

**THE RESET BUTTON HAS BEEN PUSHED: KICKING
OFF A NEW ERA IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

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THE RESET BUTTON HAS BEEN PUSHED: KICKING OFF A NEW ERA IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

TUESDAY, JULY 28, 2009

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert Wexler (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. WEXLER. The Subcommittee on Europe will come to order.

First and foremost, I want to welcome our two outstanding witnesses, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Philip Gordon; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Policies, Celeste Wallander.

The President's recent Moscow summit and the administration's effort to reset relations between the United States and Russia comes at a critical juncture as we grapple with several major foreign policy challenges, of which one of the most difficult, complex, and consistently frustrating is America's relations with Russia.

I agree with President Obama that there is an opportunity—certainly there is—for increased dialogue, cooperation, and progress between the United States and Russia, if we especially reject and put to rest, to quote, in President Obama's words, "old assumptions, old ways of thinking," that the United States and Russia are destined to be "antagonists," or that we are in a power struggle where a zero sum game is played and one side is the loser.

Although there remain serious disagreements between Washington and Moscow on many issues, at the summit the Obama administration and Russian officials successfully began the process of resetting relations and agreed to a new strategic framework for United States-Russian military-to-military cooperation, reaffirmed a common commitment to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism, and signed an agreement allowing United States military personnel and equipment to transit across Russia to Afghanistan.

Presidents Obama and Medvedev also signed a joint understanding of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that will guide negotiations and commits both America and Russia to reduce strategic warheads and strategic delivery vehicles.

Finally, a bilateral Presidential commission coordinated by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov, with 13 high-level

working groups, will meet for the first time this fall to focus on a range of issues including civil society, terrorism, common threat assessment, economic relations, nuclear energy and nuclear cooperation, and space cooperation.

As the administration pursues a more robust relationship with Russia, it will undoubtedly carefully navigate and make sense of the internal political dynamics and power struggles in the Kremlin and Russia, a weakened Russian economy and a growing values gap between the United States and Russia in terms of human rights, democracy, rule of law, corruption, economic transparency, and freedom of the press.

It is hard to be overly optimistic about United States-Russian relations as we approach the 1-year anniversary of the Russian-Georgian war, Russia's military and political presence in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and of Abkhazia is hardening, President Medvedev has renewed threats to place short-range missiles on Russia's border with Poland, and another prominent Chechen human rights activist has been brutally murdered without judicial recourse.

There is no more pressing issue on the United States-Russian reset agenda than Iran's development of nuclear weapons. To date, Russia's actions suggest anything but a real partner in deterring Iran's nuclear program. In fact, Russia has failed to implement Security Council resolutions and their accompanying sanctions, continues to build the Bashir nuclear power plant, and provides the Iranian Government with lethal weapons, even signing an agreement to sell the S-300 antimissile defense system to Tehran.

Twenty years after the revolutions in 1989 and the fall of the Iron Curtain, many Central and Eastern European nations feel increasingly threatened by a resurgent Russia. America must take these concerns seriously, continue to unequivocally reject a Russian sphere of influence, assist Europe in its quest for energy security, expand the visa waiver program to include allies, and consult closely with European governments, including Poland and the Czech Republic, on missile defense. We must also strengthen NATO follow-through on efforts to provide credible defense plans for Alliance members, and state unequivocally America's unwavering obligation to our Article 5 commitments.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

Chairman Robert Wexler
Subcommittee on Europe

Opening Statement

“The Reset Button Has Been Pushed: Kicking Off a New Era in U.S.-Russian
Relations”

July 28, 2009

The Subcommittee on Europe will come to order.

I want to welcome our two witnesses, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia policy Celeste Wallander.

The President’s recent Moscow Summit and the Administration’s effort to “reset” relations between the United States and Russia comes at a critical juncture as we grapple with several major foreign policy challenges, of which one of the most difficult, complex and consistently frustrating is America’s relations with Russia.

I agree with President Obama that there is an opportunity for increased dialogue, cooperation, and progress between the U.S. and Russia if we reject and put to rest “old assumptions, old ways of thinking” that the United States and Russia are destined to be “antagonists,” or that we are in a power struggle where a “zero sum game” is played and one side is the loser.

Although there remain serious disagreements between Washington and Moscow on many issues, at the Summit, the Obama Administration and Russian officials began the process of “resetting relations,” and agreed to a new strategic framework for U.S.-Russian military to military cooperation, reaffirmed a common commitment to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism, and signed an agreement allowing U.S. military personnel and equipment to transit across Russia to Afghanistan.

Presidents Obama and Medvedev also signed a joint Understanding on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that will guide negotiations and commits both the U.S. and Russia to reduce strategic warheads and strategic delivery vehicles. Finally, a bilateral Presidential Commission, coordinated by Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov, with thirteen high-level working groups, will meet for the first time this fall to focus on a range of issues, including civil society, fighting terrorism, common threat assessment, economic relations, nuclear energy and nuclear cooperation, and space cooperation.

As the Administration pursues a more robust relationship with Russia, it must carefully navigate and make sense of the internal political dynamics and power struggles in the Kremlin and Russia, a weakened Russian economy, and a growing values gap between the U.S. and Russia in terms of human rights, democracy, rule of law, anti-corruption, economic transparency, and freedom of the press.

It is hard to be optimistic about US-Russian relations, as we approach the one year anniversary of the Russian-Georgian War, Russia’s military and political presence in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia is hardening, President Medvedev renews threats to place short range missiles on

Russia's border with Poland and another prominent Chechen human rights activist is brutally murdered without judicial recourse.

There is no more pressing issue on the U.S.-Russian "reset" agenda than Iran's development of nuclear weapons. To date, Russia's actions suggest anything but a real partner in deterring Iran's nuclear program. In fact, Russia has failed to implement Security Council resolutions and their accompanying sanctions, continues to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant, and provides the Iranian government with lethal weapons – even signing an agreement to sell the S-300 anti-missile defense system to Tehran.

Twenty years after the revolutions of 1989 and the fall of the Iron Curtain, many central and eastern European nations feel increasingly threatened by a resurgent Russia. The U.S. must take these concerns seriously; continue to unequivocally reject a Russian sphere of influence, assist Europe in its quest for energy security, expand the Visa Waiver Program to include allies, and consult closely with European governments, including Poland and the Czech Republic, on missile defense. We must also strengthen NATO, follow through on efforts to provide credible defense plans for alliance members, and state unequivocally America's unwavering obligation to our Article 5 commitments.

I would now like to invite the ranking member, Mr. Gallegly from California, to give his opening remarks.

Mr. WEXLER. With great pleasure, I would now like to invite the ranking member, Mr. Gallegly from California, to give his opening remarks.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I could just yield to Mr. Wilson, I have my statement that I will have for the record, but if I could have a couple minutes.

Mr. WEXLER. Certainly. Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this meeting. I studied Russian history at the Citadel when I was in college. I have had the opportunity to visit Moscow and St. Petersburg for the last 20 years, and I have seen the restoration of cities that were run down, now restored to be beautiful centers of culture.

I have had the opportunity to visit Western Siberia and the Yekaterinburg, and Tomsk, Novosibirsk. The city I represent, Columbia, is the sister city of Chelyabinsk. We are very proud of the relationship. Having grown up in Charleston, South Carolina, we had a significant number of citizens who had emigrated from Russia. So I grew up with a great appreciation of the Russian culture which has had such a positive impact on American culture. And when we visit, my experience has been extraordinarily friendly people who want to have a positive relationship with the United States.

I also work very closely to promote Rotary Clubs to be developed in Russia. This is obviously nonpolitical. It is where business people can network. And there are over 100 clubs today in Russia and the people—members can network by attending clubs in Japan, India, Germany, United States, around the world, thousands of clubs. And it is a way for the Russian business leaders, men and women, to understand the benefits of free market democracy.

So I am very grateful that Rotary now has a very significant presence, and I am very grateful to be the host to Rotarians from Russia when they visit here in the United States or in Washington.

So I want to wish you well on your presentations today, and I am very hopeful for a positive reset. Thank you.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:]

Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on Europe

Statement of Rep. Elton Gallegly
The Reset Button Has Been Pushed: Kicking Off a New Era in U.S.-Russian
Relations

July 28, 2009

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this oversight hearing on the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia. I would also like to welcome Assistant Secretary Gordon and Deputy Assistant Secretary Wallander for appearing here this afternoon.

Few relationships in the international arena are as important as our ties with Russia. At the same time, few relationships have the potential of being derailed because of misunderstandings and competing interests. In this regard, I believe that the establishment at the recent summit in Moscow of the U.S. – Russia Bilateral Commission, which is intended to improve communication and diplomacy on a wide range of issues, is a step in the right direction.

This is an essential relationship, one that has important implications for U.S. national security in such critical areas as counter-terrorism, the war in Afghanistan, and nonproliferation.

Needless to say, despite the progress made at the summit meeting, there are still differences between the two countries on issues such as NATO expansion, missile defense, energy security, developments in the Balkans, human rights, and the best strategy for dealing with the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran. I look forward to discussing these issues and others with our two witnesses.

Again, I would like to thank Mr. Wexler for holding this important and timely hearing.

Mr. WEXLER. I want to invite the other members who have been so kind to join us to have some opening remarks, and just beg the panel's deference just in terms of timing. Take the time you wish, just so we can get to the witnesses. And I thank really everyone for coming. We have had a great turnout.

Congressman Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this hearing. I think it is a very important hearing.

Long an adversary, and now something less, although I dare not say a friend quite yet, that is the situation with Russia. Russia presents us with quite a dilemma with respect to achieving our long-term foreign policy goals as well as long-term peace and stability worldwide. By that I mean on the one hand, Russia seems willing to help mitigate the nuclear proliferation threats in Iran and North Korea. And having just visited there earlier this month, spending about 1 week, I see this kind of schizophrenic dichotomy of the mindset of Russia. On the one hand, they want to help with Iran and North Korea; but on the other, we have seen them distribute nuclear technology to Iran and to Syria, both of whom have stated desires to obtain nuclear weapons and to use them for nefarious

purposes. That one example best illustrates the schizophrenic dichotomy of mind that Russia is in.

On the one hand, they are willing to mitigate, they seem to be offering a hand to mitigate, but the reality is they are sending nuclear technology to these countries, both of whom which have stated desires to obtain nuclear weapons and, in fact, to use them.

We have seen them bloviate and threaten over U.S. missile defense programs. We have also seen Russia use its natural gas supplies to stick it—with a huge stick to beat the Europeans and some of their satellite nations about the head and shoulders. They have cut the gas off in places like Lithuania and using it political means—and the Ukraine. These are documented. But what troubles me most, Mr. Chairman, as I witnessed when I was over there, was Russia's internal actions.

So the question becomes: Can we truly count on Russia as a partner—or, more to the point, should we—when they seem content to backslide on the treatment of their own people? We see opposition voices snuffed out, murderers of journalists and activists go unpunished. We see rampant corruption and political cronyism at every level of government, and especially in the judiciary.

We see expropriation of private sector enterprises. Every day, it seems, the Russian people lose more and more personal freedoms, and the government seems to be becoming more and more authoritarian.

And so I worry, Mr. Chairman, that sooner rather than later, because of all of this internally, Russia might not be in a position to help us because of internal strife that inevitably rises out of such action.

Russia officials, including President Medvedev, have said that Russia will not agree to limit offensive nuclear weapons unless the United States suspends its plans to deploy a missile defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic. But even if this was on the table to negotiate as an item, we still do not know which hand Russia is playing with.

The fundamental question that the administration has to answer I think is: Does this reset of relations with Russia mean that democracy and human rights issues will be placed on the back burner?

Now, please don't make any mistake, Mr. Chairman, for saying that Russia is a lost cause. I am not saying that. Far from it. But I do believe that we have to deal very frankly and openly and from positions of strength in dealing with the Russians. Russia has tremendous potential to assist us and the rest of the world in reaching stability and prosperity.

No other two nations have in their hands the future of this planet as Russia and the United States. However, I am worried about the level to which we must help Russia to help itself before they can help us and the world. And I am just not sure that we have all of the resources and/or the time to effect the internal change in Russia so that they are in a better position to help us in the world.

But that being said—and that is why this hearing is so important—I for one certainly think we as a Nation must try. Thank you.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Chairman Gallegly.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for holding this oversight hearing on the bilateral relationship between the United States and Russia. I would also like to welcome Assistant Secretary Gordon and Deputy Assistant Wallander as well to the hearing this afternoon.

You know, Mr. Chairman, few relationships in the international arena are as important as our ties with Russia. At the same time, few relationships have the potential of being derailed because of misunderstandings and competing interests.

In this regard, I believe that the establishment at the recent summit in Moscow of the U.S.-Russian Bilateral Commission, which is intended to improve communications and diplomacy on a wide range of issues, is definitely a step in the right direction. This is an essential relationship, one that has important implications for the U.S. National security in such critical areas as counterterrorism, the war in Afghanistan, and certainly the issue of non-proliferation.

Needless to say, despite the progress made at the summit meeting, there are still differences between the two countries on issues such as NATO expansion, missile defense, energy security, development in the Balkans, human rights, and the best strategy for dealing with the threat of a nuclear armed Iran.

I look forward to the discussion today, and I would also like to hear comments from our witnesses today about the recent statements that were made by Vice President Biden as it relates to his assessment of the strength and prominence that Russia plays in the world today. There seems to be some inconsistency, and I would just like to know whether that is really speaking on behalf of the administration and maybe some misinterpretation on my part and the parts of others. And, again, thank you for calling this hearing today. I look forward to all our participation. Thank you.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Just in order of appearance, Mr. Miller. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. And I appreciate your leadership, Mr. Chairman, in holding this hearing. And I hope that you will continue to provide leadership on this issue, because our relationship with Russia will go a long way to determining whether or not our country lives at peace and our people are secure, and will have a lot to do with American prosperity and security in the future.

I actually think that Russia is a vital component to America's future, a component that we have taken for granted. And let me just say we need to make an effort—perhaps this hearing is the first one—to try to undo some of the damage that has been done for the last 20 years of what I consider to be senseless American hostility toward our former Soviet enemy, which was now and should have been treated as our current Russian friends.

This hostility and diplomatic incompetence has turned what could have been a great friendship that would have well served both of our countries into a situation today that it could go in either direction. And I do not place that fault on the part of the Russians.

Let me just note that we can describe in hostile words and in sinister phrases the things that the Russians have been doing. But, in reality if you look at them, does anyone expect the United States should sell its natural gas and our reserves and our products at a level lower than market value? Yet, when the Russians try to do this, they are described as being involved in some sort of heinous scheme.

If Russia was involved with putting up an anti-missile system on our borders or participating in a military alliance after the United States withdrew from an area, and ended up putting a military alliance on our border, would we consider that a hostile act? We certainly would.

I was as Cold Warrior as a Cold Warrior could be. I wrote many of the speeches Ronald Reagan gave that were called the hard-core anti-Soviet speeches of the day. I wrote them. I worked with the President on those speeches. I engaged in military action against Russian troops in Afghanistan and probably killed a few.

I can tell you, this is a different world than it was then, and we have to reach out to the Russians or we will suffer because of it.

Today we have great opportunity to reset that relationship. And one of the things, one of the few things I can say that I totally support the Obama administration is in its efforts to reset and reestablish a good relationship and a friendship with the Russian people that will help us confront the two challenges aligned with this.

There are two challenges that face our country. Just as Soviet communism was the threat when I was a young man, the threat today is radical Islam. They declared war on us. They slaughtered 3,000 of our people, just as they slaughtered hundreds of children in Russia, I might add. And Communist China, which hasn't one inch of reform, and we have been treating them like our business partners while Russia has had dramatic reform and we have treated them as if they were still some Communist despotism.

So with that said, we need to work with this. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I plan to work with this and the administration to set things straight.

Mr. WEXLER. I thank the gentleman for his kind and thoughtful remarks.

And, Congressman Delahunt, you try to top that.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Well, if you would give me 1/2 hour, Mr. Chairman, I might be able to even exceed it.

I was joined by the ranking member and Mr. Scott and Mr. Sires, along with the chairman of the full committee, recently on our trip to Moscow. It was very informative. I want to congratulate both the Department of State and the Department of Defense for I think a very valuable effort, and I think the results are concrete.

I agree with others who have stated this is an extremely important relationship because it has been noted, correctly so, that in excess of 95 percent of the nuclear weapons on the planet today are in the possession of the United States and Russia. It is a relationship that has to work. I left Moscow, observing the summit which I thought was a solid success, that it is more than rhetoric. I think the reset button has been hit and I think that progress is being made. I think we have to be realistic in terms of our expectations. It did not reach the low point the nadir, if you will, overnight. And

it is going to take time to restore it to what I think both nations wish to see: A mutually respectful relationship.

And I think that both sides have to be careful as well in terms of our rhetoric. You know, it is easy to—passion sometimes overcomes good judgment when words are being used. And we have learned, I think, that words do have consequences. Words that have been uttered in the past 8 years have I think impaired and hurt the United States national security interests. But that is the past, and I think that we are embarking on a new course. I note that there has been an agreement that has been reached, a memorandum of understanding between HHS and its counterpart in Russia.

I want to speak to you, Mr. Gordon, about an effort that I think is worthy of serious consideration, and have spoken to our counterparts in the Russian Duma and the Federal Council relative to exchanges with a particular focus on sports, bringing young people from Russia and sending our young people over there for better understanding.

I think it was Mr. Scott that really emphasized there seems to be a mystery. I think the key to unlocking that mystery is more understanding, more communication, and real clarity. You know, we hear even on this panel some reservations and even among the American people about what is happening in Russia. But we can't lose sight of the fact that polling data in Russia indicates that more than two-thirds of the Russian people have a negative view of the United States. We have got to address that. If we don't address that, our, I think, shared and mutual interest and our goal will not be achieved.

But again, let me congratulate you and also the President for the good work, and let's just keep on keeping on. I yield back.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Mr. Sires.

Mr. SIRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here today. I was also one of the individuals, Members of Congress, who traveled to Russia recently. And I found a very interesting—how can I say? In the people that we met, there seemed to be An Old Guard and a New Guard, and obviously the New Guard seem to be more receptive to some of the ideas while the Older Guard that we talked to seemed to be a throwback to the Cold War.

Even when Congressman Delahunt asked about a question, two-thirds of the Russians do not trust or like the Americans, the person that jumped right away to answer the question, to me, was the Old Guard. And he was resentful. He did not like or trust Americans. I don't know how you deal with that in negotiations, because who is going to set the direction for Russia in the future?

We also talk about the problems with the journalists, the lack of human rights, the shutting down of TV stations. Is that the new Russia, or is that the pressure from the old Russia advancing ahead?

So I think we have our work cut out for us. I think, like everybody else, that we have to be very careful. I certainly share that we have to negotiate, not backing away but just confronting and dealing with the problems. So congratulations on some of the nego-

tiations that you have done thus far. And, Chairman, thank you very much for holding this hearing.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Mr. Costa.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief because I want to hear the witnesses.

I concur with much of the statements that have been made from my colleagues on both sides of the aisle here. This is a very important relationship. It has not gone as well as I think either country would have liked to see in the last 15, 20 years. The opportunity of this new administration to hit the reset button I think provides a chance for both countries to reset and to put their priorities on the table. Those priorities have, I think, complementary issues that we share in common. There are some obvious conflicts and differences of point of view that were noted by Mr. Rohrabacher and Mr. Delahunt.

I am especially interested to hear our witnesses talk about, as we look at resetting, on how we focus on not only the Middle East, but South Asia as it relates to the challenges both countries face with a potential Iran that is seeking nuclear weapons.

I am also looking at our relations with Europe and the former Soviet republics that are now independent, and that sphere of influence as Russia looks at it, as we look at it. And then your suggestions on, as we look at trying to develop a friendship that really should exist in more meaningful ways, in my view, what the milestones ought to be. In other words, what we should expect in the next 6 months, the next year, the next 2 years as we move in a more positive direction. So I will be looking forward to that testimony.

Mr. Chairman, I also think it is maybe appropriate to note when we talk about Russia and its former sphere of influence, I have an exchange student here from Belarus, Veronica Blechovich, and she and her fellow students are in the Capitol watching democracy in action. So we welcome her and her fellow students. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. And welcome on behalf of the committee.

Mr. McMahan.

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for convening this very important hearing. I too will be brief because we have great witnesses and we want to hear from them.

I think when I contemplate Russia, I am reminded of what Will Rogers said when he said that Russia is a country that, no matter what you say about it, it is true. And as you know, he said that over 70 years ago and yet it is still relevant today. Russia's political, social, and economic dynamics are highly complex, contradictory, and nonlinear. I think most U.S. lawmakers, as was noted by my colleague from the great State of New Jersey, Mr. Sires, most U.S. lawmakers will note that there seems to be a values gap between the United States and Russia which has been demonstrated time and time again through their domestic political developments.

The same can be also seen in Russia's foreign policy. The Ukrainian gas disputes and the Russia-Georgia conflict of just this last year raises questions about Russia's capacity to be a responsible

stakeholder in the international community. And just this year, we witnessed Russia withdrawing its candidacy from the World Trade Organization and resorting to a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan after waiting for membership. It is becoming increasingly clear that Russia is accustomed to isolation, and this is clearly not the appropriate strategy we would hope and not the one most beneficial for the rest of the world.

A Russia integrated into the international system is a Russia that would be more likely to behave according to internationally accepted norms of behavior and lead to a safer world. That is why I support the administration's decision to engage with Russia on matters of nonproliferation and energy security, and I am encouraged by proposals to promote further exchanges between Russia and the United States to close what I refer to as the values gap between our two countries.

However, Russia's refusal to agree to tougher sanctions against Iran in exchange for a new nuclear arms deal and in pursuit of its military bases in Syria and Libya, makes me wonder how much we should give through these talks. I hope that Secretaries Gordon and Wallander will address these issues, and we thank them for their testimony here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Ms. Berkley.

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you so much for being here. I chair the Transatlantic Dialogue, which is an ongoing discussion between Members of Congress and our European Union Parliament counterparts. We meet twice a year, once in Europe and once here in the United States. In our last meeting, we met in the Czech Republic. And prior to the meeting, the American delegation went to Estonia and Lithuania in order to show our support to the Baltic republics.

In our conversations with their government officials, there was—they communicated to us their extraordinary concern about a Russian—about the fact that they were concerned that they would be sucked back into the Russian sphere of influence. We also had an opportunity to meet with Belarusian dissidents, and they also expressed the same concern.

I am hoping in your discussion today you will share with me what our relationship will be with the Russians vis-à-vis the Baltic republics. They are very concerned that we are going to, in an effort to have a thawing of relations with Russia, that we will in fact back away from our support for them. And they expressed that concern time and again. So if I could ask you in your very wide-ranging discussion today to hit upon those issues, I would be very grateful. And I thank you again for being with us.

Mr. WEXLER. I want to thank all of the members for their thoughtful remarks.

Our first witness is Dr. Philip Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs at the United States Department of State. Prior to this appointment, from 2000 to 2009, Dr. Gordon was a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, where he focused on a wide range of European and United States foreign policy issues. Prior to joining Brookings, Dr. Gordon served as director for European Affairs at the National

Security Council under President Clinton. Dr. Gordon has held numerous teaching and research positions, and he is a prolific writer on international relations and foreign policy issues and has been a frequent contributor to major publications such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, and the Financial Times. Dr. Gordon holds a Ph.D. in European Studies from Johns Hopkins University.

Our second witness is Dr. Celeste Wallander, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia in the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the United States Department of Defense. Previously, Dr. Wallander has served as a professor in the School of International Service at American University, a visiting professor at Georgetown University, director and senior fellow of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, and professor of government at Harvard University.

Dr. Wallander is also the founder of the Program on New Approaches to Russian Security and the Eurasian Strategy Project. She is an expert on Russian foreign and security policy and Eurasian security relations, institutions, and military and defense issues, including conflict escalation and intervention. She has authored numerous books, articles, and other publications on these topics, including the role of NATO and the geopolitics of energy. Dr. Wallander holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Yale University.

With that, Dr. Gordon, please. Thank you for your patience.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PHILIP H. GORDON, PH.D.,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EUR-
ASIAN AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. GORDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the hearing. And thanks to all the members of the committee for being here and for your thoughtful opening comments. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today about the administration's achievements in Moscow at the summit between President Obama and President Medvedev. I have submitted my full testimony for the record, but here, if you permit, would like to just make some introductory remarks briefly. And let me begin by putting the results of the summit into a somewhat wider context.

The Obama administration entered office seeking to put an end to a period of difficult and deteriorating relations with Russia. Last December, then President-Elect Obama called for a reset in our relations with Russia, and he argued that the United States and Russia have common interests in a number of areas including, for example, nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism in Afghanistan. There are many others. And he argued that it should be possible to cooperate practically in these areas, even as we disagreed with Russia in other areas. And I think, and we will try to explain today, that the results of the Moscow summit demonstrate that the President's instincts on this were correct.

Just 6 months since the President took office and just 3 months since he met with President Medvedev in London and announced the upcoming summit, the United States and Russia have gone far

toward achieving this fresh start. Not only have our leaders made progress in improving the tone of our relations and in building good will between our two countries, but as the Moscow summit demonstrates, we have succeeded in translating the rhetoric about potential collaboration into concrete actions that are fundamental to the security and prosperity of both of our countries.

The significant progress in our relations with Russia, let me stress, did not in any way come at the expense of our principals or partnerships with friends and allies. There are still many areas where the United States and Russia disagree and we will continue to disagree. This issue was raised by some of you and I look forward to addressing it. The President made this quite clear in Moscow.

At the same time, we demonstrated in Moscow in real terms our shared desire to build a relationship based on mutual respect and common interests, and I think we succeeded in a number of concrete areas.

First and foremost, the United States and Russia took important steps to increase nuclear security and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, beginning with the reduction of our own nuclear arsenal. The two Presidents signed a joint understanding for a follow-on agreement to start that commits both parties to a legally binding treaty that will reduce our nuclear warheads and delivery systems by at least one-third compared to our current treaty limitations.

They also agreed to participate in a joint threat assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century, including those presented by Iran and North Korea. An interagency team of experts is already heading out to Moscow this week to begin discussions.

Second, we made concrete commitments to deepen security cooperation, including by working together to defeat violent extremists and to counter transnational threats, including those of piracy and narcotics trafficking. At the summit, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, and his Russian counterpart agreed to a work plan for resuming military-to-military cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism, search and rescue, and counter-piracy.

Another I think very tangible result of the summit was Russia's agreement to allow the United States to transport its military personnel and equipment across Russia in support of the NATO-led international security and assistance force as well as our coalition partners in Afghanistan. This agreement will add flexibility and further diversify our crucial supply routes resulting in a potential savings of up to \$133 million in fuel maintenance and other transportation costs.

The significance of this contribution to our effort to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, which is also of strategic benefit to Russia, should not be understated. I think it is an excellent example of how the two countries can cooperate in the pursuit of common interests without any quid pro quos. We also agreed to strengthen cooperation in nonstrategic areas, including public health and the restoration of a Joint Commissioner on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action.

Finally, President Obama and President Medvedev recognized the need for a more structured foundation for advancing our cooperation in key areas across respective interagencies. The bilateral Presidential Commission, to be chaired by the two Presidents and coordinated by Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov, will provide a mechanism for sustaining and expanding the progress we achieved in Moscow while also providing for ways in which we can work together to narrow our differences.

Notwithstanding all of these positive developments, let me be clear we have no illusions that the reset of relations with Russia will be easy or that we will not continue to have differences with Russia. Nonetheless, we are confident that the United States and Russia can work together where our interests coincide, while at the same time seeking to narrow our differences in an open and mutually respectful way, be it on questions of human rights, again raised by members of the committee, or Russia's unlawful recognition of Georgia's separatist regions.

In this regard, the President was unequivocal in his message that our reset in the bilateral relationship will not come at the expense of our friends and our allies. More than in words but in actions, we demonstrated our commitment to the territorial integrity and independence of Russia's neighbors, including Ukraine and Georgia.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, at the Moscow summit the United States and Russia took significant steps forward in translating the reset in relations into concrete achievements, to the benefit of both of our nations and our global partners. Without abandoning our principles or our friends, we demonstrated that the United States and Russia can work effectively together on a broad range of issues.

I thank you all for inviting us to testify, and look forward to the discussion.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gordon follows:]

**Testimony of Philip H. Gordon
Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee for Europe
July 28, 2009**

"The Reset Button Has Been Pushed: Kicking Off a New Era in U.S. – Russia Relations."

Chairman Wexler, Congressman Gallegly, members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today about the Administration's achievements in Moscow as a result of the summit meeting of President Obama and President Medvedev July 6-8.

In their Joint Statement in London on April 1, President Obama and President Medvedev committed to "resetting" U.S.-Russia relations and laid out an ambitious, substantive work plan for moving forward in a number of areas where the United States and Russia share national interests: from reducing our nuclear arsenals, preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and countering the threat of nuclear terrorism to overcoming the effects of the global economic crisis and developing clean energy technologies. Recognizing that a fresh start to U.S.-Russia relations needs to be more than just warm words, the two presidents committed to deliver results.

After three months of close collaboration, the United States and Russia have worked hard to do exactly that. The achievements of the Moscow Summit will help put an end to a period of dangerous drift in U.S. - Russia relations by increasing our cooperation on a range of issues that are fundamental to the security and the prosperity of both countries. This significant progress in our relations with Russia, moreover, did not in any way come at the expense of our principles or partnerships with friends and allies. There are still many areas where the United States and Russia disagree and will continue to disagree. Nevertheless, we demonstrated in real terms our shared desire to build a relationship based on respect and mutual cooperation. Through the newly created Bilateral Presidential Commission, we will seek to broaden these areas of cooperation in a way that is mutually beneficial and improves security and stability around the world.

Today, I will highlight some of the examples of what was achieved in Moscow and outline our policy objectives as we go forward.

DELIVERING ON A FRESH START

First and foremost, the United States and Russia took important steps to increase nuclear security and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, beginning with the reduction of our own nuclear arsenals. President Obama and President Medvedev signed a Joint Understanding to guide the work of negotiators on a follow-on agreement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which will reduce our nuclear warheads and delivery systems by at least one third of our current treaty limitations. This is a level of reduction that will be lower than in any other previous strategic arms control agreement. Negotiators have already met once since the summit and will continue to meet as required until an agreement is reached. This new agreement will be yet another step in support of the goals outlined by President Obama during his speech in Prague and will help demonstrate Russian and American leadership in strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

In their Joint Statement on nuclear security cooperation, the two presidents further committed to work together and with other nations to secure nuclear materials worldwide. Following on his announcement in Prague to convene a global nuclear security summit next year, the President suggested to President Medvedev that Russia host a subsequent summit to continue progress on this critical issue. The presidents also agreed to strengthen U.S.-Russia cooperation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to stop acts of nuclear terrorism as well as affirmed a common vision to see the growth of clean, safe, secure, and affordable nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Both presidents noted current negative proliferation trends and agreed on the need to hold other nations accountable to prevent the emergence of a nuclear arms race in some of the most volatile places in the world. In his remarks, President Obama praised Russia's recent support for UN Security Council Resolution 1874 on North Korea and welcomed Russia's agreement to participate in a joint threat assessment of the ballistic missile challenges of the 21st century, including those posed by Iran and North Korea. Also important, the presidents agreed to intensify dialogue on establishing the Joint Data Exchange Center as a basis for multilateral missile launch notification regime. President Obama and his Russian counterparts spoke at length on Iran, agreeing to continue to work together to address threats emanating from this region. President Obama noted the opportunity for intensified cooperation, emphasizing the importance of Russia's role in pressing Iran to comply with its non-proliferation obligations.

Second, we made concrete commitments to deepen security cooperation, including by working together to defeat violent extremists and to counter transnational threats, including those of piracy and narcotics trafficking. Particularly significant was a transit agreement through which the United States will be able to transport its military personnel and equipment across Russia in support of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force as well as our Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, a mission that has clear security benefits for Russia and the United States. This agreement will further diversify our crucial supply routes, resulting in a potential savings of up to \$133 million in fuel, maintenance, and other transportation costs. In addition, the United States and Russia affirmed their commitment to increase assistance provided to the Government of Afghanistan in developing the capabilities of the Afghan National Army and police, and in training counternarcotics personnel. Both the agreement and the Joint Statement were Russian initiatives and represent a substantial contribution by Russia to our international effort.

The United States and Russia also agreed to resume practical cooperation between our militaries. On the margins of the Summit, Admiral Mullen and the Russian Chief of Defense signed a strategic framework for military-to-military engagement, thereby raising our military cooperation to a new level and striving to deepen mutual understanding between our respective armed forces. Within this framework, U.S. and Russian military forces agreed to conduct nearly 20 exchanges and operational events before the end of 2009. This will facilitate improved cooperation and interoperability between our armed forces, so that we can better address transnational threats such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and piracy on the high seas.

Finally, the United States and Russia took steps to build cooperation in areas affecting the well-being and prosperity of our people. For example, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Russian Ministry of Health and Social Development signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Field of Public Health and Medical Science. The Memorandum establishes a framework for deeper cooperation between these government institutions to fight infectious diseases and chronic and non-communicable diseases, to promote healthy lifestyles and to protect the health of mothers and young children. We also agreed to restore the work of the Joint Commission on Prisoners of War and Missing in Action, which will allow our researchers to resume the vital work of obtaining information on our missing servicemen and women.

While our achievements in Moscow were substantive, we recognize that the ultimate test will be whether or not we can continue to build on this progress in meaningful, tangible ways. Acknowledging the need for a more structured foundation for advancing our cooperation, the two Presidents thus agreed to create a Bilateral Presidential Commission, which they will chair and Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov will coordinate. The Commission will include working groups on nuclear energy and nuclear security; arms control and international security; foreign policy and fighting terrorism; drug trafficking; business development and economic relations; energy and the environment; agriculture; and civil society, among other areas. The work of the Commission will be geared towards producing results, not just dialogue. Its working group structure is intended to be both inclusive of the many agencies within our governments and dynamic, adapting to our many shared interests and changing priorities.

These successes build on existing U.S. assistance programs that foster U.S.-Russian cooperation on key global issues such as counter-proliferation, health threats and counter-terrorism, and are a demonstration of the value of continuing assistance to Russia in areas where it supports U.S. interests.

STANDING FIRM ON OUR PRINCIPLES

Despite all of these positive developments, we have no illusions that our reset of relations will be easy or that we will not continue to have differences with Russia. Nonetheless, we are confident that the United States and Russia can still work together where our interests coincide while at the same time seeking to narrow our differences in an open and mutually respectful way.

As we advance our relations with Russia, we will not abandon our principles or ignore concerns about democracy and human rights. In numerous venues during his Moscow trip, including in his comments to the Russian press and during meetings with government officials and opposition leaders, President Obama made a point of raising human rights concerns and urging support for the development of civil society. In his remarks at the New Economic School, the President affirmed America's conviction that it is democratic governments that best protect the rights of their peoples. He stressed that it is our commitment to democratic principles and human rights which allows us to correct our own imperfections, and to grow stronger over time. The President also spoke of how the freedoms of speech and assembly allow citizens to protest for full and equal rights and how rule of law can work to shut down corruption and end abuses of power. He also advocated on behalf of independent media, which is imperative not only in fighting corruption and making government more accountable but also in making government more effective. The United States supports these universal rights and freedoms at home, in Russia, and around the globe. In support of these principles and in recognition that progress requires a sustained commitment to supporting democratic actors, this year the U.S. Government is providing over \$29 million in assistance to advance democracy and human rights in Russia, most of which is targeted to strengthen civil society, independent media and the rule of law.

The importance of addressing human rights concerns was made more real when just over a week after the President's return from Moscow, human rights activist Natalya Estemirova was kidnapped and later found dead. The State Department and White House have spoken out against this heinous crime and we are vigorously supporting President Medvedev's calls for an appropriate application of justice in this case. This tragedy reminds us of the pressing nature of the concerns facing civil society in Russia, and underscores our resolve to make progress in our bilateral discussions with Russia on civil society cooperation.

During his visit to Moscow, the President also made clear that the "reset" in our bilateral relationship will not come at the expense of our friends and allies. Rather, we believe our efforts to improve relations with Russia can only benefit these countries as we seek to defuse zero sum thinking about our relations with Russia's neighbors. The United States does not recognize a Russian sphere of influence and will continue

to support the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Russia's neighbors, including their sovereign right to make their own choices about their defense and alliance relationships. This message was reiterated strongly during the Vice President's visit to Ukraine and Georgia last week.

LOOKING AHEAD

The Moscow Summit succeeded in generating a fresh start in our relations with Russia. We need to take advantage of this positive momentum as we launch the new Bilateral Presidential Commission and follow up on the goals set by our presidents, in particular with regard to reaching agreement on a treaty to replace START, which expires in December 2009. Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller and her counterpart have not wasted any time, having met last week to discuss further the parameters of the new treaty and to plan a robust schedule of future discussions as we seek to conclude the treaty by December. Following up on other summit deliverables, we will work to implement cooperation on non-proliferation, missile defense, and security and stability in Afghanistan. We will also continue to coordinate closely with Russia on such issues as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, Iran, and North Korea, and on bringing peace to the Middle East.

We are confident that improved U.S.-Russia relations will increase trust and cooperation and enhance European security as well. The United States remains committed to working with Russia to improve existing structures and mechanisms for joint cooperation concerning European security and exploring ways to increase their effectiveness, including through improved implementation. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe will serve as an important forum for such a discussion, as the sole multilateral organization in Europe that brings us all together on equal terms. The Administration welcomes the resumption of the NATO-Russia Council as a forum for all-weather political dialogue and as an important venue for achieving practical results in areas of mutual interest, such as Afghanistan and counterterrorism. In addressing the impasse created by Russia's suspension of its implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, we will continue to work with Russia, along with our allies and partners, to seek a solution that is acceptable to all CFE states.

The United States and Russia also have much work to do to realize the "reset" in our economic relations. Recognizing that our economic fortunes are intertwined, the Administration will seek to deepen our economic ties with Russia, opening up opportunities for new investments and trade between our two countries, which will create new jobs, promote innovation, and contribute to our shared prosperity. Two-way trade between the United States and Russia, while growing, totaled only \$36.1 billion last year. This figure is relatively low when compared to our other trade relationships. We believe we can do better. Across the Administration we are working on a number of fronts with Russia to expand and deepen our bilateral trade and investment. The new Bilateral Presidential Commission will supplement those efforts, through working groups on Business Development and Economic Relations, Agriculture, Energy and Environment, and Science and Technology, to explore these new opportunities and expand our cooperation across a wide range of economic sectors.

While looking to create opportunities, the Commission's working groups will also focus on removing obstacles to improving our trade and economic relations. As the President pointed out in Moscow, transparency, accountability, and rule of law are vital to the health of any economy, and we support the initiatives of the Russian president to strengthen Russia's legal system and fight corruption. The United States and Russia need to work together to limit bureaucracy and refrain from imposing protectionist measures which stand in the way of our shared prosperity and economic recovery.

The Administration has been working with Russia to address some current measures that raise concerns. Since last year, Russia's Agriculture Ministry has attempted to control imports of meat and poultry products from the United States through the imposition of food safety measures that are not in accordance

with international standards or based on science. Furthermore, Russian veterinarians continue to restrict the number of American plants processing poultry, pork and beef that can ship to Russia by refusing to recognize U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) inspection of those plants as agreed in a bilateral agreement. Working with our colleagues in USDA and USTR, we have made some important progress in restoring that trade: since the Summit, Russia has lifted restrictions on imports of U.S. meat and poultry, stemming from an unfounded fear of H1N1 contamination, from several states. These restrictions threatened U.S. exports, which came over \$1.3 billion last year. The Administration will continue to work with Russia's Veterinary Service to eliminate H1N1-related bans on our meat trade from the last remaining state, Florida. We will also continue to press Russia's veterinarians to recognize USDA's authority to inspect poultry, pork, or beef plants and approve them to export product to Russia. In addition, we will continue to urge Russia to issue a Government Decree establishing a process by which it would move to developing food safety standards based on international standards. All of these steps will increase the predictability and stability of our bilateral meat and poultry trade.

On non-agriculture trade issues, the Administration is working to ensure full implementation of the United States-Russia Bilateral IPR Agreement to strengthen Russia's IPR regime and enforcement against extensive counterfeiting and piracy, including Internet piracy. We are also seeking implementation of the United States-Russia Bilateral Agreement on Products with Encryption Technology to liberalize the importation of mass-market information technology products.

A major opportunity for expanding U.S.-Russian economic ties continues to be lost with Russia's absence from the 153-member World Trade Organization (WTO). The United States supports Russia's accession to the WTO and integration into the global rules-based trading system. While the United States wants to see Russia join the WTO, the pace at which Russia makes progress towards this goal continues to depend on Russia. In London this past April, Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed to take steps to finalize as soon as possible Russia's individual accession into the WTO. Subsequent Ministerial-level contacts confirmed this. The June 9 announcement that Russia would suspend its individual WTO application and seek to join the WTO as part of a customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan came as a surprise to us and many other WTO Members. As USTR Kirk has told his Russian counterparts, the WTO rules do not provide for the accession of a customs union, and following this path will only further delay Russia's accession. We stand ready to work hard with Russia and the other 152 Members of the WTO to complete its accession to the WTO as an individual country member.

Lastly, Americans and Russians have a common interest in the development of the rule of law, the strengthening of democracy, and the protection of human rights. As President Obama stated, we not only need a "reset" in relations between the American and Russian governments, but also a reset in relations between our societies and he called for "more dialogue, more listening, more cooperation in confronting common challenges." The Bilateral Presidential Commission's working groups on Civil Society and Educational and Cultural Exchanges will work to promote ties between our societies and make civil society promotion an integral part of our bilateral relationship. Beyond the working groups, we will continue to make a point of maintaining an open dialogue through a variety of channels, official and non-official, with Russian leaders, civil society representatives, members of the media, and human rights activists.

Conclusion

At the Moscow Summit, the United States and Russia took significant steps forward in translating the "reset" in relations into concrete achievements to benefit both our nations as well as our global partners. Without abandoning our principles or our friends or ignoring our concerns about democracy or human rights, we demonstrated that the United States and Russia can work effectively together on a broad range of issues where our interests coincide, from security issues and economic issues to energy, the

environment, and health. Recognizing that more unites us than divides us, President Obama and President Medvedev expressed confidence that the United States and Russia can continue to act to benefit the people of both countries, while seeking to narrow our differences in an open and mutually respectful way. Russia and the United States will continue to work very hard together to find practical solutions to some of the most pressing global challenges.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Gallegly, members of the Committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak before you today, and I welcome the opportunity to respond to your questions.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much
Dr. Wallander.

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CELESTE A. WALLANDER,
PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND EURASIA, OFFICE OF THE UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, UNITED STATES DE-
PARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Ms. WALLANDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Wexler, Ranking Member Gallegly, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the recent U.S.-Russia summit in Moscow and its implications for the bilateral relationship, global and regional security challenges, and American national interests.

I have long been a teacher, scholar, and analyst of Russian foreign and security relations, but preparing for and participating in the Moscow summit was my first opportunity to contribute to the practical policy work of developing and implementing America's strategy for working with Russia, where possible, in order to protect and advance American national interests. I am privileged to be asked to report on the results of the summit and answer your questions. With your indulgence, I have a longer statement that I would like to submit for the record and will keep my opening remarks brief.

When Vice President Biden declared in February at the Munich Wehrkunde conference that it is time to press the reset button, he set in motion a process of working to create a better foundation for pragmatic cooperation in areas where the United States and Russia agreed, as well as structures to address our differences where we do not. Simply declaring the reset itself did not create a more pragmatic relationship; it created an atmosphere in which laying the foundation would be possible in order to better secure American interests. His statement was followed by an intensive and productive series of meetings at the highest levels, including between President Obama and President Medvedev in London in April, as well as numerous working-level bilateral meetings.

The Moscow summit was therefore the first opportunity to test whether the reset of United States-Russia relations could produce pragmatic results. And it did. It was a test of whether the United States and Russia can work together to address core defense and security challenges, including strategic arms reductions, Afghanistan, proliferation of dangerous technologies, military relations, and missile defense. And the results were strikingly positive.

The summit was successful beyond expectations, and most notably in the areas of defense and security. Of the eight agreements and statements signed at the Moscow summit, seven addressed defense and security challenges. Beyond the specific agreements, the success is measured in the pattern of pragmatic negotiations, constructive discussion before and during the summit. The ongoing test of the reset will be whether Russia will continue to engage in the pragmatic cooperation and serious negotiations we have seen in the past months.

I would like to highlight two important summit achievements of these seven in the defense area. The first is the Lethal Transit

Agreement. After weeks of intensive and constructive negotiations, William Burns, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov signed a bilateral agreement which will allow transit of lethal material and military personnel through Russian airspace. The agreement permits up to 4,500 military and unlimited commercial flights per year. It will result in significant savings over the use of other routes, and allows us to diversify our supply lines, thus reducing transit times and fuel usage.

The second agreement I would like to highlight is the Military-to-Military Cooperation Framework. Admiral Michael Mullen and General Nikolai Makarov signed a new framework on military-to-military cooperation. This framework changes the nature of the United States-Russia military-to-military relationship, which will now be based on principles of pragmatism, parity, reciprocity, balance, and synchronization with NATO. The framework establishes conditions that will raise military cooperation to new qualitative levels and deepen mutual understanding between our respective Armed Forces. We have agreement on a work plan with Russia which will include nearly 20 exchanges and operational events before the end of this year. And, in addition, the U.S.-European Command and the Russian Ministry of Defense have agreed to meet to plan a robust and even more ambitious work plan for 2010.

At the same time, the summit offered the opportunity for the United States to clearly affirm our commitment to the security and stability of countries throughout Europe and Eurasia. We continue to support the sovereignty of all states regardless of geographic location. President Obama clearly and repeatedly made this point while in Moscow, in both public statements and private meetings. We do not accept zero sum thinking regarding security in Europe and Eurasia, and we continue to believe that stable democracies on Russia's borders contribute to not only Europe's security but to Russia's as well. President Obama made clear during his meetings with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin that U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity is steadfast and unequivocal.

President Obama also expressed U.S. support for Ukraine, an important strategic partner. He reiterated support for Ukraine's right to choose its own alliances based on its sovereign rights as an independent nation.

The Department of Defense will continue to support both countries' efforts to transform and restructure their militaries into modern joint professional and NATO interoperable forces.

Despite disagreement on Georgia and Ukraine, Russia clearly seeks to engage with NATO in the NATO-Russia Council and in NATO-Russia Military-to-Military Cooperation. Russia's strong security concerns regarding Afghanistan and the instability, crime, and extremism that an unstable Afghanistan breeds have moved President Medvedev to a pragmatic, cooperative stance, which we should build upon, given NATO's mission in Afghanistan.

After the summit, our task is to follow up on the agreements reached, and continue to work with Russia and our allies in areas where we did not agree. The most promising mechanism for this work will be the bilateral Presidential commission that the Presi-

dents agreed to create. With a pragmatic and constructive atmosphere established in our bilateral relationship, the United States can, as a result of the summit, work now for success in addressing issues where we have disagreed with Russia. In an atmosphere in which Russia no longer sees U.S. engagement and policies in zero sum terms, countries in the region will be able to engage more productively with Russia and pursue their own global integration and security interests.

So we had an ambitious agenda for the Moscow summit. And while we did not achieve everything on the list with this first step, we made significant progress on a number of very important issues and achieved very real agreements in the defense and military spheres. The United States and Russia have a broad responsibility to work together in addressing global and regional security challenges.

Thank you very much for your time, and I look forward to your questions and hearing your own assessments of the summit and the way ahead.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Wallander follows:]

Testimony of Dr. Celeste A. Wallander

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia Policy
Department of Defense

July 28, 2009

House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe

“July 6-8, 2009 Moscow Summit”

Chairman Wexler, Ranking Member Gallegly, Members of this Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the recent U.S.-Russia Summit in Moscow and its implications for the bilateral relationship, global and regional security challenges, and American national interests. I have long been a teacher, scholar, and analyst of Russian foreign and security relations, but preparing for and participating in the Moscow summit was my first opportunity to contribute to the practical policy work of developing and implementing America’s strategy for working with Russia where possible in order to protect and advance American national interests. I am privileged to be asked to report on the results of the Summit and answer your questions.

When Vice President Biden declared in February at the Munich Wehrkunde conference that “It’s time to press the reset button,” he set in motion a process of working to create a better foundation for pragmatic cooperation in areas where the U.S. and Russia agree, as well as structures to address our differences where we do not. Simply declaring the reset itself did not create a more pragmatic relationship: it created an atmosphere in which laying the foundation would be possible in order to better secure American interests. His statement was followed by an intensive and productive series of meetings at the highest levels, including between President Obama and President Medvedev in London in April, as well as numerous working level bilateral meetings.

The Moscow Summit was therefore the first opportunity to test whether the reset of U.S.-Russia relations could produce pragmatic results, and it did. It was a test of whether the U.S. and Russia can work together to address core defense and security challenges, including strategic arms reductions, Afghanistan, proliferation of dangerous technologies, military relations, and missile defense – and the results were strikingly positive. At the same time, the discussions highlighted and did not shy from important security issues on which the U.S. and Russia are far from agreement, including Georgia’s security and territorial integrity, NATO’s role in European security, and conventional arms control in Europe. But the fact of those disagreements cannot be avoided, and the summit provided an opportunity for President Obama to re-affirm American policies and commitments directly to the Russian leadership.

In my testimony today, I would like to highlight the specific agreements, areas of productive discussion, and our plans to advance in these areas of progress after the summit. I will also address the challenges where the U.S. and Russia did not agree, making clear that our work now will also focus on securing our relationships and interests even as we continue to seek dialogue and improved understandings with Russia.

Summit successes in defense and security relations

The summit was thus successful beyond expectations, and most notably in the area of defense and security. Of the 8 agreements and statements signed at the Moscow summit, 7 addressed defense and security

challenges. Beyond the specific agreements, the success is measured in the pattern of pragmatic negotiations and constructive discussion, before and during the summit. The ongoing test of the reset will be whether Russia will continue to engage in the pragmatic cooperation and serious negotiations we have seen in the past months.

AFGHANISTAN AND THE MILITARY TRANSIT AGREEMENT

President Medvedev has stated on numerous occasions that Afghanistan is a Russian-American common cause. Earlier this year, we began to transit non-military goods through Russia, using a NATO-Russia arrangement. At the April meeting in London, President Medvedev offered to allow transit of military material through Russia as well. After weeks of intensive and constructive negotiations, Bill Burns, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Foreign Minister Lavrov signed a bilateral agreement which will allow transit of lethal materiel and personnel through Russian airspace. The agreement permits up to 4,500 military and unlimited commercial flights. It will save the United States as much as \$133 million over the use of other routes, allows us to diversify our supply lines, and reduces transit times and fuel usage. This route will be in addition to others we already use in the region, multiplying our options and increasing our flexibility. We will continue to use all available routes to Afghanistan and not become overly dependent on any one of them. We hope to start utilizing the agreement as soon as it enters into force, on or about September 6, 60 days from the date of signing.

The lethal transit agreement is part of a broader improvement in U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, as reflected in a joint statement issued at the summit. In Moscow, the U.S. delegation had the opportunity to view a training center at Domodedovo, where Afghan police officers had been trained through the NATO-Russia Council Counter-Narcotics Project. We are thinking together about how to go forward with future counternarcotics cooperation.

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COOPERATION

Good relations between militaries form a sound building block for good relations between countries and we are working with the Russian MOD and General Staff to improve on the military-to-military programs we had before they were suspended as a result of the war in Georgia. During the summit, Admiral Mullen and General Makarov signed a new Framework on Military-to-Military Cooperation. This Framework will change the nature of the relationship, which will be based on principles of pragmatism, parity, reciprocity, balance, and synchronization with NATO. The Framework establishes conditions that will raise military cooperation to a new qualitative level and deepen mutual understanding between our respective armed forces.

We have agreed on a work plan which will include nearly 20 exchanges and operational events before the end of the year, including a strategic discussion between the U.S. Joint Staff and the Russian General Staff, orientation for Russian military cadets at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, planning for a joint exercise to respond to a hijacked aircraft in national and international airspace, visit of the faculty of the Russian Combined Arms Academy to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, and a naval war game conducted by the Kuznetsov Naval Academy and the U.S. Naval War College. In addition, the U.S. European Command and the Russian Ministry of Defense have agreed to meet to plan a robust and more ambitious work plan for 2010.

POW-MIA COMMISSION AGREEMENT

The U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs is meant to serve as the forum through which both nations seek to determine the fates of their missing servicemen. The Russian side has not participated in the commission in recent years. However, at the summit, with an exchange of diplomatic notes, the U.S. and

Russia renewed the work of the Commission, reaffirming the importance of it as a forum through which both nations seek to determine the fates of their missing servicemen.

START AND STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

The Summit also resulted in the Joint Understanding on the basic framework for the START Follow-on treaty, a central security issue in our bilateral relationship, but one with implications for global security as well. In Moscow, the Presidents agreed to a limit in the range of 500-1100 strategic delivery vehicles and 1500-1675 of their associated warheads within seven years of the Treaty's entry into force, compared to the maximum level allowable under the expiring START Treaty's 1600 launch vehicles and the Moscow Treaty's 2200 warheads. It is important to note that these ranges will not necessarily be included in the final text of the Treaty; they are the subject of continuing negotiations. In addition:

- The treaty will combine the predictability of START and the flexibility of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT – the Moscow Treaty), borrowing from the best elements of START on definitions, data exchanges, notifications, eliminations, inspections and verification procedures, as well as confidence building and transparency measures.
- The Treaty will be in effect for ten years, unless it is superseded before that time by a subsequent treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms.
- The Presidents also agreed to direct their negotiators to finish work on the treaty soon so that they may sign and submit it for ratification in their respective countries.

In his speech to graduates of Moscow's New Economic School, President Obama reiterated America's commitment "to stopping nuclear proliferation, and ultimately seeking a world without nuclear weapons." The steps initiated at this month's summit represent an important demonstration of U.S. and Russian leadership fulfilling their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and contribute to a successful 2010 NPT Review Conference.

MISSILE DEFENSE

While we made progress on START and nuclear security, missile defense remains a difficult issue. Nevertheless, we were able to make some progress in laying the groundwork for cooperation in future.

At the Summit, President Medvedev agreed to conduct a Joint Ballistic Missile Threat Assessment, which will be primarily focused on Iran and North Korea. We hope that the Threat Assessment will offer an effective venue in which to discuss and explain our respective viewpoints. The first meeting of the Joint Threat Assessment will be conducted in Moscow at the end of this month.

To develop more effective technical cooperation, we have also pledged to redouble our efforts to open the long-planned Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow. This center will allow us to share missile launch data with each other and will reduce or even eliminate the chances for an inadvertent launch due to misunderstandings over a test launch or other benign missile launch. We believe that through this center we could also exchange data from third country launches, information that would be of obvious benefit to both parties.

The Department is taking a comprehensive look at our plans for European BMD as a part of the ongoing Ballistic Missile Defense Review. Initial results will likely be available by the fall. We will look to the outcome of that process to guide our next steps. Our decisions on how to proceed with missile defense in Europe naturally will be dictated by our own national security interests, taking into account our security

commitments to friends and allies, by the nature of the threat, and by the cost and technical effectiveness of any proposed missile defense systems. But as we move forward, the steps initiated at the Moscow Summit will provide an excellent opportunity to engage Russia constructively on how the United States and Russia could cooperate in protecting our populations from nuclear and ballistic missile threats from Iran and elsewhere.

NUCLEAR SECURITY COOPERATION

Another high-priority issue for the President at the Summit was ensuring the security of nuclear materials and facilities, and strengthening our cooperation with the Russians to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. President Obama and President Medvedev agreed to broaden cooperation to increase the level of security of nuclear facilities worldwide. We also remain committed to implementing the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, through which we will dispose of 34 metric tons each of weapons-grade plutonium. Both presidents emphasized the importance of dealing with the threat of nuclear proliferation and taking measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. We believe the Russians are open to more significant cooperation in this area as they share our goal of ensuring that additional countries in the Middle East and Asia do not seek nuclear weapons.

Recognizing Differences in Security Relations

The Summit offered an opportunity for the U.S. to clearly affirm our commitment to the security and stability of countries throughout Europe and Eurasia. President Obama affirmed our commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all countries -- naming particularly Georgia and Ukraine, and the right of all countries to choose membership in alliances -- including NATO. That the Russian leadership offered alternative views was not surprising, nor a measure of failure of the summit: it was a measure of how much work we have to do and how important it is for the U.S. government to commit to it.

AFFIRMING SECURITY IN EUROPE AND EURASIA

We continue to support the sovereignty of all states regardless of geographic location. President Obama clearly and repeatedly made this point while in Moscow, in both public statements and private meetings. We do not accept zero-sum thinking regarding security in Europe and Eurasia, and we continue to believe that stable democracies on Russia's borders contribute to not only Europe's security, but to Russia's as well. In that vein, we stand by our commitment to continue to strongly support building partner capacity and establishing strong security cooperation programs with our partners in the region.

One of the clear areas of disagreement on security at the summit was Georgia. President Obama made clear during his meetings with President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin that U.S. support for Georgia's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity is steadfast and unequivocal. This clear commitment was further reinforced last week with Vice President Biden's visit to Tbilisi, as well as to Kyiv where he stated, "We do not recognize -- and I want to reiterate it -- any spheres of influence. We do not recognize anyone else's right to dictate to you or any other country what alliance to belong to or what bilateral relationships you have."

The U.S. is building constructive defense relationships with countries throughout Europe and Eurasia. We are implementing the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, which seeks to deepen our strong legacy of bilateral cooperation in a wide array of areas, including defense. The U.S. will continue to support Georgia and will engage in security assistance to build Georgian capabilities for defense and for contributing to ISAF in Afghanistan. We regret that Russia blocked the extension of the OSCE's and UN mission in Georgia, and that we unfortunately could not come to agreement with Russia on international access for monitors in Georgia's separatist regions. However, we continue to believe that the need for international

monitoring is great, and we are working with European friends and partners to continue to engage and to impress upon Russia the importance of this effort in contributing to regional security. We must work with our international partners – including the UN, OSCE and EU - to improve the security and humanitarian situation throughout Georgia and to increase international access to the separatist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. We will maintain solidarity with the international community in refusing to recognize the independence of these separatist regions of Georgia. With our European allies, we also continue to press Russia to honor its commitments to the August 12 and September 8 Medvedev-Sarkozy ceasefire Agreements which call for Russia to withdraw troops to pre-war numbers and locations, and allows for international monitors in and around the separatist regions.

In Moscow, President Obama expressed U.S. support for Ukraine, an important strategic partner. He reiterated support for Ukraine's right to choose its own alliances based on its sovereign rights as an independent nation. As an active NATO partner participating in NATO-led operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Iraq, Ukraine has demonstrated its commitment to regional and global security. The Department of Defense is working hard with Ukraine to complete the reforms necessary to meet NATO standards. The Department will continue to support Ukraine's efforts to transform and re-structure its military into a modern, joint, professional and NATO-interoperable force.

NATO: CONTRIBUTIONS TO EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL SECURITY

We have a better foundation for working with Russia to address regional and global security concerns constructively with NATO, but we cannot be blind to the fact that we still have much work to do in convincing Russia to accept NATO's 21st century role and form. Considerable progress has been made: Russia clearly seeks to engage with NATO in the NATO-Russia Council and in NATO-Russia military-to-military cooperation. Russia's strong security concerns regarding Afghanistan and the instability, crime, and extremism that an unstable Afghanistan breeds have moved President Medvedev to a pragmatic cooperative stance, which we should build upon given NATO's mission in Afghanistan.

Allies are consulting with NATO partners, including Russia, as the Alliance develops its new Strategic Concept, and has already begun this process with a meeting on July 7th in Brussels. During a meeting on July 7, the Secretary General acknowledged the need for a new Strategic Concept to meet the demands of the 21st century and noted that NATO-Russian relations would be one of the topics in these discussions.

Yet despite these very promising developments, Russia continues to view NATO and NATO enlargement as a threat. We affirm the right of European countries to seek NATO membership and to be admitted to membership once they have satisfied NATO's own internal procedures and requirements for membership. We need to continue to engage in a frank discussion with Russians on the depth of the alliance's post-Cold War transformation and where we see the future of NATO-Russia relations.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL FOR SECURITY IN EUROPE

The Administration is concerned that, since 12 December 2007, Russia has continued unilateral "suspension" of its legal obligations under the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Discussions in Moscow revealed diverging views of both the key problems with the existing CFE treaty and how to resolve them. There does appear to be interest, however, in continuing to seek a resolution. We have agreed to re-engage both bilaterally and multilaterally this fall on discussions to re-start conventional arms control in Europe.

The U.S. is committed to cooperative security and fulfillment of international agreements, as well as the importance of the confidence that results from military transparency and predictability. Because of this, the U.S. and NATO continue to fully implement the CFE Treaty. Additionally, the U.S. and NATO have offered

a set of constructive and forward-looking proposals for action on key issues, and are seeking to engage Russia in negotiations to bring Russia back into the conventional arms control regime in Europe. The U.S. continues to urge Russia to work cooperatively with the U.S. and other concerned CFE States Parties to reach agreement so that together we can preserve the benefits of a landmark regime.

III. Building on the foundation for pragmatic engagement and cooperation

- After the summit, our task is to follow-up on the agreements reached, and continue to work with Russia and our allies in areas where we did not agree. The most promising mechanism for this work will be the Bilateral Presidential Commission that the presidents agreed to create. President Obama and President Medvedev will co-chair the Commission with Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov serving as coordinators. More structured relationships will help us to maintain momentum, focus on results, and avoid misunderstandings. Security related working groups and their co-chairs are: Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Security: Sergei V. Kiriyenko, Head of Rosatom, and Daniel Poneman, Deputy Secretary of Energy;
- Arms Control and International Security: Sergei A. Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs;
- Military-to-Military Relations: General of the Army Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the General Staff, and Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- Foreign Policy and Fighting Terrorism: Sergei A. Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, and William Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs;
- Drug Trafficking: Viktor P. Ivanov, Director, Federal Drug Enforcement Service, and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy; and
- Cooperation in Prevention and Handling of Emergency Situations: Sergey K. Shoigu, Head of Emergency Situations Ministry, and Craig Fugate, Administrator, FEMA

Additional working groups will be added on an as needed basis. The commission will provide a structure for implementing agreements reached, monitoring progress in further negotiations, and laying the groundwork for seeking agreement and cooperation in additional areas:

- implementing agreements on military-to-military programs and joint threat assessment;
- discussion to advance cooperation on missile defense, and on defense technology cooperation;
- further negotiations on strategic and conventional arms control, and
- addressing the tough security questions such as counterterrorism and counter-piracy, while also seeking to narrow differences on the security of Russia's neighbors, frozen conflicts, and NATO enlargement.

In addition to this bilateral mechanism, the U.S. will be able to work through multilateral structures to address issues central to the U.S.-Russia relationship. With the agreement to re-start the NATO-Russia Council at the Corfu meeting of foreign ministers, the U.S. has an important forum for discussing European and global security challenges, as well as affirming our commitment to existing agreements and principles.

The Corfu meeting also affirmed a re-start in NATO-Russia military-to-military cooperation, providing an opportunity for deepening Russia's defense cooperation multilaterally as well as bilaterally.

The U.S. remains open to discussion on improving the broader European security architecture, an issue raised by President Medvedev, and confirmed during the OSCE informal ministerial at Corfu. One of the outstanding issues we face is the weakening of European security structures triggered by Russia's suspension of its implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. At the OSCE ministerial in Corfu, we discussed with our European friends and Allies and Russia ways to strengthen European security. We continue to welcome dialogue with Russia in the OSCE about its ideas for a new European security architecture, but we remain committed to working through and improving existing structures and mechanisms for joint cooperation on European security. The OSCE will serve as an important forum for such a discussion, as the sole multilateral organization in Europe that brings us all together on equal terms.

These discussions also provide the U.S. the opportunity to re-affirm NATO's role in European security in discussion with Russia so that its people and leaders can understand in practical terms NATO's missions, capabilities, and role in European and Eurasian stability and security.

Multilateral arms control is another opportunity to keep up the momentum achieved at the summit and to broaden the value of improvements in U.S.-Russian relations for European partners and allies. Russia is currently engaged in a serious effort in its own military reform, making this an important period for fully engaging Russia in transparency and negotiation mechanisms. With a pragmatic and constructive atmosphere established in our bilateral relationship, the U.S. can, as a result of the summit, work now for successes in multilateral forums in addressing issues where we have disagreed with Russia. In an atmosphere in which Russia no longer sees U.S. engagement and policies in zero-sum terms, countries throughout the region will be able to engage more productively with Russia and pursue their own global integration and security interests.

CONCLUSION

We had an ambitious agenda for the Moscow Summit and while we did not achieve everything on the list with this first step, we made significant progress on a number of very important issues and achieved very real agreements in the defense and military spheres. The U.S. and Russia have a broad responsibility to work together in addressing global and regional security challenges. Many of these challenges were positively addressed at the summit, particularly Afghanistan, reductions in nuclear arms, and improving the capacity for military-to-military cooperation.

Others remain on the to-do list, including cooperation on missile defense and conventional arms control, but the summit revealed that both the U.S. and Russia accept the responsibility to seeking cooperation in these areas as well.

On the issue of sovereignty and the principles of international law that reinforce it in Europe and Eurasia, the discussions revealed that we remain far apart. This fact, however, will not lead the U.S. to neglect or reject its commitments, principles, and interests. Nor will this prevent us from implementing successful agreements with Russia and pursuing the very promising start established at the Summit for a broader cooperative agenda. It is far better for our friends and partners in Europe and Eurasia if the U.S. can build on our summit success to seek progress on these tough security challenges.

Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions, and to hearing your assessment of the summit and the way ahead.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you to both witnesses.

I will start, if I may, by asking and concentrating on Iran.

Certainly conventional wisdom would suggest that a nuclear weapon-armed Iran would not be in Russia's interest. However, Russia certainly has been, at best, reluctant in terms of supporting meaningful sanctions with respect to Iran regarding its nuclear weapons program. Certainly if President Obama's policy of engagement is to be successful, it would appear that Russian cooperation on all sides of that policy would be essential.

So my question would be: What is it that we can do? What are we in fact doing to encourage a more positive response from Russia in the context of Iran? And in that regard, what can we do to encourage Russia to cease its arms sales, specifically the sophisticated anti-aircraft systems, to the Iranians?

And, ancillary to that, with respect to Syria, there have been certain reports indicating that the Russians were going to sell quite sophisticated military equipment to the Syrians; specifically, the advanced MiG-31E fighter jets. If both of you could comment on that, I would greatly appreciate it.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I think it is entirely appropriate to begin with Iran, because there is not a probably greater global issue between the United States and Russia or an issue of greater importance than that one. I would say that was reflected in the discussions in Moscow. There probably wasn't a topic in the many hours of conversations between the two Presidents, and between President Obama and Prime Minister Putin, an issue that got more attention than Iran. Because, like you, we believe this is a very serious matter.

I think also that Iran is in the category of those issues that many of you have talked about where we see conflicting signs from the Russians, areas of cooperation and areas where they are less cooperative.

On the positive side, I also agree with you, Mr. Chairman, any objective analysis would suggest that Russia has a very strong interest in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. And I believe they understand that. They have supported the E3+3 process, which is our main diplomatic tool for dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue, and they have been working with us extensively with that. And they have also supported a number of chapter 7 U.N. Security Council resolutions putting pressure on Iran.

So there are some common elements where we are working relatively well with the Russians, but at the same time it is true, as you say, that they are reluctant to take further steps which we feel may be necessary if Iran continues to refuse to meet its obligations to the international community on the nuclear issue.

We were pleased at the summit that Russia agreed to a joint threat assessment on the Iranian nuclear program, a joint threat assessment on ballistic and nuclear issues which will include Iran. And, as I mentioned in my testimony already, an interagency team is headed to Moscow to talk to them about this issue, and we hope that this exercise will help convince them what we believe, which is that there are very serious concerns about Iran's nuclear program. And by sharing with them our analysis, we hope to persuade them that, as we have said many times, the President has said, if

we don't see a response from Iran soon, we will indeed need to turn up the pressure on Iran.

Finally, on the issue of arms sales to Iran and Syria, again, we agree with you very much that these are very serious issues. We have certainly conveyed that to the Russians at the highest levels, that the sales of sophisticated air defense or other technology to Iran and Syria would be a real problem for our relationship with Russia and we will continue to make that clear.

Ms. WALLANDER. I would just agree with Dr. Gordon on his answer on the arms sales, and just add that we would have to discuss any specific issues relating to potential arms sales, weapons sales, in a closed hearing. But we want to reassure you, we would like to reassure you that the Defense Department is monitoring the issue closely and also have concerns about the potentially destabilizing nature of some of the weapons systems that have been discussed.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There are several pieces of legislation that would initiate economic sanctions against people who are dealing with Iran. How would those sanctions affect Russia?

Mr. GORDON. How would those sanctions affect Russia?

Mr. ROHRABACHER. There is legislation here that is making its way through the body that will actually be punitive against people who deal—especially in the oil industry, et cetera. How would that affect Russia?

Mr. GORDON. I think already we have had on the books for years, legislation such as the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, that penalizes companies that make significant investments in now, no longer Libyan but the Iranian energy sector, and I think that legislation already has had a dampening effect on the willingness of those firms to run the risk of sanctions before making such investments. So I think that that sort of legislation has had a deterrent effect. We have also made significant progress—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How does this affect Russia?

Mr. GORDON. Well, in the same way it affects any other countries in the international community that has firms that would otherwise be thinking about major investments. I think there are Russian firms who take that into account when they consider whether they want to do business with Iran or they want to do business with the United States.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you don't see this as having a deleterious effect with trying to establish new relations with Russia?

Mr. GORDON. There are two sides to that policy, and always have been, including with our European allies as well. On one hand, it does contribute to deterrence against those firms from making the investments that we would find highly problematic and undermine our efforts in dealing with Iranian nuclear issue. At the same time, any secondary sanctions cause tensions with our partners, which is why I would stress that we have also made good progress, indeed perhaps even more significant progress, in working with Europeans, Japanese, and Russians in the financial sector in deterring

banks and others from providing credits that Iranian firms need. And almost all of that has been done on a voluntary basis.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Let's hope we can work together on that. And certainly by this hostility that was actually aimed in Russia's direction the last 20 years, we couldn't expect them just to automatically be concerned about what is—how something will affect the United States and others.

Let me ask you this. The Vice President made some statements recently that seemed to indicate that he didn't have that same level of respect and concern about Russia that the President expressed. Is the White House disavowing those remarks?

Mr. GORDON. I think the entire administration is exactly on the same page on this issue. The Vice President talked about some challenges, very frankly, that Russia faces. It clearly does, as do we and the other countries. But he also, I would remind you, was the first to talk about the need for a reset with Russia. It was, as Dr. Mullen just said, the Munich Security Conference in February, less than 1 month into the administration, that the Vice President stepped forward and made famous this phrase about resetting relations with Russia.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So the administration is not renouncing or disassociating itself from that statement, the rather strong statement the Vice President made. Maybe when he goes overseas next time, you can have someone whose only job is to have a gag at the right moment for the Vice President.

On to NATO and expansion of NATO. Don't you believe that expansion of NATO and the talks that we have had with countries in Russia's backyard has contributed to the unwillingness of those countries to reach compromises with Russia on various issues?

Mr. GORDON. No. In fact, I think the entire process of NATO enlargement has been enormously positive toward security and stability in Europe, and that the reassurance that NATO membership provides to those countries can and will and does contribute to their willingness to work with Russia rather than—

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So you think that giving them some sort of military guarantee from the United States actually makes them more likely to reach the compromises that are necessary to solve problems rather than saying, well, now we have got the United States behind us?

Mr. GORDON. Indeed, I think American reassurance to those countries provides a level of security that allows them to rely on collective defense, rather than their own national rearmament or other efforts that would create further tension with Russia.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, that doesn't make sense to me. Let me just note that we maybe we should invite Russia to join NATO if we want to have a positive impact such as that. But if we are not, how can we expect Russia to look at that as anything but a military alliance that it is being kept out of and that perhaps as belligerent motives? As I say, if that was done to us by Russia, I think we would feel the same way. I would hope the administration looks at the issue of NATO expansion very closely and understands the how logically Russians would look at that as a hostile act toward them.

One last question, Mr. Chairman. The missile defense, I would hope when you are going to push a reset button that you do reset indeed and start looking for new policies that were not developed during the last administration, including NATO expansion and including missile defense. Perhaps it is time to scrap the European missile defense as designed by the last administration and go into a partnership with Russia which they offered to do in developing a missile defense that would be beneficial to all of our countries. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GORDON. If I might respond to missile defense. First of all, I appreciate the opportunity to do so, because it is an important question including in the context of Russia. As you know, President Obama, the Obama administration has indeed decided to review the approach to missile defense in Europe and worldwide. His consistent view from the start has been that there is a growing ballistic and nuclear threat, and that if ballistic missile defenses can contribute to the American and Euro allied security then we should pursue them. And what this review it doing is assessing that very question, how can we best contribute to the security and defense of ourselves and our European allies.

What I want to make clear is that the review is being driven by the threat from countries like Iran and by the technology designed to deal with that threat, rather than what other third parties might think of the threat. In that sense, I want to be clear, there is not a link between our review between missile defense in Europe and the issue of resetting relations with Russia. The outcome of the review on missile defense will be determined by the degree of threat that we face from Iran and the best way to deal with that threat in terms of technology and cost.

Ms. WALLANDER. I would add the Senate provided the opportunity for moving forward in these discussions. In the context of the joint statement on missile defense, the United States and Russia affirmed that they will work to actually bring to reality a planned joint data exchange center outside Moscow on missile launches, therefore beginning that kind of cooperation on a cooperative approach to the Department of missile threats. So we are looking forward to being able to continue those discussions with Russians and hopefully soon be actually opening that center outside the Moscow.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. I think my colleague, Mr. Rohrabacher, has sort of set the table for some of the lines of questioning that I would like to pursue, because I really believe that these are the two fundamental issues that are really on the table for moving forward with Russia and the United States, relationship as we reset. And that is missile defense and NATO enlargement. I just think that those are the two areas that we have to kind of start from. And I want to say that I really hope we can develop improved relations with Russia. It is a beautiful country with beautiful people, yet there are, as I mentioned in my opening statement, some very serious internal problems that we can help Russia with. Many people don't know it, but Russia's average age for their men is just 58 years, 58 years. Whereas this Nation we are pushing about 80 now. Just 58 years is the average life span.

The alcoholism, some of corruption internally, the food, our trade can be improved. I think that there are some opportunities here for some us to really reach out and help the Russian people. I have a compliment even for Mr. Putin, whom I think put forward some solid economic reforms in place, that really brought Russia back from the abyss were with a with the fall of the Soviet Union. He deserves a lot of credit for that. There are a lot of good positive things. But here we are where the President and Putin are saying, we can't move forward on nuclear non proliferation or offensive nuclear weapons with Russia until we dispose of the missile defense system in Europe.

And I think we need to pause and see how we can get a clear definition of where we want to proceed with that. And tied to them is a threat of NATO's enlargement that I think are very key. So I guess my question has to be are they receiving clear enough signals from us as to where we stand on missile defense? At one point earlier this year, there was a letter that went out that was in the media that President Obama said that that was on the table, but if we could get Iran, Russia to help us with Iran, we wouldn't need the nuclear defense missile system and that that could be a point of discussion. I would like to get a clarity on that.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide that clarity. You are right to say that the Russians have insisted or tried to insist all along that we should not proceed with offensive nuclear weapons reductions unless and until the United States abandons the so-called third site in Europe. And we have been consistent in responding to that that we are not prepared to do so. As I said a few minutes ago, our review of missile defense plans in Europe will be driven by the degree of threat and our ability to deal with that threat in terms of different technologies and deployments, not by the Russian willingness to move forward on a start agreement or not. Let me also stress that that was our position going into the summit, and we were prepared not to have a joint statement on missile defense if Russia continued to insist that we abandon these plans or this review as a price of a start agreement.

We were consistent in that. And in the end, it was the Russian side who agreed that once they realized we were now prepared to sacrifice what we think best to do for the defense of ourselves and our allies, then they were willing to go through with the joint assessment on the missile threat and the data exchange center that Dr. Wallender talked about. And we will be consistent on that and will continue to be consistent on that.

The letter from President Obama that you mentioned is also consistent with everything we have said, which is that as the President has made very clear, has said and this is eminently logical, if the threat from Iran were to be eliminated, the driving force behind any need for missile defense would also be eliminated. And you asked for clarity and I am trying to be very clear. It doesn't mean if Russia helps us try to deal with that threat where the need to be eliminated, but it is the simple fact of observation analytically that if there is not a threat, then the driving force for protection against that threat goes away.

Mr. SCOTT. If Russia comes back and says to the President, yes, we will help you, we will help to get Iran to stop this procurement

of nuclear weapons, if you will remove the missile defense shield, what will the United States answer be?

Mr. GORDON. Well, again, the deployment of a missile defense system in Europe or anywhere else would be designed to protect us from a threat that exists. Therefore, the simple willingness help try to deal with that threat would probably not be enough to lead to a conclusion that we don't need missile defenses. As I have said, the President has said there is a growing ballistic missile and nuclear threat. And if we can find ways to deal with it, we should and we will. So the driving factor is the existence of a threat and not Russia's willingness to help us with that threat.

Mr. SCOTT. If we did that, to move forward with a joint partnership and missile defense for the entire region, would that help move us off center?

Mr. GORDON. We have indeed approached the Russians on a number occasions and the run up to the summit and at the summit itself. And we are prepared to continue to do so to discuss ways in which we might work together on missile defenses. Russia should understand that any missile defense plans we might have for Europe are not directed at Russia, they are directed at Iran or other threats from the greater Middle East. Therefore—and Russia has an interest like we do in being able to protect itself against such threats. And the President has said if we can find ways to work together with the Russians on missile defense, including on our research, development and architecture, then we will pursue those discussions. We have that on the table quite clearly, and quite specifically, and it remains on the table. We are prepared to move forward in that direction.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank for your generosity, Mr. Chairman. I know I went over a little time. I will follow up with my NATO enlargement question if we have another round.

Mr. WEXLER. Mr. Boozman.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What I would like to know, it seems like after the fall of the Iron Curtain and things there was kind of a honeymoon period where the United States and Russia got along. I guess what is the cause that we are resetting from, Iran, Iraq—I'm sorry, Iraq, Afghanistan NATO, what do we need to reset?

The other thing is I was a little confused about the NATO enlargement. I have been on the NATO Parliament for the last 6 or 7 years. And the countries that have joined NATO, in the former Soviet block really are very, very nervous and very, very scared of them. Now, I agree it has given stability to those countries, but when you talk about NATO enlargement of Ukraine and Georgia, I think the Europeans are very worried about that to the point of putting it off because they don't want their oil cut off and their this-and-that cut off. And I think the Russians are very nervous about that from their perspective. So if you could just comment on those things, where we come from and then again a little bit about the NATO enlargement. Thank you.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you. I appreciate the opportunity. I will start, and I am sure Celeste will want to respond as well. Those are both good questions. The first one you are right that in the initial aftermath of the end of the Cold War, there seemed to be both

the prospect for and progress toward a much better and healthier United States-Russian relationship.

I think what happened over the course of that decade is Russians gradually started to resent the outcome of that, which included, as you say, NATO enlargement, the United States becoming frankly the sole superpower rather than a pair of superpowers. And as Russia recovered from the demise of the Soviet Union and its economy started to recover and the rise in oil prices started to fuel a sense of prosperity and power, that resentment came to the fore. And under President Putin, initially Russia started to become more assertive and resistant to what they considered to be undue American power and undue American hegemony. And I think that is their story in part of the past few years is Russia's effort to resist what they consider to be excessive American power.

And of course, we in the United States have tried to explain that our interests are in promoting global stability and not dominating in any way, but they see it differently and that has led to tensions.

Mr. BOOZMAN. And they do appear to be bullies in many instances. And it seems like they feed on instability in the region. Would that be a fair statement? They like their neighbors to be kind of—

Mr. GORDON. It is certainly true that for many Russians at least, I want to come back to the remarks of several members of the committee who talked about the old guard and the new guard, I forget who put it in those terms, but there are different views in Russia. But yes, I would agree that for all too many Russians continue to see the world and Europe in zero sum terms. If it is a gain for the United States, it is a loss for Russia. That has prevented cooperation and frankly it is frustrating because we don't see it in those terms. We think there are things that can be done that should benefit both countries. And that to answer your first question about what is the reset for, that is one of the things we are trying to reset, is this notion—and it is frankly a Cold War notion and a 19th century notion they or we have to win on different issues.

Preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapon I would argue is not an American issue that we hope Russia will let us pursue. It is a common interest, and again, that was exactly the theme of the summit. There are some common interests like promoting stability in Afghanistan or combating piracy or fighting al Qaeda or reducing nuclear proliferation. We both benefit and that is precisely what we are trying to achieve.

Very briefly on your NATO enlargement question, because it fits into the same discussion. It is true that some of the countries of the foreign more Soviet Union remain, as I think you put it, nervous. We try to provide reassurance and make clear to them that the reset with Russia doesn't, in any way, come at their expense.

On the issue of potential membership for Ukraine and Georgia, we are trying to feel a simple principle, which we have made clear from the start, and that frankly the Russians have accepted in different fora that European democracies should be able to choose their own security alliances. And that is what we said applies to Ukraine and Georgia. And there is a lot of work for them to do. And we want to work with them so that they feel more secure and that they are better able to meet the criteria for NATO member-

ship. But it is a rock solid principle of ours that democracies should get to decide for themselves what alliances they want to join.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. Mr. Miller—did I cut you off?

Ms. WALLANDER. Let me just add two points on NATO. There is a real disconnect between when you talk with NATO allies about what NATO military missions are, what their training for, what they are planning for, and what they are working on. And that is focused on Afghanistan and our global missions where NATO allies have agreed to contribute to common goals security problems. And Moscow hasn't gotten there. Moscow really still sees NATO as designed, deployed and ready for Cold War war. That is a reason to continue the engagement though with Russia. And we have agreed to restart the meetings of the NATO Russia Council. At the meetings in Corfu, we agreed to restart the meetings in the NATO Russia Council, and to restart the military to military relations between the Russia and NATO members precisely to continue this difficult process of overcoming this Cold War thinking, which is understandable, but incorrect about what NATO's missions, capabilities and intentions are. So the work is still there, the process continues and it is going to take some time. But again, the summit provided the opportunity to get back to work in a pragmatic way on that.

Mr. BOOZMAN. Thank you.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you, and I apologize. Mr. Miller.

Mr. MILLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not think I have ever attended a hearing at which political party was a less accurate predictor of what member's opinions or points of view would turn out to be.

I have a less benign view of Russia than some on this subcommittee, including my friend Mr. Rohrabacher. I certainly think we should look for those areas of mutual interest where we can work together, where our interests are parallel and it makes sense for us to join forces. But Russia and the United States are unlikely BFFs. They do not really have either the Russian people or certainly Russian leadership have a democratic tradition or impulse. They are deeply nationalistic, felt a great pride in being one of the world's two great superpowers, it had nothing to do with ideology, but had everything to do with nationalism and felt a great humiliation at what happened in the 1990s.

One of the reason for Putin's popularity with Russians is not just how better the economy is doing than it was under Yeltsin, but that he is reasserting himself, that Russia is rising from its knees.

And I agreed with what you said earlier, there are certainly areas where we may need to hit a reset button, but there are areas where we need to hit the save button with respect to areas of our policy.

I was on the same delegation to Russia to Moscow that several of the other members were. In one discussion, Russian parliamentarians, they talked about South Ossetia and Crimea in successive sentences. It worried me some. What happened in Georgia last year has now become disputed, it is who started it, who provoked who, what really happened, whose fault it was. It has now all kind of fused over, and 1 year ago is now already history. But if the Ukraine is found in the heap at the bottom of the staircase the

same way Georgia was, what can we do to make it clear that we are not going to believe that Ukraine tripped, we are going to believe that Ukraine was pushed. What can we do, are we doing enough, what are we doing?

Mr. GORDON. Thank you for those thoughtful comments. On the first part, let me just say we agree with the analysis. When you talk about Russia being nationalistic and resentful and sometimes unhelpful. I don't think anybody here would challenge that. And the President certainly didn't challenge that in his thinking about why we wanted to reset. The question is do we say therefore, let's not talk to them, let's not try to work with them where we have common interests, let's cut them off and try to contain them or do we try to find areas where we do have common interest, and I think I have identified a few and we identified some at the summit. That could show Russia that the world actually is not only a zero sum place, that we are not out to get them, that we can work together, and restore a little trust. And maybe over time the new guard will prevail over the old guard, and a new generation will come along, and we can have the type of relationship that we would like to have. So I think in terms of analysis of the situation, we don't have a disagreement—

Mr. MILLER. Ukraine. What do we do about Ukraine and Crimea?

Mr. GORDON. We take very seriously Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and I think Russia knows that. We also take very seriously Georgia's territory and integrity. And the point you made about South Ossetia and Abkhazia is absolutely right. I want to make clear we are not fuzzing that over. If anyone has the impression that we have moved on and said, well, it was 1 year ago, so let's not worry about it. For the reasons that you suggest, that would be a huge mistake because it would imply that if it happens somewhere else we would do the same thing. We are far from fuzzing it over; we have been absolutely insistent that we will not and do not recognize them.

We have successfully lead the international community in opposing recognition, leaving Russia extraordinarily isolated on this point. They went on a limb and recognized, and as far as I understand other than the Nicaraguan legislature has found nobody else to support them.

Mr. MILLER. Hamas?

Mr. GORDON. No other countries to support them including Belarus. That sends a pretty strong message that Russia can't simply do what it wants and get away with it and we won't let this lie. We will continue to bring it up at all of the meetings of the international organizations and bilaterally with the Russians with our friends so that this stays on the international agenda and we can overcome it. And therefore in the same way Russia needs to understand that any such actions in another country, sovereign country with territory whose territorial integrity should be defended would also not be acceptable to us.

And of course, if I might just add in Ukraine's case, as in the case of many other countries, the most important factor is what happens within that country itself. The best thing Ukraine can do is to pursue the political and economic reforms it needs so that

Ukrainians and even ethnic Russians within Ukraine want to be part of a sovereign independent Ukraine, strong and prosperous and stable.

Mr. WEXLER. I don't want to cut you off again. Thank you. Mr. Inglis.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know it is important for us in the United States to focus on human rights and we want to export those values around the world. I don't know whether it is more troubling to think that the Russian Government has the policy of supporting kidnapping and assassinations of journalists and human rights activists, or whether they just abdicate their role of maintaining order on the streets. Which do you think it is? Are they participants or they just stand back and watch? Which do you think is worse, from an American perspective?

Mr. GORDON. Well, what is certainly true is that there has been a troubling degree of violations of human rights and frankly murders committed in wide open, and lack of follow up by the authorities in dealing with them. I am not sure we are in a position here right now to say exactly who was behind some of the horrific developments that we have seen in Russia but we can quite clearly say that we are not satisfied to the degree to which those human rights have been protected and the Russian State has done all it can to defend human rights and prosecute those guilty for such violations, including the most recent cases.

The kidnapping and murder of Natalia Estemirova which took place just last week; it was obviously a terrible tragedy. The Russian President Medvedev immediately wrapped it in this case and said that he would follow up. And we will be sure to follow up with the Russian Government to make sure that this atrocious violation of human rights in Russia not go unpunished or uninvestigated. It is very important to us and we will make that clear to the Russian Government.

Mr. INGLIS. What do you think, sir, in your view of the Russian people, are they concerned that these things happen and then nothing, no follow up, no prosecutions, or are they accepting of it? Do you have a thought about what their reaction is to the lack of prosecution of these murderers and kidnappers?

Mr. GORDON. I would just say I do know plenty of Russians who are troubled by the lack of prosecution. There are an awful lot of Russians who do not want to live in a place where people, journalists can be murdered on the street or kidnapped without any consequences. So I don't want to make a judgment about the overall Russian society or population, but I can tell you I know a number of Russians who are deeply troubled by that. I can tell you that we met with a number of them in Moscow. The President raised this issue of the need for a rule of law, and an independent judiciary, and the free press, and respect for human rights. He raised it in his private meetings with the Russian leadership and he spoke about it publicly when he met with opposition leaders, when he met with civil society groups, including human rights advocates, and when he spoke to the next generation of Russians of the new economic school. So it is absolutely something that we are very much focused on and we raise at every possible level with the Russian Government.

And to answer your question yes, I do think a lot of Russians are troubled by this and want to see an end to this sort of injustice in Russia.

Mr. INGLIS. Is there anything more we can do to aid the folks that do want to end these sort of practices? Is there something else as a Congress we can be doing or as an administration?

Mr. GORDON. Well, it is an important point and we are always open to. I think we should always have the attitude that there is more we can do. Obviously we are not entirely succeeding so we need to constantly be asking ourselves what else we can do. I think we are trying to do a lot. As I say both in terms of our assistance to those Russians who are trying to remedy these issues, in terms of our engagement with the Russian Government. But I don't want to be in any way complacent. There is always more we can do when the results are not showing what we need them to show.

Mr. INGLIS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. Mr. Costa.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to explore the area that I mentioned in my opening comments about the former Soviet Union's spirit of influence with regards to the various today independent republics. And I know one size doesn't fit all obviously in this situation with the Ukraine and Georgia, there are attempting to join NATO, and of course with Belarus and with Kurdistan and some of the other former Soviet republics, it is a different circumstance.

It is your views that Russia is trying to, in fact, reestablish its former sphere with those countries today? What do you think their true agenda and attitude is toward the countries as they go about their own independent path?

Mr. GORDON. Again, I am hesitant to generalize about a Russian view, but let me say that for many Russians yes, they see what they call the Near Abroad as an area of special and privileged interest. And I think I can say this with confidence because they say that this is their view, and that they, for historical, and cultural, and ethnic reasons, deserve special influence in some of these neighbors. And that is obviously an approach that we disagree with, not because we think we should have some privilege spheres of influence in those countries. We think it is up to those countries to decide how they want to orient themselves, and that if they want to orient themselves toward the European Union, NATO and us, that shouldn't be seen as a threat to Russia.

Indeed, I think Europe and the world will be a better place when Russia sees it the same way. That when they come to the conclusion that having stable prosperous democracies on their border is their greatest way to achieve security. They don't currently see it that way, at least many Russians don't currently see it that way. And when I said in Moscow we, after a positive summit, had disagreements with the Russians and were frank about them, this was one of them. And President Obama was clear with President Medvedev that we believe it is up to those countries to decide what sort of foreign policies they want to pursue and that there shouldn't be privileged spheres of influence. I do think Russia continues to take a different view of that issue.

Mr. COSTA. Would you care to comment quickly?

Ms. WALLANDER. Sure. In the NATO frame, it is an opportunity to clarify that the approach to NATO cooperation and defense, and bilateral defense cooperation with countries like Ukraine and Georgia is to support their defense transformation, their modernization, their reform, their capacity to contribute to global missions. Ukraine has contributed in the Balkans. Georgia preparing to contribute forces to Afghanistan. And that these are capabilities that allow countries in Russia's neighborhood to contribute to common security problem. These are the not intended, nor shaped, nor aimed at contributing to defense capabilities against Russia.

Mr. COSTA. But Russia doesn't see it that way.

Ms. WALLANDER. But Russia doesn't see it that way.

Mr. COSTA. Quickly, before my time expires, you noted in your comments about after 15 years of effort, there was withdrawal from attempting to become a member of the WTO. Mr. Rohrabacher mentioned in his opening comments about inviting them to join NATO.

In both cases what would be an incentive, a momentum for Russia to either be reengaged on WTO or to look seriously at NATO?

Mr. GORDON. We would like to see Russia join the WTO. That is a goal of the administration because Russia to join the WTO would have taken market reforms and establish guarantees and things like intellectual property that would be good for us. Obviously it has to meet the criteria before it can join the WTO. And the reason it hasn't in these 15 or 16 years, is it hasn't yet met those criteria. But we want to work with them toward that end. And that is why we were somewhat puzzled frankly and disappointed even that out of the blue, they came up with this idea of joining as a customs union with some of their neighbors which has no precedent and as far as I understand it which is imperfectly doesn't fit within the rules of the WTO.

Mr. COSTA. How about NATO, quickly?

Mr. GORDON. It shouldn't be excluded. We have said that NATO's doors should be open to democracies in Europe. And if Russia meets the criteria, and can contribute to common security, and there is a consensus in the alliance, it shouldn't be excluded.

Mr. COSTA. A defense specialist opine.

Ms. WALLANDER. We will do whatever the State Department tells us to do.

Mr. GORDON. That is the first time that has been said.

Mr. COSTA. My time has expired. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEXLER. That bears repeating. Dr. Gordon said, that was the first time.

Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Yes, thank you.

This is to both of you really, in terms of missile defense, this is a follow up to the questions that were posed by Mr. Scott. And I appreciate what you said in terms of collaborative and working with the Russians on missile defense.

Would that also include discussions relative to a missile defense system that was located, positioned within Russian geographical borders or has that been taken off the table?

Ms. WALLANDER. Nothing has been taken off the table. And some of the proposals that the Russians have floated which could be the subject of intensive discussions now that we have agreed to explore those did involve facilities on Russian territory. Although not exactly in that same vajadak would be the first step along those lines, but maybe the only step. This is meant to be a true opportunity to share ideas as options. And I think that that is definitely on the table.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you. I appreciate that.

In terms of the architecture itself of the system, there is a possibility that does exist that the system itself, the hardware could be placed within Russian geographical borders, a possibility.

Ms. WALLANDER. Well, the discussions have not gotten that far down the road to actually specifically talk about hardware. And it has to be, as Dr. Gordon pointed out, driven by the assessment of threat and the ballistic missile defense review is underway. So we would have to await that assessment.

Mr. DELAHUNT. It hasn't been eliminated.

You have heard a lot of concern on this side of the dais expressed about Russian sales, the potential sales of weapons to Syria, to Iran. We have heard them regarding the sale of military hardware, to Venezuela in this particular hemisphere. So there has been some concern. It has been expressed what I find interesting is a recent story in The Washington Post, last week that Georgia's—I am reading the headline—Georgia's Saakishvili is seeking U.S. weapons to deter Russia.

I took note of a quote that is attributed to Mr. Saakishvili that the only thing to stop him, meaning Mr. Putin, is a clear unequivocal message from the West that there are going to be very grave consequences. He believes that Mr. Putin is in a pretty desperate situation, his domestic political standing is in question, although when we were in Russia his poll numbers were pretty good. I think some us on the panel would be happy with them if we took a poll on our own districts. I am really concerned about Mr. Saakishvili. I understand he wants to be a better democrat, he has made his speech recently that he's going to give it his best shot to be less authoritarian and a better democrat, small "d" democrat. But his language seems to create a real us versus them in implicating the United States into a problem that I would submit to a large extent he is responsible for vis-à-vis Russia.

And now we see a new suggestion that—and again this is his statement of Georgia for reintegration issues, this is his quote, not mine. "It will be the same mission"—in other words make United States part of the EU mission—"it will be the same mission, but representatives of other countries will also take part, they will increase the authority of the mission and granted additional safety because attacking American monitors or attempting to attack them is politically disadvantageous."

I am really concerned about being used, and I would be adamantly opposed to the sale of weapons to Georgia. You know, we can be critical of the Russians and sometimes that is justified, but I did note that there was a statement from Mr. Medvedev, the President. Now, I don't know if this is taken out of context, but it is reported in the New York Times, which is generally responsible.

And it is reported that the Russian President stated at NTV the Russians need—and again, these are language attributable to the Russian President—normal working, friendly relations with the United States, mutually beneficial relations. He went on to say, the deterioration of our ties with other countries, our U.S. relations with some other countries, including Ukraine and Georgia, should not affect that relationship, the United States and Georgia. I kind of welcome the tone. But I certainly do not welcome the idea of selling arms to Georgia, nor making the United States part and parcel of the EU mission. We have got plenty on our plate. And if we are going to reset this relationship, why add fuel to a volatile situation? Care to make a comment?

Ms. WALLANDER. Thank you, Congressman, President Saakashvili gave that interview just before the Vice President, as the Vice President was on his way for his visit to Tbilisi, so it gave the Vice President an opportunity to address those two issues that the President of Georgia had raised. And he was very clear in the answer on U.S. policy, which is that the United States supports a responsible and robust defense cooperation program with Georgia that is focused on improving Georgia's education, training, command capabilities, building an NCO core and along those lines. That is what Georgia needs right now. But Georgia is not ready for the kinds of weapons acquisitions that the President floated. And that in the future, is not off the table, but certainly the United States is not in a position for believing Georgia is ready for that kind of defense acquisition.

And similarly on the EU monitoring mission, the Vice President was able to point out that the EU, that is an EU mission, and the EU would need to decide whether it wanted to invite American participation. And at that point, the United States would have to have a discussion about whether the United States would believe it was the appropriate choice to send American participation or agree to American participation in that mission. So this is all very premature.

Mr. DELAHUNT. If I may, Mr. Chairman. I presume that the invitation from the EU has not arrived in the mail yet.

Ms. WALLANDER. As far as I know, it has not arrived.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Okay.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much, Mr. McMahon.

Mr. MCMAHON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

On the issue of energy immediately following the signing of the Nabucco pipeline deal with the EU, German Chancellor Angela Merkel met with President Medvedev of Russia to discuss energy security. And it seems our European partners dependence on Russian gas leaves them both, them and NATO in a tough bind. How can we use our arms reduction talks with Russia to help our transatlantic partners ease their concerns over Russian gas and the sectors increasing instability? Can we somehow triangulate or use the two issues to the benefit of the other?

Mr. GORDON. I am not sure that we can. They are both important issues, we want to pursue the weapons reduction and the energy security in Europe. We have not linked the two together by somehow suggesting to the Russians that we would be unwilling to pursue what we think is a common interest in reducing nuclear weap-

ons unless we see changes in the energy area. Rather, we have focused to make progress on the energy area, promoting diversity of energy supplies within Europe, including the example you gave of the Nabucco pipeline and there are some others. We made some progress, I think the cutoff of gas to Ukraine last winter was a wake-up call to a lot of Europeans about what can happen to them. And it sent a message that to the degree that you are energy dependent and therefore economically dependent, you risk being politically independent as well and nobody wants that. So it is our policy and the President and the Secretary, Ambassador Morningstar to focus on this issue of Eurasian energy issues to promote supply. And interconnectors, and proper pricing, and market mechanisms, and liquid natural gas so that Europeans are less dependent. I think we made some progress on that over the past year. But what we haven't done, and I am not sure it would be advisable is try to link it to what we think is a common interest in reducing nuclear weapons.

Mr. MCMAHON. On the issue of Nabucco, it is just a pipeline. Is there a variable source to provide the energy to provide the gas into the pipeline?

Mr. GORDON. That is precisely the question. The pipeline will be built if and when there is a reliable source to supply it. On these energy issues there is always a sort of chicken and eggs prospect because you could also argue that there will be reliable sources when there is a pipeline because companies don't want to invest in the pipeline until they are sure they have supplies. But companies don't want to invest in developing the supplies until there is a reliable pipeline. So that is the point of coordination and that is where governments including ours can help, not by investing our own money in these things, but by coordinating so that these things come on stream at the same time and reinforce each other and that is what we are trying to do.

Mr. MCMAHON. I thank you.

On the issue of global security, the Russian Navy is reported to be moving ahead with plans to upgrade its Soviet-era naval bases at the Syrian port of Tartus in the Eastern Mediterranean. Also seeking to establish naval bases in Libya at the western end of the Mediterranean, and in Yemen on the Red Sea.

As I mentioned in the opening statement I am a huge proponent of engagement with Russia. But do you feel that Russia's military expansionism will be curbed through increased engagement or is there another—are we being active enough in that regard? Why do you think Russia is ramping up its program its Mediterranean, its military program in the Mediterranean?

Ms. WALLANDER. You are right. The Russian officials have announced at least their intention to upgrade the 1980s-era naval base at Tartus and Syria and talked also about Libya. Were it to be affected, it would probably be in the context of moving naval assets from the Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean, not in that increase in assets at least in the time frame given the time it takes to build naval forces of that capacity. And so then it would depend on for what purposes those forces were in the Mediterranean. Some Russian analysts have suggested, and this might be actually consistent with U.S. interest, but that they would be aimed at sup-

porting Operation Active Endeavor, which is a counterterrorism operation in the Mediterranean that United States and NATO partners participate in.

Or it might be aimed at Russian counter piracy needs, because Russian ships have also suffered problems of piracy the gulf as have other nations. So it would be something you would need to be watching in terms of what the missions would be and what they would be focused on rather than the assets in and of themselves.

Mr. MCMAHON. Do you believe this is an area of great concern.

Ms. WALLANDER. It is an area to watch. There is a time frame that is extended enough that we can assess what those missions are. It is not—I wouldn't want to react—I think we wouldn't want to react presuming a zero sum frame. That would become apparent in how those forces were deployed and what they trained for and whether they engaged in cooperative counter piracy operations as has been discussed in the NATO-Russia Council.

Mr. MCMAHON. I see my time is expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. Ms. Berkley.

Ms. BERKLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just have a very few questions, but I am wondering about your opinion on the following issue: Do you think that the United States missed an opportunity after the fall of the Soviet Union to restart our relationship with Russia?

Mr. GORDON. I don't know if it is worth—as I pointed out in the previous answer, we did in the early aftermath of the Cold War make significant progress toward a new relationship with Russia, and the question that you raised, the big interesting historical question, is there anything we could have done differently to avoid the later down turning relations that I described? The historians will continue to ponder that. I am not sure that there is.

We were open to new and different relationship with Russia. It may be that structurally empires have a hard time dealing with a loss of Empire, and no matter what we did we would have found ourselves in a world where we had resentful Russians still getting used to the idea that we weren't equals.

I think when the Cold War ended, many Russians wanted to believe that both sides would stand down and NATO would disappear just as the Warsaw Pact disappeared. Well, we had a different view because all of the members in NATO still liked it. They thought it was useful and they thought it had other purposes, including global purposes and other countries wanted to join it.

So in a way, what could we have done other than force people to abandon what they thought it was the most successful alliance in history. So we can think about whether there is anything else we could have done. It may be that structurally the loss of Empire was always going to be something that led to a significant period of resentment on the side of the Russians.

Ms. BERKLEY. Yes, I find myself in the same position that Mr. Miller is in, in that I seem to have a less benign view of Russia than many of my colleagues here today. But I am also hopeful that the reset button will not only be pushed, but there will actually be a reset in the relationship, because I fully appreciate the need to relate to the Russians in a different way than we have been doing.

There are three areas that I have concerns, one of them, of course, is about Iran and a number of my colleagues have already mentioned it. But it seems to me that a non-nuclear Iran is of mutual benefit to both the United States and the Russians, but it seems more important to us or we have more of a passion for it and I am wondering why that is.

The second thing is missile defense, is there anything that we can offer the Russians that would back them off from their position of no way, no how, or is that just a continuing problem between the two countries that can never be solved.

The third, of course, is renewed flexing of muscles, I didn't want to overstate our meetings, what was communicated with us in our meetings with the Estonians and the Belarusians and the Lithuanians and the other Baltic nations. There wasn't a huge fear factor, but I walked away feeling that they know the Russians very well and they very much appreciated the fact that we were there. And I also realize that this was fairly soon in the aftermath of the invasion of Georgia. So they were very, very concerned, as you could understand.

Can you respond to those three issues?

Mr. GORDON. Absolutely. Thank you very much for that thoughtful set of questions. First, a word on the overall reset and then your three points that follow within it. Because I fully appreciate your concerns and those of others about Russia's willingness to go along with the reset. No one has any illusions about this. The President has said we should try to have a different relationship while backing up principals and our friends. We do not know if it will work, we are trying to find out.

One of things that is important I think about the reset or the effort to reset is we need to give Russia stake in the relationship. If we simply say, we have differences and therefore we are not going to talk to you, we are not going to work with you, we are not going to cooperate on the things that we care about, but by the way will you help us on Afghanistan. I think the answer is likely to be no. And so what we are trying to find out is whether we can find some areas that will give them a stake in the relationship as well so they might not see it in such zero sum terms, which leads me to some of the issues that you raised including Iran.

You asked why they have not been entirely helpful. I think sometimes Russians are torn between their own interest in preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon and their own desire to prevent us from a big diplomatic success in the Middle East. And if we can reset the relationship, maybe they wouldn't see it that way, and would be more inclined to focus on their national interests, in preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon which happens to be exactly the same as our national interest without seeing it as somehow giving a win to American power and hegemony around the world, we hope to persuade them of that.

You asked missile defense whether there is anything we can do to reassure them or persuade them it is not a threat to them. We are trying, I think our efforts at transparency so that they understand that this really isn't directed at Russia and it really isn't the idea of a handful of interceptors in Europe that is all we are talking about to deal with the threats from Iran just cannot threaten

the Russian nuclear arsenal, even at the new limits that were talked about in the start follow on. And cooperation as Dr. Wallender talked about, cooperation that could include material cooperation with Russia. We are trying to persuade them that this could actually be in our common interest rather than in any way a threat to them. And I wouldn't be too pessimistic on that score. I think progress is slow and difficult, but it is not impossible to imagine that we could get there.

And then finally on the issue of reassurances to our friends, we have really I think done all we can, and will continue to make clear to them that a reset of Russia doesn't come at their expense. Our commitment to NATO in Article 5 is as rock solid as it ever was, and we will continue to review how best to manifest that commitment. We have been in close touch with them. We were—I personally was with my colleagues across the interagency engaging with them, within hours of the end of summit, just as we had before the summit so that they know absolutely what we are up to and what we accomplished and what we didn't.

And it is very important to us to make sure that they are entirely comfortable with how we are dealing with Russia and I think I can say for the most part, they can speak for themselves, but they are.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much. The witnesses have been very gracious with their time. If you would give us just a bit more, not too much more. Mr. Rohrabacher.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Just a few thoughts, just a gleaning from what has been said here today, it just seems that the United States is still overly concerned about an alliance with Lilliputians rather than a partnership with a giant. And I would suggest that if we are to have a peaceful world that we better get real. There are powers in this world that can make a difference. There are other powers, there are other countries in this world which will only be secure because they are latching themselves on to us or bigger powers. Russia is one of those big powers.

If we are to have a peaceful world, we need to have a partnership, a relationship with Russia, and India and Japan. And all of our European friends who have lost their courage to stand for anything, can go in the direction that they want to go to, because our security can't rely on people who send troops to Afghanistan but who insist they never go near a battle. They should be sending social workers instead of troopers.

The Russians are some of the most courageous people on this planet, I fought the Russians. Russians, we fought the Russians for decades, they are courageous people. We need them on our side. They will not fade away when it gets tough. We can have that kind of ally or we can have the allies that we have had in Europe who want to take time out for tea when there is an emergency. That was not a shot at the British, by the way, just to say that. They are people we could stand by.

I heard Russia as related as a bully. Do you believe that it is a bullying to insist that your customers pay market rate for your gas—this is what we—was Russia bullying their neighbors by insisting they pay market rate for their gas, natural gas?

The answer is no, all right. I will save you from having to upset the Ukrainians. And let's just also note this, that missile defense was initiated as a major American goal by my President that I worked on the speech with him that initiated that goal. I have been in the room a number of times when Ronald Reagan expressed that missile defense would be something that we should ask the Russians to participate in, if we could ever get them to give up their belligerency toward the West.

And obviously, the missile defense that is now being put on their borders, but they are not part of is not seen as a partnership with them. I would, again, the one last thing and that is the double standard of why would Russia—we have a lot of work to do to make up for the last 20 years, my colleagues would disagree with me on this, have to know this, we have, in the last 20 years, permitted China, which is the world's worst human rights abuser, to get away with murder, literally get away with murder, arresting Falun Gong, religious dissenters, putting them in prison, shooting them and selling their body parts, as ghoulish as it gets, but we have our businessmen swarming over to China to make a buck. While at the same time, Russia has opened up all of its churches, respects these rights, the religious rights of its people, that does have opposition parties, there are opposition newspapers there on sale, they aren't perfect obviously, but yet we have treated Russia like an economic pariah while we have set capital and technology to build up the world's worst human rights abuser in China.

Does this administration plan to end that double standard with Russia and China and perhaps—I mean, we have in the last 8 years during the last administration we couldn't get rid of Jackson-Vanik much less make Russia part of the WTO or give them permanent, normal, most favored nation status. So do we plan to change those basic economic double standards that we have had with Russia as part of the reset button? That is the question. Is that one you shouldn't answer as well?

Mr. GORDON. I wasn't sure if it was a rhetorical question.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No, it is a real question. We have had a total double standard with China while Russia remains totally isolated and fenced off from the Western markets. What are we going to do? Or are we planning to do that as part of the reset button?

Mr. GORDON. I will leave it to other colleagues in the administration to address China. I would say on Russia we have been pretty consistent on the economic front. We do want to expand bilateral economic relations with Russia which are far too underdeveloped given the respective size of the economies. And we want to see, as I said earlier, Russia join the WTO. And as soon as it meets the standards, we will do that.

That said, we continue to have concerns about some of the freedoms within Russia that you addressed, freedom of the press and independent judiciary, and we are not going to ignore those issues even as we try to promote the bilateral economic relationships.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. If you will indulge me just one moment, just one comment. We just had China shoot down hundreds of Uighurs, religious people who are religious minority in China, shot them down in the streets, arrested thousands of them. One journalist—now, we should never have turned a blind's eye, whether it is a

journalist or anybody whose rights are being violated. I don't know the details of that case. But one journalist gets all of the attention that thousands of victims in China get. In fact, a week from now, you are never going to hear anything more about the Uighurs, but you will still hear people testifying about that journalist in Russia. If that is not a double standard, I don't know what that is.

Mr. GORDON. Again, I will leave China to others. But in terms of the details of the case, the case was one of an investigator of human rights being pulled from her car, kidnapped, and then shot dead and it is not something we are prepared to overlook.

Ms. WALLANDER. If I could just address one point you made, Congressman, about the Russian military. I would agree with you, and the Defense Department does agree with you, that there is great potential for working with the Russian military. That is why the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff went to Moscow for the summit for himself sign the military-to-military framework to signal how important we believe this relationship is, the potential that inheres in that relationship and how we really would like to get serious about a military-to-military bilateral program with Russia.

And as I argued in my opening statement, now we will see whether that opportunity is something that the Russian side actually steps up to. Because I can tell you that the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in particular is ready to cooperate with the Russian military for many of the reasons that you, yourself, pointed out.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. If I may quickly just follow up with respect to Jackson-Vanik, respecting very much the answer that in part was given, and understanding that there are other concerns; intellectual property, agriculture, a host of trade and economic concerns.

With respect to Jackson-Vanik, what would the dynamic look like that would enable or encourage or prompt the administration to come to Congress to ask for Russia's graduation from Jackson-Vanik?

Mr. GORDON. The administration is still considering the best way forward on this in consultations with the Congress, and we will look forward to your views on the subject. The President has said, as previous administrations have also said, that Jackson-Vanik was passed in a very different context for a very different purpose. It is more than 30 years old. Its purpose was to foster immigration from Russia, largely Jewish immigration. And the context has changed so much that it is no longer relevant for that purpose. And, therefore, it is anachronistic and we should find a way to move beyond that.

None of that is to say that the other concerns that are sometimes linked to Jackson-Vanik about Russian protectionism, about other extraneous issues aren't important human rights. But using a 30-some-year-old piece of legislation to try to promote different goals that may be important might not be the best way to move forward. So we do want to find a way to graduate, and we look forward to working with Congress about finding that best path ahead.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. I would concur with your answer. And certainly respecting the large numbers of citizens in the country of

Israel that are from Russia, clearly Jackson-Vanik has worked at least as to the availability of emigration. And I would highly encourage the administration to consider the proper path for moving forward.

If I could just take my final moments, just considering how our policy with Russia relates to our policy in the broader sense in Central and Eastern Europe, a number of the most prominent Eastern and Central European leaders not too long ago wrote an open letter to President Obama in essence asking him to double down on our relations with Central and Eastern Europe to reinvest in NATO, to reinvest in transatlantic relations. There certainly was a degree of uncertainty or anxiety or concern in that letter. The writers of the letter proposed I think six relatively cogent steps to reinvigorate transatlantic relations. And I was wondering if you could just take this opportunity now to address that letter and address the concerns that were raised by those prominent leaders.

Mr. GORDON. I appreciate the opportunity to do so, because that is an important issue, and I want people to know where we stand on it. These are well respected leaders. We know them well. We have worked with them for years. We like them very much, and we always are happy to hear from them.

What they called for is something we are happy to support. They called for commitment and attention to Central Europe, which we think we have been paying and want to continue to pay. And if anyone there feels we haven't been paying enough, we want to make sure that they understand that we are very much focused on the issues that we are concerned about. They want to make sure that NATO's Article 5 commitment is real and so to we, and we will work in the context of the new look at NATO's strategic concept to make sure NATO is doing everything it needs to do to make sure its members are protected and reassured.

And they asked us in the context of some of the issues we have been discussing, relations with Russia, missile defense, to make sure that we consult closely with them before we do anything with Russia or as we move forward, which we are absolutely committed to doing.

So their weighing in on this set of issues is welcomed. We saw them as an administration when they were here. We will remain in close touch with them, and we will make sure that as we move forward with Russia, as I think I have said many times, we are not going to do so at the expense of our friends in Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. With that, I will turn to my three other colleagues for their final remarks. Mr. Delahunt.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I indicated earlier that I am working on a particular initiative that I would put under the aegis of public diplomacy.

Now, I note in the commission, the bilateral commission that has been established, there are various working groups. I would like to work with the administration on this. Myself and the chair of the full committee have a draft, are in the process of drafting a sense of Congress, resolution, or maybe just a concept paper. Could you identify who among the working groups would this be an appropriate—under which working group would this fall?

Mr. GORDON. What you said about exchanges?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Right. And let me be clear. This has a particular focus on sports.

Mr. GORDON. Can I volunteer for participation in some capacity?

Mr. DELAHUNT. Have you played in any sports?

Mr. GORDON. As often as I can. Less in this job than in previous ones.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I have been having discussions with a former minister of sports, who I know has communicated to high-level Russian authorities and he is actually a star of Russian hockey. But this would not just be limited to hockey, but would include soccer, track and field, basketball, whatever. And it would be focused on bringing in large numbers of young people from Russia and young Americans to Russia to engage in international competition. And, again, the feedback coming from Moscow has been very positive and enthusiastic. And, let's say goodwill games. At one point in time we had the Presidential Council on Health and Fitness. This is, in rough form—not defining it very well, but this is the core of the concept.

Mr. GORDON. It sounds like a terrific initiative. We will have to look into the best way to move forward. There is an education and cultural exchange subcommission in the Presidential Commission that we have set up. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Judith McHale is running that. Maybe this fits under that category. But if it doesn't, let's talk about other categories, because it sounds like a great thing.

Mr. DELAHUNT. I will be calling you.

Mr. GORDON. Please do. Celeste is a marathon runner, so you might want to involve her as well.

Mr. DELAHUNT. We will bring the Department of Defense into this.

Mr. GORDON. Excellent. That sounds great.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Thank you.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. Mr. McMahon. Ms. Berkley.

Ms. BERKLEY. Yes. I also wanted to ask you, as long as you are doing sports with Mr. Delahunt, let me ask. As I mentioned to you earlier, I chair the transatlantic dialogue. Our next meeting is here in the United States, first weekend in December in New York. Many of our European Union Parliament members are new because of their elections, so this is the first time they are coming to the transatlantic dialogue. This has been going on for over 35 years.

I am wondering, we usually bring a number of administration officials. Part of the dialogue is very much concentrated on Russia, Iran. I am wondering, Mr. Gordon, because we usually deal with State Department more than Defense, would you be willing to come? And to whom do I speak about this?

Mr. GORDON. In principle, of course I know about the transatlantic dialogue. It is important and we would love to support it. If your staff gets in touch with our office, I am sure we will do all we can to make sure we are properly represented.

Ms. BERKLEY. It would only take 1½ hours of your time, because each segment of the discussion is only about 1½ hours long.

Mr. GORDON. Thank you.

Mr. WEXLER. If you think you are getting away with "properly represented," with Shelley on the march, I doubt it.

Mr. GORDON. I will be on a sports delegation to Moscow that week. But if there is any way to work it in. No, seriously. Thanks. Let's be in touch about it.

Mr. WEXLER. I very much want to thank Dr. Wallander and Dr. Gordon. I hope everyone agrees, I think this was a particularly thorough and illuminating hearing. And your answers and responsiveness I thought were quite uncommon, and I am deeply grateful to both of you.

Mr. DELAHUNT. Mr. Chairman, if I can, I would like to repeat what I said at the beginning, and that is, to offer accolades for the excellent work done to date in terms of moving this relationship along, especially with the President in Moscow.

Mr. WEXLER. I will let that be the last word. The subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X



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SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Subcommittee on Europe
Robert Wexler (D-FL), Chairman

July 21, 2009

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend the following **OPEN** hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe to be held in **Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building**:

DATE: Tuesday, July 28, 2009

TIME: 2:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: The Reset Button Has Been Pushed: Kicking Off a New Era in U.S.-Russian Relations

WITNESSES: The Honorable Philip H. Gordon, Ph.D.
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
United States Department of State

The Honorable Celeste A. Wallander, Ph.D.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
United States Department of Defense

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations please call 202-225-5021 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee as noted above.
