been a factor.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let us get back to your point. You are suggesting we underinvested in the security buildup. And let me suggest there are those of us, as you are well aware, that think that the strategy of a centralized defense buildup was the wrong strategy to begin with. And I remember when General Dostum, and the Tajiks, and the Uzbeks and our warlords in the north who would help defeat the Taliban were disarmed, and instead we went with General Wardak to create a national force. Was that not the wrong decision? Should we have kept the traditional militia system as the basis for Afghan defense against the Taliban rather than trying to create a central force?

Mr. KHALILZAD. I know that you and I have had some of these issues. We have discussed them before. But let me say that at that time, the challenge that Afghanistan faced given the anarchy of the 1990s, the fear that existed was a return to warlordism as it was described and a civil war situation that then led to the rise of the Taliban. And what the Afghans were looking for was with nostalgia to a period of—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. When the King was there, my guy.

Mr. KHALILZAD. The King. And there were central institutions, a national army and other insurgents, and therefore they wanted to go to do that again. And as in many such postconflict situations, there was an effort to DDR—decommission, demobilize and reintegrate—the regional forces what helped us overthrow the Taliban into the central institutions. It was not that Afghanistan had suffered from having too much of a state, that, therefore, they wanted the decentralized approach. And as you know, I went to Iraq, as the chairman said, from Afghanistan, and there they had suffered under a very centralized state, and they wanted very much what—a Federal state. But Afghanistan had the opposite experience.

So we could argue about this. I mean, maybe honorable people could differ on it. But that was the circumstances of that time to which we were responding. We didn't go with a cookie-cutter approach that we liberated Iraq, they should have this, and we liberated Afghanistan, they should have that.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I think the point you make that honorable people of intelligence can disagree——

Mr. KHALILZAD. Absolutely.

Mr. ROHRABACHER [continuing]. Is an important point. And I do disagree and have disagreed with some of the things, but I have enjoyed our sparring over a decade.

Mr. KHALILZAD. Yes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you.

The gentleman's time has expired.

We now will thank the panel effusively for the tremendous testimony. I think you have all done a very good job this afternoon. It has been of considerable help. We will pass on the information that we learn, and our staffs will, to our colleagues who were unable to be here this afternoon, but are here in spirit. So thank you all for coming.

If there is no further business to come before the committee, we are adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:54 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X



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Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Steve Chabot (R-OH), Chairman

October 28, 2011

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, to be held in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building **(and available live, via the WEBCAST link on the Committee website at <http://www.hcfa.house.gov>)**.

DATE: Thursday, November 3, 2011

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: 2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I

WITNESSES: The Honorable Zalmay Khalilzad, Ph.D.
Counselor
Center for Strategic and International Studies

Lieutenant General David W. Barno
Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow
Center for a New American Security

Ashley J. Tellis, Ph.D.
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment

C. Christine Fair, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor
Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-3021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON MESA HEARING

Day Thurs Date Nov 3 Room 2172

Starting Time 2:00 Ending Time 3:52

Recesses (2:20 to 3) (to) (to) (to) (to) (to)

Presiding Member(s)

Chabot

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session

Electronically Recorded (taped)

Executive (closed) Session

Stenographic Record

Televised

TITLE OF HEARING:

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Ackerman Chabot Turner Connolly Rehrbacher


NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____

or
TIME ADJOURNED 3:52


Subcommittee Staff Director

